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Abstract 
Following trade liberalisation, shipping has been further affected by the 
world economic environment. Despite arguments as to whether the nature 
of the shipping industry is a liberalised one or not, it is now clearly seen as 
the case by the shipping industry itself. 
The primary goal of this thesis is to examine the attitudes within Korean 
shipping circles. An empirical study was carried out to evaluate how 
shipping is being influenced by liberalisation under the new rules, 
established by the World Trade Organisation and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
The null hypothesis was that there would be no substantial changes in 
Korean Shipping following liberalisation. The null hypothesis was rejected, 
which means that it was recognised by Korean shipping practitioners that 
there were significant changes after liberalisation. A further study was 
undertaken to test for relationships between the perspectives of four groups~ 
financial managers of shipping companies, bankers, government policy 
makers and sales managers from shipbuilding companies. It transpired that 
there was unity in their perceptions of shipping investment. A hypothesised 
seven-factor strategic model of the shipping industry was initially proposed 
and re-interpreted following the empirical results. To cope with the new 
competitive market, strategic options are likely to include tax and registry 
considerations. 
Finally, following the financial crisis in Korea last year, which occurred 
before this research was completed, interviews and a survey were 
conducted, based on a random selection of previous respondents. This was 
to establish whether their views had changed. The results revealed that they 
were now very hesitant to make any new investment decisions given the 
present situation. 
However, respondents are sure that there will be no further measures to 
impede the current liberalisation moves in Korea. Rather they regard this 
financial crisis as a mechanism to accelerate liberalisation, following the 
International Monetary Fund's options to dismantle the Korean protectionist 
barriers. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1.1 The Objective of Research 
This thesis addresses the effects of the WTO agreement to introduce trade 
liberalisation in shipping provisions within Korea and to examine the implications 
of this policy on the decision making and policy formulation of the managers 
involved with ship operations, shipping investment and shipbuilding. The method 
used for this purpose is to apply a statistical approach as a tool for empirical study, 
with samples taken from Korean shipping circles including shipping, banking, 
government and shipbuilding. The intention is to discover whether there was any 
difference between the before and after liberalisation positions taken by the 
managements in the four sectors 
Stopford (1990)[1] defmes the judgment of a decision-maker to be changed by the 
environmental situations, here in terms of supply and demand of the shipping 
market: 
" In principle, supply will follow demand if decision-makers 
are successful in judging what the future level of demand 
will be and taking the necessary actions to adjust the 
available supply. The decision-makers in this case are a 
composite group of shipowners, bankers, government 
officials and shipbuilders, all of whom have some control 
over the movement of supply, though their particular 
interests may be very different. (p.63)" 
Branch (1988)[2] also notes the duty of shipowners to consider newly developed 
situational factors when making an investment decision in shipping, as saying: 
1 
" (as far as shipping investment is concerned), Shipowners 
have to weigh the relative merits of new and second-hand 
tonnage in a wide range of situations. The factors involved 
are considered and the way in which they affect the choices 
that will be made in 1990s. (p.59)" 
Further, the study will reveal to what extent there are any differences between the 
four sectors examined in terms of their beliefs as to the Liberalisation effects on 
their decision making 
The shipping industry in Korea was previously govellled by the policy initiatives of 
the Korean government which sought to promote in particular, the shipping and 
shipbuilding industry as part of the national economic development schemes. 
Although a close relationship exists between these sectors and is emphasised in 
most national shipping environments the integration in Korea was especially close 
before the adoption of the WTO rules. 
Parker (1993 )[3] evaluates the relationship between shipowners and bank as 
follows: 
" As a general rule therefore an owner with too many banks 
or with too few is more likely to be unable to easily resolve 
problems. An owner with a manageable number of banks 
or 'club' may be better placed but only if such banks are on a 
broadly similar relationship footing. . ... It is important to 
comment on the word 'relationship' because it is a qualitative 
abstract notion that will play a significant role in banks' 
attitudes to clients who encounter serious difficulties. 
(p.21)" 
Delamater (1993) [4] also takes the same view as above: 
2 
"Shipowners will be wise to examine the strength and 
quality of their banking relationships, as well as that of the 
banks themselves. (p.ll)" 
Tzoannos and Bredima-Savopoulou (1990) [5] note about shipping and 
shipbuilding: 
" In most EC member states governments look upon 
shipping and shipbuilding as being closely related 
indusny .... In three countries, namely Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, national shipowners are compelled to place their 
orders of new vessels to national shipyards. (p.54)" 
Stopford (1990) [6] mentions the relationship between shipping and shipbuilding as 
follows: 
" Although the regional distribution of shipbuilding capacity 
depends upon competitiveness, there is clearly a close link 
between shipping and shipbuilding activities. (p.54)" 
The thesis will examine the shipping strategies pursued before trade liberalisation 
and attempt some review of the necessary changes consequent upon the perceptions 
gleaned from the survey and will promote a strategy more in line with the likely 
outcomes for the industry post liberalisation. 
Morden (1993) [7] clearly defmes the strategy as below : 
" The establishment of strategies and plans is a management 
decision-making process . . .... The process of business 
planning is used by decision-makers to formulate strategies 
and policies. (p.xix)" 
3 
Davis (1993) 's [8] effort to study the investment bank's view by setting up the 
model under the new environmental changes, was stated as follows : 
". . . . two of the questions posed to the investment 
community by the present regulatory enVlfonments 
confronting the shipping industry. One of these issues 
might be described as ' tactical' - the question of the extent of 
liability for environmental damage, and the second as 
'strategic' - the whole question of the rate of return the 
investment community perceives to be available from 
investment in shipping ..... Taking the OP A as a model, .... 
(p.61)" 
Hochstein (1988)[9] focuses on this matter in relation to port industry as saying: 
" The continuously changing port environment has given rise 
to a new planning concept called strategic planning. 
Strategic planning can be defmed as ' .... matching 
organisational capacities with the opportunities and risks 
created by the environment'. . . . The thrust is to develop a 
strategy that takes ' .... advantage of opportunities and counter 
threats by enhancing a port's strengths and mitigating its 
weaknesses' (p.33)" 
The financial implication for the industry is further analysed in light of the changed 
cicumstances with the benefit of a further selected survey of specialists in this field. 
This view is based on a second survey selected by the writer from the previous 
respondents where they are shown to have specialist knowledge in this field. 
Writers on the Asian fmancial crisis are at present observing the current downturn 
and conjecturing on the likely long term effects. Ion (1998) [10] evaluates the 
situation as follows: 
" A year ago the Asian economies were expecting a year of 
4 
further growth and an aggregate GDP increase of around 
80/0-10%. There were a few clouds on the horizon but the 
sense of optimism which has been the hallmark of the Asian 
region for more than a decade remained intact. The events 
of the last quarter of 1997 proved that much of the economic 
, miracle' in many Asian countries was in fact just a mirage. 
The long terms effects on the shipping industry are still 
difficult to ascertain (p.l)" 
Fossey (1998) [11] makes a comment as below: 
" It is hard to predict what the long-term effects of the recent 
economic turmoil in Asia will have on the container liner 
industry. But several local carriers are already engaged in 
restructuring programmes, which the liner trades tolfrom the 
area are becoming increasingly imbalanced. (p.49)" 
However, Korea Maritime Press (1998) [12] divides the effects that Korean 
shipowners have faced so far as follows : 
" In terms of positive effects, it is expected to improve the 
balance sheet based on freight which is to be charged upon 
the dollar basis, and the seafarer will be more easily 
recruited. On the negative side expected, it is hard to raise 
capital following higher interest rates, market instability due 
to fall of Asian trade volumes in the long run. (p.20) " 
As far as shipbuilding is concerned, Fairplay (1998) [13] comments; 
" Shipbuilding in Korea hit a wall at the end of 1997, and 
owner confidence in the industry virtually disappeared 
overnight. However, slowly but surely, newbuilding 
enquiries are starting to return, as a devalued currency 
enables price-cutting, driven by the national need to export 
its way out of trouble. (p.24)" 
5 
1.2 Null Hypothesis Adopted 
Following the trade liberalisation policies of the WIO/OECD mechanism, the 
shipping industry has been also largely affected by the requirement for a more 
liberal trade environment, although it is already a well known assumption that 
shipping is subject to the open market, (the so called concept of freedom of seas 
principle). However, it has always been an area of protectionism. For those 
involved with national interests and strategic conflicts Korea is a prime example of 
these factors which have in the past played an important part in the protected 
environment of her shipping sector. 
It can be easily understood that to protect one of the vital national industries is to 
recognise its strategic value within the overall national economy and shipping has 
always been included in this category. Protectionism in shipping is a persistent 
theme being practiced in the past and it is still one of the important areas that have 
not been fully resolved through the WTO negotiations. 
Bjerregaard (1994) [14] analyses the matter in this context: 
" After the Second W orId War a lot of developing countries 
continued the unfortunate tradition of protectionism within 
shipping. Protectionism has manifested itself as flag 
preference for own ships, and, for obvious reasons, less 
subsidies. In order to draw a parallel to the economy 
theory, one could say that developing countries based 
themselves on the infant industry concept. At the same time 
the industrialised countries based themselves on the theory 
of comparative advantages, and a reciprocating development 
was experienced within the OECD. " 
6 
As the Rochadale report describes [15], state intervention such as protectionism in 
shipping takes as many fonus as has been broadly indicated. 
': The government's responsibilities towards the industry fall 
mto tw~ categories. The fIrst, .. .is a general responsibility 
concerrung the industIy's commercial interest both at home 
and overseas, and promoting its contribution to the national 
well-being; the second ... is a more detailed regulatory 
function, established by statute, for the safety of ships and 
the welfare of seafarers. " 
However, Frankel (1988)[16] recognises that protection in various forms has been 
the principal policy of many countries for the development of their national fleet, 
reviewing as follows : 
" Protectionism takes many forms and includes : 
1. cargo sharing or reservation for national shipping; 
2. cargo preference schemes for national shipping ; 
3. preferential port facility allocation to national shipping ; and, 
4. preferential exchange rates for national shipping." (p.18) 
Therefore, it is not so difficult to assume that the protectionism has hampered other 
countries' shipping industries, even though they might be benefItting from similar 
policies in their own country. Trade liberalisation can be regarded as an innovation 
to solve these problems, but it increases exposure to competition as it enlarges the 
free market global economy.· Commentators generally agree that there is a need 
for greater competition in shipping regardless of the countries involved. As some 
maritime economists state [17] " however, a strong appeal for further liberalisation 
in shipping comes from both traditional maritime nations and developing countries, 
though the understanding ofliberalisation in shipping remains different (p.13)" 
7 
The advantage of liberalisation using GATT (now WTO) especially in tenns of a 
derived demand for shipping, is evident: 
" The aim of GATT is to liberalise world trade and place it 
on a secure basis. With the reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers achieved in various rounds of negotiations, 
GATT is expected to increase substantially the volume of 
international trade which in tum should increase the demand 
for maritime transport services. (p.12) [18] " 
However, Schrier et al (1985) [19] identifies aspects concemmg the desirable 
degree of liberalisation : 
" A central question regarding the desirable degree of 
liberalisation is to the extent to which the elimination of 
impediments in maritime transport services can produce 
substantial efficiencies and substantially increase the total 
market for maritime services." 
Shipping investment could be influenced by an investor's attitude to liberalisation. 
But, it is not always the case. 
Some commentators are less sanguine as to the benefits of trade liberalisation on 
shipping, and for the matter of implementation, Frankel (1988) [20] states: 
" GATT which continues the Uruguay talks started in 1986 
(and planned to end in 1990) is largely ignored, and GATT 
talks have become largely irrelevant to developments in 
world trade as protectionism again raises its head 
everywhere. (p.12)" 
Ademuni-odeke (1988) [21] also identifies problems areas as below: 
8 
" Although multilateralism in shipping may have its 
advantages it also has its disadvantages as a departure from 
freedom of shipping. Although departure from the 
traditional patterns has evident advantages from the point of 
view of the operation of vessels, its implementation is 
difficult. Basic sources of disagreement are the criteria 
adopted for the distribution of reserved shipments. 
Countries controlling a large volume of trade will still aspire 
to reserve a substantial part for their own carriers. On the 
other hand, members whose foreign trade is insufficient to 
sustain the development of the viable merchant industry will 
favour an integrated multilateral approach, expecting to 
obtain a share in the carriage of trade between their bigger 
partners. (pp.164-165)" 
Chrzanowski (1985) [22] also raises concerns: 
" It is more a slogan than a reality, and it is a model for 
relationships within the shipping industry which can never 
be fully implemented. It is expected that this liberalisation in 
shipping will activate shipping investment, but there are 
those within the protected sector of the industry (cabotage 
operators and in some case closed conference operators who 
still remain skeptical)." 
WSTS (1997) [23] discusses the opening of the Japanese domestic market to 
foreign products and says : 
" Pressure to open up the market isn't really a sufficient 
solution. Success has come through producers' enlightened 
self-interest because they were most worried about severe 
protectionist barriers to trade. (p.I-13)" 
About the matter of weakness, Wergeland (1994) [24] describes: 
" Over the last few years, the tenn 'unfair trade practices' is 
used more and more frequently by nations to justify 
measures against trading partners, and if institutions as 
GATT (now WIO) is losing power, there is a real danger of 
9 
world wide increased protectionism. (p. 11)" 
Frankel (1988) [25] identifies inequities: 
" Similarly there are free trading arrangements among 
unequal trading partners which are not really fair because 
they do not consider large differences in capability. (p.15 )" 
As far as future development is concerned, Bjerregaard (1994) [26] insists on : 
n Preaching a free market policy, it somehow sounds strange 
that the Danish Shipowners' Association has voiced a strong 
opposition to the inclusion of shipping in any future GATT 
round of talks on liberalisation of services. The main 
reasons are the low priority accorded by many countries to 
the interests of maritime trade, and the desire on the part of 
other nations to maintain or introduce protectionist measures. 
GATT has achieved significant results in the area of trade, 
but this does not mean that this will also implicitly apply to 
shipping. As shipping is to a very large extent liberalised 
between the established industralised countries, and as the 
newly industralised nations have come a considerable 
distance along the same road, it is difficult to see the 
advantages that could be gained by including shipping in the 
GA TT round, especially since assurances of special 
considerations have already been given to the developing 
countries (pp.54-55 )" 
Westeneng. Haralambides and Zou (1994) [27] express the view: 
" As the Uruguay Round concluded without adopting an 
agreed position for maritime transport (shipping is loosely 
included within a wider GA TT framework but excluded 
from the specific round settlement), the prospects of the 
industry, with regard to further liberalisation, become 
somewhat vague. p.13 )" 
It can be seen that a conflict of views are still expressed as to the advantages of 
trade liberalisation on shipping. However, the industry will have to live with the 
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treaty obligations implied by the agreements concluded. 
The assumption drawn is based on the null hypothesis that there will be no changes 
of both managers' perceptions and attitudes, and policies from shipping companies, 
banks, government and shipbuilding companies in the matter of investment 
decision-making subsequent to the adoption of the WTO rules. 
1.3 The Structu re of the Thesis 
The thesis is constructed with ten chapters to pursue the four objectives previously 
selected and to examine the research in a logical manner using appropriate social 
scientific methodology. The structure of the thesis follows a deductive method in 
order to test the null hypothesis and accordingly to categorise the four sectors 
results and examine for statistical significance from the data collected in the 
empirical study. The framework of thesis is formulated from the available 
theoretical knowledge in the literature as well as from the imperatives of the field 
survey where the shipping contextual material has been carefully selected by 
reference to a pilot study prior to the general survey. 
Chapter II presents an existing strategic model for shipping, based on shipowners 
attitudes and investment behaviour in the past. It also includes the discussion on 
the choice of a suitable strategic model relating to the factors to be considered in 
shipping investment and financing generally. 
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Chapter III is an examination of the past and present situation in Korean shipping 
and shipbuilding given the changed circumstances and the past and present 
provisions by govenunent and the banking sector with some focus on the possible 
effects of the liberalisation strategy on these policies. 
Chapter IV explains a preparatory procedure for statistical analysis, based on the 
survey process and the choice of sampling procedures including the statistical 
theory underlying it and the means of validating the sample. 
Chapter V is a breakdown of the survey results, revealed in an appendix 2 (2.1). 
Chapter VI then explores and compares the relationships between the four groups 
(of shipping, banking, government and the shipbuilding sector) and gives a 
breakdown of the survey results as shown in an appendix 2 (2.2). 
Chapter VII is the interpretation of the results from statistical analyses chosen for 
the four groups in relation to shipping investment, to verify or not the null 
hypothesis. 
Chapter VIII translates the strategic model given in the earlier chapter II, in terms of 
the fmdings from chapter VII and develops the new strategic model implied by 
these fmdings. 
Chapter IX re-examines management opinions following the present financial crisis 
in Korea, based on the further survey of five respondents randomly chosen by 
12 
researcher. 
Chapter X embodies the conclusion and the possible outcomes identified by the 
research. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review on Shipping Context 
2.1 Factors to be Considered in Shipping Investment 
2.1.1 Regulation in Shipping Investment 
The regulations imposed by national governments will have an impact on 
shipowner's decision-making for shipping investment. Protectionist measures 
towards national fleets such as flag preference, tax benefits and special fmancial 
packages are often employed by national governments. When this is agreed by a 
government's willingness to establish a national fleet, shipping investment would be 
activated, as shown in most developing countries. 
Most governments have historically seen shipping companies as serving national 
needs (bolstering a strong merchant marine for defense purposes and ensuring 
access to foreign markets), in addition to furthering the commercial interests of the 
owners of the shipping lines. Many countries have policies intended to ensure the 
survival of national-flag carriers, including subsidies for shipbuilding, operational 
subsidies to shipowners, tax advantages, and other policies aimed at encouraging 
shippers to support their national flag. These policies have resulted in an industry 
which is not entirely driven by commercial economic forces [1]. 
Between the First and Second World Wars international shipping experienced a new 
setback, as several nations established protectionism to protect their own fleets. 
Strategic considerations were very much in focus, and several nations from Europe, 
as well as Japan, the United States and others furthermore tried to strengthen their 
fleets by subsidising in various ways. In some countries even state-owned 
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companies were established [2]. 
Subsidies to a counny's maritime industries are probably a more common and 
certainly a more significant form of fiscal assistance throughout the world than 
discriminatory taxes on foreign competitors. The very distinguished opinion by 
Ademuni-odeke (1988) [3] on this matter follows : in the economic context a 
subsidy is a payment to individuals or a business by government for which it 
receives no products or services in return. The purpose of such payments is to 
maintain a particular service - in this case a maritime transport service - at a price 
that the public can readily afford but that cannot otherwise be profitably supplied at 
this pllce. The particular service or product should be essential to the public welfare 
and/or national interest. The government would therefore find it necessary to 
subsidise the enterprise in order to keep it operating and producing the service or 
product. 
Financing and protection from competition are given special emphasis by many 
countries when formulating their respective maritime support programs. According 
to Hart et al (1993)[4], subsidies were well classified into several categories of the 
following: 
Of the many classifications of shipping subsidies the most often used one is based 
on the division between direct and indirect subsidies. Direct subsidies may take 
form of: 
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(a) construction subsidies 
(b) postal subsidies or postal/mail contracts, 
(c) operating subsidies 
(d) scrap-and-build subsidies 
(e) admiralty subsidies for special defence equipment 
(f) credit facility 
(g) guarantee of profits, share of loss, etc., 
(h) subsidies of special marine insurance 
(i) lease of ships belonging to the State to private companies, 
(j) sale of ships belonging to the State to private companies. 
Among indirect subsidies one may indicate : 
(a) subsidies to the shipbuilding industry, 
(b) customs reductions, 
(c) tax and depreciation allowances, 
(d) subsidies to immigrant's fares or operators transporting them, 
(e) reduction in port, canal and other charges, 
(f) subsidies for construction and operation of ports and canal 
(g) preferential railway tariffs to/from the country's seaports. 
During the last 20 years there has been a tremendous expansion in the merchant 
fleet owned and operated by interests located within the Asian Pacific Rim. In 
recent years attention has focused on the growth of its container canying services 
but throughout the whole period there has also been substantial growth in the 
numbers of other vessel types operated by regional interests (by both domestic and 
foreign flag holdings), most notably the dry bulk carrier and tanker fleets. 
Undoubtedly a major factor encouraging the penetration of Pacific Rim fleets into 
the world scene was cost advantage. The region is the centre of the world 
shipbuilding industry and close relationships have been built up between local ship 
operators, cargo interests and shipbuilders. More than this has been the large 
differentials in operating costs - particularly crew costs, which (with the exception 
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of Japan) have given local ship operators a significant cost advantage - more so in 
periods of depressed freight levels. 
According to Fossey (1997) [5], on the global level, the world container fleet is a 
crucial modifier of ship-borne capacity, as is the ration of cellular to non-cellular 
capacity ; while a change to routing patterns have caused fundamental changes in 
effective vessel productivity in recent years. 
Regulatory bodies, especially in Europe and the USA, have become increasingly 
vigilant towards the liner shipping industry and have assailed many of the anti-trust 
exemptions previously enjoyed by carriers [6]. 
Table 2.1 Forecast Global Container Activity to 2000 
(Million TEO of container handling operations) 
=============================================== 
Year Loaded Empty* Total Growth (%) 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
69.7 
77.0 
84.5 
92.9 
102.0 
110.8 
120.3 
129.8 
139.3 
149.3 
159.6 
17.7 
18.8 
20.7 
22.4 
24.7 
26.9 
29.1 
31.5 
33.7 
36.2 
38.6 
87.4 
95.8 
105.2 
115.3 
126.7 
137.7 
149.4 
161.3 
173.0 
185.5 
198.2 
6.6 
9.6 
9.9 
9.5 
9.9 
8.8 
8.5 
7.9 
7.3 
7.2 
6.9 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * for 1994-2000 assumes that 19.5% of total moves are empties 
Source : Reference [7] 
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Table 2.2 Forecast Global Container Activity by Region 
(Million TEU of total throughput at regional ports) 
Region 1980 1990 1995 2000 
-----------------------------------------------.-.-----------------------
N.America 
Far East 
W.Europe 
SE Asia 
Oceania 
Mid East 
L.America 
E.Europe 
S.Asia 
Africa 
Total 
N.America 
Far East 
W.Europe 
SE Asia 
Oceania 
Mid East 
L.America 
E.Europe 
S.Asia 
Africa 
9.5 
7.7 
1l.7 
1.9 
1.6 
1.9 
2.3 
0.4 
0.2 
1.5 
38.7 
% of activity 
24.6 
19.8 
30.3 
4.8 
4.2 
5.0 
6.0 
1.0 
0.6 
3.7 
16.7 
23.0 
22.4 
9.6 
2.3 
3.5 
4.8 
0.6 
1.8 
2.7 
87.4 
19.1 
26.3 
25.6 
11.0 
2.7 
4.1 
5.5 
0.7 
2.0 
3.1 
20.8 
39.6 
30.5 
20.6 
3.2 
6.8 
8.0 
0.6 
3.4 
4.2 
137.7 
15.1 
28.7 
22.2 
15.0 
2.3 
5.0 
5.8 
0.4 
2.5 
3.1 
24.1 
60.4 
39.9 
34.9 
3.8 
10.5 
11.7 
1.0 
5.8 
6.2 
198.2 
12.1 
30.5 
20.1 
17.6 
l.9 
5.3 
5.9 
0.5 
2.9 
3.1 
---------------.---------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [8] 
Some regional governments have initially played an active role in encouraging bulk 
fleet build-up in order to meet the increasing demand for bulk imports so that the 
domestic economy derives maximum benefit from the trade which it is generating. 
Latterly these fleets have been active in the cross-trade and have had a crucial 
impact on international shipping operation [9]. 
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Table 2.3 World Seaborne Dry Bulk Trades Development 
1980-2005 (Unit: MT) 
== 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 20002005 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iron are 319.3 322.7 356.0 414.0 401.2 420 425 430 450 
Coal 189.5 275.4 344.3 422.3 435.0 450 465 510 560 
Grains 167.3 157.3 165.6 185.5 184 185 187 195 215 
Agribulks 94.3 97.9 11.8 125.5 124.5 124 125 131 141 
Aluminium raws 49.9 40.0 53.1 50.0 52.0 53 53 53 55 
Ores and minerals 79.9 89.8 98.0 110 .. 6 115.0 118 121 133 145 
Fertilisers 100.2 106.3 111.4 107.2 107.5 108 108 115 120 
Forest products 150 132.0 158.0 163 166.0 170 175 180 200 
Iron and steel 90.1 117.4 116.3 128.0 137.0 138 140 148 160 
Manufactures 65.3 70.8 66.5 78.5 80.0 83 84 91 98 
---------------.-.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total bulks 1,305.8 1,409.6 1,580.0 1,784.6 1,802.2 1,849 1,883 1,986 2,144 
-.-.-----.------------------------------------.---------------.-.-.-.--------------------.-----.-
Note: Historical figures 1980-1996~ Estimated figure 1997~ Forecast figures 1998 
- 2005. 
Source: Reference [10] 
2.1.2 The Shipping Market Function 
The shipping market is one of the important factors when a shipowner makes an 
investment decision. The supply and demand in the shipping market function is 
closely related to freight rates and also influences ship prices which are linked with 
investment decision-making in shipping. Therefore, it is worthwhile to review this 
matter in order to understand relationships with shipping investment. 
The shipping industry has been always dependent on two factors, supply and 
demand like other industries. Supply implies tonnage and demand implies the trade 
volumes of shippers, whose relationship produces the tariff rate [11]. A change in 
the balance of supply and demand affects the level of freight rates. When there is 
a shortage of transport capacity, freight rates rise and the older and less efficient 
ships become profitable to operate and are progressively brought back into service 
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until the whole of the physically operational fleet is at sea [12]. 
There is, however, a danger that supply and demand is mismatched because of over-
investment in the modernisation structures which have significantly enhanced the 
productivity of the shipping sector ahead of the volume of transportable goods [13]. 
Traditionally, this equilibrium has occasionally resulted in a low rate following the 
overcapacity, especially in the three major routes, Far EastINorth America route, 
Far East/Europe-Mediterranean route, and N011h AmericaJEurope-Mediterranean 
route [14]. 
But the fight for market share has forced rates down in some instances to levels 
which defy the laws of supply and demand. This has been further complicated by 
the fact that in many instances lines are competing for door-to-door shipments, and 
the inland segments have been used as part of the rate bargaining, with a result that 
they are often priced with little regard to actual costs [15]. 
Over the last decade, rates in the ocean liner industty have fluctuated considerably. 
One of the most important factors contributing to rate fluctuations has been trade 
imbalances. These imbalances tend to increase rates in one direction of a trade, 
while depressing rates in the opposite direction. As trade becomes more balanced, 
the rate levels often reverse themselves; rates increase in the weak leg and fall in 
the stronger one [16]. 
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The development of freight rates on individual trade routes is only partially 
detennined by global supply and demand influences, with trade specific factors 
being far more important [17]. 
In the case of demand, the sheer pace of increase in flows of containerised traffic 
has had far-reaching implications for the port and shipping sectors. In the 
established markets investment has accelerated to accommodate these increases 
[18]. 
This sharp increase in demand as the economic consequences of the unification of 
the national EEe economies under the tenns of the 1992 agreement will have far-
reaching effects on the level of required investment in the port/terminal and 
shipping sectors of the industry [19]. 
At the same time, Stokes (1993) [20] said that most shipping slumps have been 
caused by excessive supply rather than a contraction in demand .. 
Containerisation is by its by nature a costly business, but as competition becomes 
ever more intense, so does the need to pull costs down to win an edge, no matter 
how marginal, over rivals. In this sense, tonnaging policy is one of the main areas. 
Gardiner (1994)[21] discusses on this matter that investment in new deep-sea 
containerships has actually been little dented by the economic climate, certainly less 
than one might expect. This is due to a number of factors as firstly, many lines 
had been holding off while new-building prices have been high, and are starting to 
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order in greater quantity now that prices have dropped somewhat. Secondly, the 
operating costs of the efficient ships, especially if good utilisation can be achieved, 
are much lower fuel-efficient, with low manning requirements, a new 4,000 TEU 
ship can be operated as cheaply as an older ship of half the size - slicing unit costs 
in half. The long-term benefits of using new tonnage are obvious. A third 
element is that many of the newbuilding orders which have taken place in recent 
years are not for owner-operators at all, but for tramp owners, ordered on the back 
of long-term charter deals with the new operators. 
The supply side of the bulk shipping market is driven by the balance of scrapping 
and new-building. Since these activities play such an important part in the 
fortunes of the shipping market, it is worth taking a look at the broad trends in these 
two key areas [22]. 
An important factor in determining dl)' bulk carrier profitability is the size of the 
bulk carrier fleet. The future fleet will also be reflected in the existing new-
building orderbook, which extends as far as 1997, although there is clearly 
uncertainty about new-building deliveries beyond this date. There is uncertainty, too, 
over future scrapping levels and the rate at which older tonnage will be removed 
from the fleet [23]. 
Future bulk carrier employment and the demand for bulk shipping is largely a 
function of three key factors - fust, the quantities of dl)' bulk cargo being 
transported by sea, both internationally and in coastal trade ; second, the 
geographical pattern of bulk cargo traffic and the effects of this on the average 
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distances over which shipments are made and third, the perfonnance of the bulk 
carrier fleet, the fleet's overall productivity being influenced, among other things, by 
DWT utilisation and average load factors, operating speeds, the frequency of 
ballasting, port tum-around times, delays and congestion, the incidence of 
scheduled and unsheduled repairs, etc. [24]. 
Crucial to any assessment of a shipping investment is an understanding of the 
factors which determine ship prices, either fundamentally or during the negotiating 
process. The principal influences on price are the current supply/demand balance 
and the market's expectation of change [25]. A new trend is that shipowners order 
vessels based not on market pricing but some value-added factors such as 
teclmology, time to order, delivery dates, etc. 
The most fundamental pnce influence is the perception of the current and 
prospective supply/demand imbalance. This saicL it is rare to fmd agreement on 
how this can be measured. In truth, any quantification is tenuous because the 
shipping industry is dynamic and automatically adjusts to changes in the underlying 
fundamentals through movements in freight rates [26]. 
Since 1990, the fundamental problems of recession in the industrialised world, 
tonnage oversupply and a dip in freight rates have combined to subdue both the 
new-building market and the level of sales for further trading. The price paid for 
secondhand tonnage in the 1990s is likely to be strongly influenced by (a) the state 
of the freight market and (b) the level of new-building prices (though the 
26 
relationship between these elements is by no means fixed) [27]. 
The most fundamental influence on the new-building price of a vessel will be the 
demand for that type of vessel at the time of ordering. This, invariably, will be 
linked to the freight market. Traditionally, the cyclical "boom-bust" nature of bulk 
shipping has mirrored the global economy, with freight rates rising when GDP 
growth rates pick up and falling when they slow down. During "boom" periods, 
when freight rates have risen, new-building orders have also risen, fueling new-
building prices. Such a pattern was clearly evident in the early 1990s. In 
between these peaks, freight rates have generally been eroded by a combination of 
over-tonnaging, the result of high ordering levels during the boom periods, and 
weak demand for seaborne goods' movements [28]. 
Uremovich (1992) [29] discusses that in recent years we have seen, in many 
industries, the effective shifting of economic leverage from the supplier/carrier to 
the customer. This shift of leverage has been particularly acute in the 
transportation business. The major factors at work are seen as below: 
_ DeregulationJpartial deregulation -loss of supply side controls 
_ New 'quality management' techniques focus on the customers 
- Excess capacity in every mode - air, water, truck, rail 
_ Requirements for change from the customer's view; new logistics 
patterns/demands; use of logistics as a competitive weapon. (p.19) 
However in recent times the quality of the service providers has been an additional 
factor to the purely supply and demand considerations, consequently, this new 
dimension to the basic supply & demand of" value-added" has caused adjustments 
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to be made to rates which had prevailed during the 19705 and 1980s [30]. 
Having taken account of the relative historical importance of freight costs to 
delivered price and changes in freight rate levels, some consideration needs to be 
made in respect of the changing health of the ship operating community. This may 
also have implications beyond absolute freight rate levels, since for many operators 
the concern over freight is not purely with cost - quality and reliability of shipping 
service is also a crucial factor [3 1]. 
In order for any company to survive in any industry today a customer service focus 
can no longer be viewed as a 'concept'. It has become an absolute necessity and 
critical element of success for all of us [32]. 
Service is an important element of the liner shipping industry. In choosing a 
carrier to transport cargo, a shipper is concerned not just with the price, but also 
with the speed and predictability with which his product will be delivered, the 
choice of scheduled sailings by the carrier, the reliability of the carrier, and the 
adequacy of capacity of the carrier's vessels [33]. 
Carriers have also played an expanded role in distribution. The quality of ocean 
transportation today is such that millions of dollars of distribution costs have been 
eliminated from the system [34]. 
The only real beneficiaries continue to be the carrier's customers, who frequently 
fmd they are pushing on an open door when it comes to negotiating a rate decrease. 
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However, over the long term, it is much in the interests of shippers as carriers to see 
that the latter make a decent return on their investment [35]. 
2.1.3 Shipping Cycles and Forecasting 
The shipping industry, through its long history, has been a cyclical one. It seems to 
be a fact of life that the freight rates and ship prices tend to fluctuate over the 
months and years in something like a cyclical manner, popularly known as the 
shipping cycle. Furthermore, in the past, following the Drewry (1993) [36] report, 
the various sectors of the shipping industry have each tended to display a cyclical 
pattelTI of new-building, which has exacerbated the problems associated with 
investment decision-making. 
Shipping has long been perceived as - and is - one of the most cyclical industries for 
investors to come to terms with. Asset values are, with slight exceptions, driven 
by speculation on the rise (and fall) in freight market earnings. This means, 
however, that, given the ability to correctly assess the market sentiment towards 
specific sectors of the shipping industry, it has been proved, over and over again, 
that returns from investing in the industry can be extraordinarily high [37]. 
The "feast and famine" nature of shipbuilding which characterised the 1970's and 
1980's has given way to a more orderly cyclical pattern. Replacement of tankers 
and bulk carriers now operates through market cycles ; periods of high freight rates 
trigger many orders, periods of low freight rates trigger higher scrapping. 
Fortunately for the shipbuilders, the market cycles for tankers and bulk carriers have 
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been asymmetric. When one market is up, another is down and vice versa : 
ordering booms for different ship types have followed one after another giving a 
reasonably stable workload [38]. 
As the prospects of a market upturn become more evident, shipowners will be 
considering orders for new tonnage as owners, therefore, begin to think about 
obtaining [mance for new-building [39]. 
Hampton (1988) [40] discusses two shipping cycles, short and long. He defmes that 
the idealised short cycle is typically 3 to 4 years in length and typically follows the 
economic trade cycles by a few months. The idealised long cycle lasts for a duration 
of 20 years and consists of the build-up and correction phases. The 8-12 year 
build-up phase consists of three short cycles with each peak rising to a higher level, 
and the 8-12 year correction phase is a period when the excesses of the long cycle 
build-up phase are worked off. 
The working of the longer-term adjustment mechanism in shipping is seriously 
hampered by the problem of imperfect knowledge about future market development. 
Shipowners regularly order vessels at the top of market, only to find that when they 
are developed freight rates have collapsed [41]. 
Stopford (1991) [42] said that the most important feature of the shipping market 
cycle is far too unpredictable to provide bankers, or anyone else for that matter, 
with much guidance on the future earnings or collateral value of the vessels they 
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[mance. He recognised that its weakness as a forecasting tool becomes only too 
apparent when the pattern of past cycles are examined in detail. 
As far as bulk shipping is concerned, it is an industry which is prone to cyclical 
development and to prolonged periods of relatively poor-paying freight rates. The 
foundation for any bulk carrier market forecast must be an estimate of the future 
volume of bulk trade. It is necessary to know what categories of dry cargo may be 
carried by ships of this type, now and in future years, the quantities of each of 
which will be shipped by sea, and the geographical pattern of shipments, as this will 
detennine the distance the cargo is shipped (and, in tum, ship demand) [43]. 
Hampton (1988) [44] argues that shipping investment requires a medium to long 
term forecast because of the limited liquidity of ships and the life of a ship is 
nonnally at least 20 years. For long term forecasts, particularly in the volatile 
shipping market, the cyclical model tends to work better because it is more dynamic 
and takes into account a longer period of history. However, Stopford (1997) [45] 
has a different and reasonable idea of prediction in shipping. He emphasises that the 
shipping market is so complex that there is little chance of making accurate 
predictions more than a short time ahead. What really matters is not predicting the 
future, but reading the signs that the market is turning before others and taking the 
appropriate action. 
2.1.4 Risk Element and Decision-making in Shipping 
Few industries have been as exposed to uncertainty as shipping. Being highly 
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international, both commercially and politically, shipping is a business which 
instantly is influenced by political and economic tunnoil, wars and natural disasters 
[46], even though shipping is freeing itself from the worst influences of major 
world markets, such as oil, money and the worst excesses of government [47]. 
The shipping industry is a highly risky business, full of physical dangers [48] and as 
with all business, shipping decisions involve risk. 
The importance of risk as a major influencing factor in investment decision -making 
is widely recognised [49]. Cullinane (1991) [50] observes, however, that this 
usually extends solely to the major capital investment decisions. 
The shipowner accepts a risk which others are unwilling or unable to accept simply 
because the value of the ship and the economics of running of the ship involves 
huge sums of money which have to be invested over a long period of time where the 
market horizon is uncertain. As Gray (1986) [51] states, taking such risks is the 
shipowner's business, and they are risks which he or she cannot avoid. In return for 
accepting these risks the shipowner can expect to make a reasonable profit. 
The decision of whether or not to invest in a particular venture is of fundamental 
importance to the success of a shipping enterprise. The capital requirements are 
however enormous and very few shipping companies are fmancially capable of 
making the investment decisions necessary or persuading banks and institutional 
investors to support them. Thus the ability to match the capital investments of a 
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service industry to the demands of its customers has been almost impossible as both 
sides of the equation have taken shorter and shorter term decisions. 
Stopford (1997) [52] has pointed out the reason why these decisions are so crucial. 
These decisions are crucial because the shipping market is highly volatile, 
comprising a succession of alternating peaks and troughs. 
For the vast majority, ship ownership is a high-risk business. Few owners can 
avoid completely the perils of the freight market and consequently their investment 
has to be set in the context of the peaks and troughs and through mechanisms of 
changing supply and demand balances, market expectations, and availability of 
fmances etc.[53]. 
When an executive chooses between a set of investment projects he takes into 
account his own attitude towards risk, together with other critical evaluation factors, 
as Frankel (1989) [54] also points out and the Drewry Report (1987) [55] also 
comments that the choice of project is detennined by a potential investor's attitude 
to fmancial risk. However, attitudes towards risk and the cyclical vagaries of 
shipping investments have become less tolerant, as container lines have changed 
from simply ship-owning companies into global, multi-modal transport operations 
[56]. 
Following Andreassen (1990) [57] studies investment behaviour of non-liner 
shipping fmus, and focuses on risk matters. He notes that the individual firm's or 
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decision maker's attitude towards risk is an integral part of the model. Two risk 
groups are classified: the risk averters and the risk lovers. The risk averters will 
tend to adjust their transportation capacity towards expected demand regardless of 
market fluctuations. The risk lover will normally attempt to adapt his or her 
capacity such that he or she is better able to cover peak demand. In an internally 
organised market it is easier to be risk loving where some of the variables are 
certain, thanks to protection and regulation. In a market where the boundaries are 
unlimited by deregulation the risk lover may be less willing to take these risks 
which are uncertain or in some cases unknown. 
Furthermore, risk attitudes can change, and vary through indusny volatility and 
environmental uncertainty as Jaucl and Glueck (1988) [58] described. In vel)' 
volatile industries, executives must be capable of absorbing a greater amount of 
risk; othelWise, they cannot function. Accordingly, the division of risk must be 
structured to reflect the volatility of the returns (It is desirable to have a safe level of 
first mortgage bank debt, with further investor involvement in the form of co-
investment with the shipowner). In this regard, Thomas (1994) [59] has claimed 
that properly stIuctured debt, such as subordinate fmance can achieve meaningful 
returns for the investors and, at the same time, enhance the profits of the shipowner 
and partner. 
According to Gray (1986) [60], successful risk management comes in three parts : 
fIrst, taking normal limited risks which are covered by existing capital ; second, 
taking a small uncovered risk to maximise opportunity profits ; third, taking any 
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other risk which can be offset or hedged. It is worthwhile to remember the words of 
Jaud and Glueck (1988) [61] that the investment-risk mix is related to strategic 
choice and so, of course, if expansion is the desired strategy, greater risks are 
acceptable. Finally, a meaningful comment is given by Richard (1994) [62] that 
the investment world is increasingly global, and sophisticated investors are 
increasingly evaluating opportunities on a comparative basis. However, owners 
will be under pressure to provide more and better infonnation to meet the standards 
of management prevalent in other industries with which shipping will compete for 
credit. 
At the same time, Stopford (1997) [63] also refers to the timing aspects of decision-
making, and discusses that success depends upon a small number of crucial 
decisions about when (or the right time) to buy and sell ships, and whether to tie 
them up in long-term commitments such as time charters, or to keep them available 
for spot trading. 
The timing of asset acquisition as a shipping investment can be of paramount 
importance especially since vessels are the most costly investment for a container 
shipping company [64]. The timing of a new vessel order is indicative of a more 
entrepreneurial approach to asset management amongst the carrier community. Up 
to 1990 containership ordering activity rose when prices rose and fell, indicating 
that caniers were essentially reacting to upturns in the world trade cycle [65]. 
2.1.5 Capital Raising 
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Demand for ship finance is derived from orders for new-building tonnage and the 
Sale & Purchase market. The requirement for new tonnage, and the ability of 
shipowners to afford to place orders for new vessels, depends on a complex 
equation involving the expected level of shipping demand and prevailing freight 
rates, as well as the availability of finance. For one reason or another, shipowners 
have not always, in spite of a sound fmancial basis, had the liquidity to fmance the 
purchase of new tonnage. Ship mortgage banks have been developed to lend money 
for this purpose and this still remains the most common way of raising capital 
today. 
With operating income restricted and to a large extent unpredictable, companies 
have been less able to use their own reserves when it comes to major investment 
projects, so they have been forced to find cash elsewhere. There are several 
options (excluding the obvious long-term solution of cost-cutting programmes). 
These include the more familiar forms, such as the recourse to parent company 
funds where applicable - although in times such as these, the rationale for 
investment has to be pretty convincing - or seeking outside loans [66]. 
As a matter of fact, investment in shipping requires large amounts of financing and 
moreover, Stokes (1994) [67] especially emphasises the need for long-term capital 
for shipping which has in practice a much shorter-term horizon. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs tum to banks for help in carrying out their plans for expansion in 
boom periods. 
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Conversely, there is a case that a banker would encourage the shipowner to invest 
during a boom period. The idea was followed by Davies (1994) [68] that while the 
shipping market continued to rise, and the companies, which invested at the 
beginning of the cycle, reported encouraging earnings and massive (though largely 
unrealised) capital appreciation, the structure was perceived to be very successful. 
Consequently the impetus for the establishment of such start-up shipping ventures 
began to come, not from the shipowners or managers themselves, but from 
investment bankers urging shipowners to 'use a fund' as a vehicle for 'going public' 
by the back door without having to offer their businesses to the public at a discount 
to net asset value. 
However, according to LSE (1996) [69], shipowners can also raise money by 
forming joint ventures with each other. The joint venture agreement will almost 
certainly state, mainly for tax purposes, that the agreement between the parties does 
not constitute a partnership. From a legal perspective, it is probably a form of 
partnership, which is in itself another form of an equity investment vehicle. In 
the meantime, joint ventures are formed to recover operational difficulties 
especially where the management skills of one partner are used to supplement those 
of the other. Ward (1993) [70] indicates that the difficult liner market and the 
capital-heavy door-to-door concept have made it more pertinent to co-operate 
within the framework of conferences or in close commercial joint ventures in order 
to rationalise investment and services. 
2.2 Suitable Strategic Model 
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Strategy becomes a fundamental framework through which an organisation can 
assert its vital continuity, while at the same time purposefully managing its 
adaptation to the changing environment to gain competitive advantage [71]. 
A global industry such as shipping, is one that comprises fmns whose competitive 
positions in major geographic or national markets are fundamentally affected by 
their overall global competitive positions. To avoid strategic disadvantage, fInns 
in global industries are virtually required to compete on a worldwide basis. Global 
industries have four unique strategy-shaping features [72] : 
- differences in prices and costs from country to country due to currency 
exchange, fluctuations, differences in wage and inflation rates, and other 
economic factors. 
- differences in buyer needs across different countries. 
- differences in competitors and ways of competing from country to country. 
- differences in trade rules and governmental regulations across different 
countries. (p.280) 
According to Hax (1994) [73], strategy could be defIned as a rendition of the CEO's 
personal mission statement, rationalised by the corporate planner, and brought into 
being by the executive committee and chief stockholders. There are six dimensions 
of strategy that can be described as the following: 
- strategy as a coherent, unifying, and integrative pattern of decisions . 
_ strategy as a means of establishing an organisation's purpose in tenus of Its 
long-term objectives 
- strategy as a defmition of a fInn's competitive domain 
_ strategy as response to external opportunities and threats and to internal 
strengths and weaknesses as a means of achieving competitive advantage 
_ strategy as a logical system for differentiating managerial tasks at 
corporate, business, and functional levels . ' . 
_ strategy as a defmition of the economic and noneconormc contrIbutIon the 
finn intends to make to its shareholders. (pp.9-11) 
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One must be creative and quick to recognise new opportunities [74]. Here, there 
are some basic lessons from economic theory and the experiences of successful 
frrms. The basic lessons are [75]: 
(i) ~ves~ in proje.cts that take advantage of your competitive edge. The corollaI)' 
IS, sock to domg one or two things and doing them well ;don't get involved 
in business you are unfamiliar with. 
(ii) Invest in developing, maintaining, and enhancing your competitive 
advantages. 
(iii) Develop a global scanning capability. Don't be blindsided by new 
competitors or lower-cost production techniques or locations. 
(iv) Pick market niches where there is little competition. Be prepared to 
abandon markets where competitors are catching up and apply your 
competitive advantages to new products or markets. 
Shaw (1993) [76] says that before finalising a corporate strategy, management must 
consider how it will affect shareholder wealth. Any new investment or planned 
growth which fails to meet this objective should be rejected. It is believed that 
management should ask themselves the following questions before embarking upon 
any new corporate strategy. These are : 
(i) How would alternative strategies affect shareholder value creation? 
(ii) Which strategy is likely to create the most value? 
(iii) For the selected strategy, how sensitive is value to internal and external 
business factors not contemplated in the "most likely" scenario? 
As far as the shipping is concerned, some valid strategic options could be applied to 
the real shipping world. Following the opening of the domestic market, it is actually 
useless to divide the national market in a broad sense, which means that every 
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shipping route can be employed by any of the shipping flrms. Therefore, many 
options can be available and require an active strategic approach as long as they can 
afford it. 
2.2.1 Strategy in the Competitive Shipping Market 
The shipping industry, like any other segment of international business, will have to 
adapt to a new and changing world. Profound changes are emerging in the pattern 
of global economic development and trade, with important consequences for the 
shipping indusny [77]. 
Porter (1998) [78] introduces his three genenc strategies - lowest cost:> 
differentiation, and focus which bring structure to the task of strategic positioning. 
He shows how competitive advantage can be defmed in terms of relative cost and 
relative prices, thus linking it directly to profitability, and presents a whole new 
perspective on how proflt is created and divided. The ideas address the underlying 
fundamentals of competition in a way that is independent of the speciflcs of the 
ways companies go about competing. 
The shipping flrm basically has two strategic options in its quest for comparative 
advantage : it can seek lower costs than its competitors or it can differentiate its 
product in a number of ways, including high advertising expenditures, product 
innovation, high product quality meaning a flrst-rate service. Each of these options 
involves a number specific investment decisions [79]. The more an investment 
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widens a fInn's competitive advantage and reduces the chances of successful 
replication by competitors [80], the greater the likelihood that investment will be 
successful. 
The profIle of today's container shipping industry has been shaped to a considerable 
degree by the strategic decisions taken by individual liner companies on a series of 
fundamental operational and commercial issues. The container market is thus a 
dynamic organism characterised by the continuous struggle between competing 
corporate strategies, each intended to secure a commercial advantage. However, the 
financial performance of the container shipping industry has deteriorated in recent 
years to such an extent that many of the world's largest carriers have undergone 
massive philosophical and organisational restructuring in an attempt to erase the red 
ink from their profit and loss accounts [81]. 
Many commentators/pundits and authors of liner company annual reports point 
primarily to an ongoing erosion of rates driven by a combination of slow market 
growth and chronic overcapacity as the reasons for poor performance [82]. 
In the present environment the Korean industry is a year away from completing the 
present investment programme, or to some, over-investment cycle [83][84][85]. By 
the second quarter of 1998 carriers had received most of the ships on order and 
upgraded and expanded key terminals. What the industry does not possess is 
profItability. Further, the industry will lack the ability to raise rates in the market-
place - a condition which could last several years and could worsen. Serious cost 
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reductions may be the only avenue for survival. 
In short, the competitive battleground has moved firmly and inexorably to the cost 
side. In all areas of industry, competition is forcing organisations into cost-cutting 
measures such as automation, outsourcing and buying from the cheapest suppliers. 
Simultaneously, organisations are having to expand their international markets, 
thereby increasing their transportation needs [86]. 
Accordingly, the present competition in the shipping market is severe and the 
strategies that shipping companies have to adopt have become diverse. Therefore, 
the existing concepts for looking at the shipping industry require change, otherwise 
shipping companies will fail to survive if they do not adapt to the changing 
circumstances especially those now appearing in the Korean economy. 
2.2.2 Defining a Strategic Model for Korean Shipping 
The following list of attributes have to be considered in accordance with subjects 
addressed in a subsequent questionnaire : 
(i) The Korean shipping industry is a regulated industry of government. 
(ii) Shipping investment is largely influenced by the demand side of the 
shipping market. 
(iii) The shipping cycle belongs to the category of the medium stage of cycles. 
(iv) Shipping Finance in Korea is controlled by government directly. 
(v) Attitudes of the shipping investor in Korea are passive. 
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(vi) Shipbuilding is integrated with shipping in Korea. 
(vii) The reason for strategic alliances is for the expansion of services. 
(viii) Partnerships are likely to be with other Asian shipping companies. 
These subjects will now be reconsidered. 
(i) The Korean shipping industry is a regulated industry of its own government. 
The shipping industry in Korea, as one of the developing countries, but now a 
developed OEeD country, is an important Korean nurtured industry and is obliged 
to follow various regulatory policies imposed and implemented by Korean 
government. This is involved with duality of policy by the Korean government 
that subsidises and protects the shipping industry as an infant industry, although, on 
the other hand, it controls (regulates) the shipping industry. 
(ii) Shipping investment is largely influenced by the demand side of the shipping 
market. 
The market mechanism ill modem society IS mainstreamed by a demand 
(consumption) economy. This is the modern market principle in contrast to the 
supply (production) economy in the past. Accordingly, it can be said that a 
derived demand for shipping in the industry is a starting point to create shipping 
investment. 
(iii) The shipping cycle belongs to the category of the medium stage of cycles . 
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There is general opinion that the shipping cycle belongs to a medium stage ('5-10 
years' for the shipping cycle, 'between 10-15 years' for ROI, and 'between 15-20 
years' for depreciation). The reason for this length of period is that the shipping 
cycle is based upon the general economic cycle, and ROJ and depreciation is upon 
ship's age that is generally assumed to be 'between 15-20 years'. 
(iv) Shipping Finance in Korea is controlled directly by the government. 
Korean shipping industry, and especially shipping finance, is strongly influenced by 
government policy. This is related to a policy implementation of Korean 
government which has the perception that the shipping industry is a source of dollar 
earnings and the shipbuilding industry is exporting manufacturing industry. Korea 
as one of the past developing countries has facilitated shipping earnings and 
provided fmance as a means of protecting the industry and, by creating a barrier to 
entry to Korean shipping financial markets by foreign financiers, further protected 
the industry from foreign competition. This has been in fact a regulating mechanism 
over both the shipping and shipbuilding industries in the past. 
(v) Attitude of shipping investors in Korea is passive. 
To date, shipping investors in Korea have been sheltered under the umbrella of 
government policies with regard to access to funds, therefore they tended to avoid 
active investment strategies outside those permitted by government policy. That is 
why they have in the past avoided the risk of bankruptcy when making bad 
decisions since they are merely following Government directives and hence can get 
assistance from the state when decisions go badly wrong. Therefore, attitude toward 
investment is passive which means there is strong tendency to be risk-averse. 
(vi) Shipbuilding is integrated with shipping in Korea. 
The choice of shipyard for the new-building of shipping is critical since the price of 
the ship cannot be ascertained through competitive bidding amongst foreign yards. 
The shipowner has been obliged to order ships from Korean yards by the 
compulsory policy measures of the Korean government. This is also precondition 
for shipping finance availability to a Korea shipping company. Furthennore many 
of the shipping companies are part of the Chaebol system which was in itself a 
government inspired method of ensuring local construction. 
(vii) The reason for strategic alliances is the expansion of service. 
The current shipping market has practiced strategic alliances as way of covering 
their own weaknesses with a partner's strength. This is one of the alternative 
methods to survive competition and to provide a wider range of service within the 
global shipping market. 
(viii) Partnership is likely to be with other Asian shipping companies. 
Generally speaking, more competitive business activities for service expansion can 
be achieved by making a strategic partnership with a shipping company of a counoy 
closely located geographically with nearly the same trade route for inbound and 
outbound cargo. A common business culture is more likely to prevail and the 
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partners will have a similar experience of their local market. Accordingly, it can be 
considered that an Asian shipping company is the best partner for an alliance in 
shipping. 
2.3 Financing Techniques Accessed 
There will also need to be a reappraisal of shipping as an industry. Shipping today 
is still vel)' much the pursuit of private individuals. Very few companies are listed 
on the world's stock exchanges and yet there are in excess of 25,000 owners. This 
has created an industry with too little equity and an excessive amount of bank debt. 
2.3.1 Finance for Ships 
The bottom line of any ship finance deal is that a bank, or some other lender, 
advances money to a ship owner to assist the owner to build a new ship ; buy a 
second-hand ship; convert, repair or alter a ship ; or refinance existing indebtedness 
secured on a ship. The lender must be secured and looks for his or her main, though 
by no means only, security to the ship itself. At the same time, fmancial terms and 
conditions change - especially in a cyclical industry such as shipping -and banks 
and owners become ever more sophisticated. Different types of vessels require 
lenders to take into account different considerations. But ultimately, the starting 
point is the same. The bank lends and the borrower secures the repayment of the 
loan by mortgaging his ship to the banle Invariably there will be other security. 
Graham (1991)[87] indicates that refinancing is largely the result of competition 
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between lenders - owners will generally approach more than one lender to fmance a 
new acquisition. It is not uncommon for owners to switch lenders during the life 
of a facility when a different lender is able to offer better tenns. Most lending 
secured on second-hand ships is by way of a tenn loan. In other words, the lender 
will lend to the shipowner a fixed amount repayable over an asset period. In its 
simple form, the loan will be available to the borrower in one drawing only and will 
be repayable in equal instalments over the duration of the tenn, most likely every 
six months. 
Higher freight rates add to the recovery in liquidity levels. Different financial and 
investment decisions are made, to lower leverage, to build fleets with new tonnage 
or to build new fleets through second-hand acquisition. 
In recent years, increasing importance has been attached to the financial side of an 
investment decision in a new-building project and, in many cases it is, the decisive 
factor in the shipowner's choice of a shipbuilder. If a shipowner desiring to fmance 
a new-building should be unable to fund the difference between the government 
guarantee and the total cost of the vessel, additional funds may be gained by 
offering other assets as security for a loan. 
When dealing with the fmancing of ship construction, as opposed to the fmancing 
of second-hand vessels, it is important to take into account not only commercial and 
fmancial considerations, but also political factors [88]. This point has been 
highlighted by Brooks (1990) [89] that such new-building promotion activity is not 
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only common in developed countries, but also in less developed countries too. 
Korea has been able to take business away from the established yards of Europe and 
Japan in spite of such programs. 
In the meantime, necessaty fleet renewal has to be carried out in an orderly and 
controlled manner [90]. The capital is there for shipping, but at present it will not 
become available in sufficient amounts unless freight rates improve considerably 
and/or legislation is introduced to encourage new investments. As Paine 
(1989)[91] says, given the labour intensive nature of ship construction, and the 
political sensitivity of ship exports, it also comes as no great surprise that the 
fmancing of new construction is heavily dominated by official export credit 
agencIes. 
However, the Drewry (1993) [92] report points out that there are really only four 
reasons why a company or individual will look to acquire a vessel or vessels on the 
second -hand market (p.34): 
- in order to gain direct access to tonnage to meet a requirement to 
move cargo 
- in order to be able to hire out the vessel on the chal1er market, and 
thereby to make a return on the investment 
- as an asset management, in the hope of being able to resell the vessel at 
some future time for a larger sum 
- to take advantage of tax benefits 
Furthennore, banks, other lenders, shipyards and certain government departments 
also sometimes become owners, if loans fail or guarantees have to be taken up, but 
these are owners only by default and play no active part in the S & P (Sale & 
Purchase) market. 
The lack of effective fmancing arrangements for the acquisition of tonnage to be 
scrapped is equally disconcerting. Peters (1994) [93] showed a vel)' pessimistic 
view of shipbreaking fmancing and said that there is a little hope for major 
improvements in ship breaking capacities and output. The fact that the governments 
of these countries have shown little inclination to provide the funds for required 
investments in breaking facilities, not to mention foreign exchange needed to 
acquired tonnage to be scrapped, aggravates the situation. 
2.3.2 Source of Finance 
Irrespective of conditions in the finance sector there will still be a need for capital 
investment in the shipping industry. Even assuming minimal growth in demand 
for bulk tonnage, the age profile of the fleet, alone, guarantees the need for 
substantial replacement tonnage in the form of new-buildings in the coming decade 
[94]. 
A shipping company wishing to expand its fleet can consider a number of 
alternative sources of fmance. The method which is the most appropriate will 
depend upon the type of company, its existing capital structure, the availability of 
the different types of fmance, and the present and projected profitability of the 
company. Brooks (1990) [95] classifies source funds for ship finance into four 
areas. There are government financing, commercial debt markets, equity markets, 
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leasing and joint ventures. 
2.3.2.1 Government Financing 
New-building has traditionally been fmanced through a mixture of private and 
government funding. Government assistance has been provided through the 
medium of shipbuilding credits, either in the form of help to the yard which then 
offers benefits to the purchaser, or directly to the purchaser in the fonn of a 
favourable loan [96]. 
Brooks (1990) [97] also indicates that many countries wishing to counter the loss of 
heavy industIy employment opportunities have supported failing labour-intensive 
shipbuilding industries with construction subsidies and easy credit tenns. This 
type of behaviour effectively subsidises the interest rate on loans. 
Since the mid nineteen sixties the position of a shipping company wishing to 
expand has been made very much easier by the availability of cheap credit provided 
by governments wishing to sustain their shipbuilding industries. This idea has 
been also followed by Stokes (1992) [98]. The very existence of generous 
subsidised credit arrangements for new-buildings tended to undennine the shipping 
industry's equity base by making it too easy for under-capitalised owners to contract 
new tonnage. 
The most popular type of govelnment assistance is the provision of a long-term loan, 
at a fixed rate of interest. Often these loans are arranged through state-controlled 
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banks, which lend at a subsidised rate and receive the balance on market rates from 
the government. 
Apart from the provision of loan funds at below-market interest rates, governments 
sometimes undertake to guarantee private loans by shipowners contracting at its 
national yards. This benefits the shipowners when approaching an independent 
fmancial institution as the risk of default has effectively been transferred from the 
owner to the govelnment, thereby reducing the risk premium segment of the interest 
charged on the loan. 
Lastly, tax incentives schemes are also available in some countries in the form of 
tax write-offs, tax free reserves, and tax deferrals. Depreciation provides a tax 
shield by reducing taxable income. Accelerated depreciation allows a greater 
proportion of the value of the asset to be written-off in the early years when cash 
outflow is highest. This brings an immediate tax saving, greatly improving cash 
flow. A tax deferral scheme similarly affords an owner benefit in the early years 
[99]. 
Depreciation is a charge made against the profit of the period to represent the 
notional wearing out of the fixed asset over its useful life. This charge has no 
effect on cash resources - since it is purely a notional charge or non-cash cost item it 
is therefore not included in the assessment of ship costs. Nevertheless, some owners 
do consider depreciation as a measure of capital costs. Corporation taxation is 
another similar charge. Although a legitimate charge made against the profits of a 
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company, it is only liable when profits are made. However the ability to offset some 
expenses against tax liabilities and also the ability to carry-over losses from 
previous years, makes the inclusion of taxation an overly complex matter, which 
can only serve to cloud the issue [100]. 
2.4 Banks 
Commercial banks play an important role in the shipping industry by providing 
significant amounts of short, medium and long-term funds for both new-building 
and secondhand purchases. 
Today, more emphasis is placed on analysing projects and evaluating risk. The 
project is considered in the light of an income generator. Even so, there are signs 
that caution is being left behind as banks move back into financing shipping [lOll. 
Coming out of the mid-1980s shipping as an industry found ways to cut costs. 
Flagging out, onshore and onboard personnel reductions were accompanied by the 
benefits of competing insurance markets and new lending based on recovering asset 
values. Strong equity markets provided an additional opportunity for some new 
capital to be attracted to the industry [102]. 
Equity funds for ship financing arise either from the shipping company's retention 
of trading profits, or capital profits. The latter can be generated either by asset 
sales or from the issuance of stocks and shares. 
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Generally, it has been difficult for shipping companies to raise equity funds from 
non-shipping sources partly because the industry is viewed by potential investors as 
an area inherently speculative and risk laden. While this is probably an over-
generalisation, the shipping sector is volatile as evidenced by the well-publicised 
ups and downs of the freight market. These shipping investments seek to counter 
the risk by offering high dividend yields and a promise of capital appreciation, with 
a limited span for investment to take advantage of the cyclical nature of the industry. 
Apart from these short-term equity raising ventures, there has been large scale 
equity participation in longer-term shipping ventures, through a form of unit or 
investment trust [103]. 
The growth in ship leasing since the early 1970s has taken place as the shipowners' 
traditional preference for legal ownership has been softened by the financial 
advantages which leasing can often offer. Although the legal technicalities differ 
from country to country, leasing in general terms is a system whereby an 
investor(lessor) acquires and retains the beneficial ownership of a physical asset 
which is hired to the lessee to be employed in the course of the lessee's business 
activities. Thus, although the asset remains the property of the lessor, the lessee 
enjoys full operational control, subject only to certain minimum stipulations 
(usually related to repair and maintenance) as agreed in the lease contract. 
There are two basic fonns of leasing in common usage - a service or operating lease 
and a fmance lease. An operating lease is usually accompanied by a maintenance / 
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repair contract in which the lessor agrees to provide all technical services in relation 
to the upkeep of the asset, with the lessee often having the right to demand 
replacement of the equipment in the event of premature technical obsolescence. The 
costs of this maintenance are either incorporated into the lease payments or 
contracted off separately. 
Another important feature of an operating lease is that, frequently, it is not fully 
amOItised over the initial term of the lease. That is to say, the payments required 
under the lease contract are not sufficient to recover the full cost of the equipment. 
Obviously, these leases have contracts written for less than the expected life of the 
equipment, with the lessor having to recover the cost either in subsequent renewal 
payments, or by leasing to a new lessee or on disposal of the goods. In financing 
leasing, which is more common in shipping, all repair and maintenance expenses 
are the responsibility of the lessee although, as mentioned above, the lessor may 
demand certain technical standards such as the maximum time permitted between 
drydocking, full compliance with IMO regulations, etc. This type of leasing is a 
sophisticated tax-oriented financing tool, and can be reviewed in effect as a 
simultaneous acquisition and financing operation [104]. 
2.4.1 Cost of Capital 
Capital costs are generally those associated with the acquisition of a vessel. 
Vessels may be purchased from a shipowner' s own funds (equity) or with 
borrowed money (debt). More common is a combination of both [105]. 
The cost of capital for a company is simply the rate that it has to pay to induce the 
investor to let the company use the investor's money rather than another. The 
investor, in general, has a wide range of choices from which to select an investment. 
In the process of optimizing the earnings of a shipping company, it is to be 
anticipated that the capital of the enterprise will be acquired at the most economical 
rate, that no more will be paid than is necessal)' to obtain the money. This principle 
applies not only to existing capital but also to any expansion that a company 
contemplates. 
The cost of capital is essentially composed of two types: (a) opportunity cost and 
(b) risk cost. The opportunity cost is based on the concept that the present value of 
money is greater than its future value. The risk cost relates to the assumption that 
whenever the owner of capital invests it in any type of venture, there is always some 
risk of losing part or all of the capital [106]. 
The capital costs, for accounting and taxation purposes, considers the effect that a 
vessel acquisition has on an owner's profit and loss account and on taxable income. 
The two are not necessarily identical, as the definition of depreciation for tax 
purposes often differs from depreciation as determined by conventional accounting 
principles. Profit and loss accounting also differs from cash flow analysis, primarily 
because depreciation is not a cash flow item, merely an accounting tool [107]. 
2.4.1.1 Second-hand 
Comparing the recent history of prices and operating costs with those for new-
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buildings, it is apparent that second-hand acquisitions dating from the market low of 
1986 have been burdened with relatively low capital repayment costs, and (other 
than containerships and, to a lesser extent, general cargoships) have therefore 
succeeded in providing owners with a positive cash-flow after capital charges 
throughout the period to 1992. 
2.4.1.2 New-building 
The level of capital costs obviously varies enonnously, depending on a number of 
factors [108]. These include (p.l02) : 
- the type and size of the vessel. 
- the size of the original loan 
- whether the vessel was bought new or second-hand 
- the remaining maturity of the loan 
- the prevailing interest rate 
- any peculiarities attached to the loan, such as balloon payments, 
moratoria, etc. 
Furthermore, in terms of company liquidity, attention needs to be paid to how the 
costs of vessel acquisition are applied to the balance sheet. Broadly speaking, it has 
generally been the case throughout the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s that 
income after operating costs has been insufficient to meet capital charges associated 
with a new-building. The only exceptions to this have been found in the gas carrier 
sector, due to the exceptionally high time charter rates during 1989, 1990 and fIrst 
half of 1991. 
2.4.2 Ship Finance in Korea 
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The shipowner's choice in the Korean shipping industty has in the past been to 
prefer the BBCIHP option rather than the planned shipbuilding purchase or second-
hand purchase where ownership is directly registered in Korea. Therefore, the 
shipowners in Korea are already well placed to take advantage of the trade 
liberalisation policies implied by the WTO agreements. The offshore strategy of 
BBCIHP facilitates a considerable capital flexibility and involves foreign loans 
rather than government fmanced initiatives. 
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Chapter III: Korean Shipping, Shipbuilding and Liberalisation Era 
3.1 Liberal Trend in Shipping 
3.1.1 Two Environments for Shipping 
One important issue ill econOIll1CS IS the choice between free trade and 
protectionism. Shipping liberalism consists of the recognition of the principle of 
free and fair competition in sea transport, irrespective of the flag the ship is flying. 
Consequently, any fonn of shipping protection is contrary to this principle. Under 
the policy of shipping liberalisation, shippers have the right of a free choice of 
carrier, be it a home or a foreign-flag vessel. However, the basic principle of 
shipping liberalism is that the merchant fleets operate on the freight market without 
any intervention of the public bodies like governments or their agencies. 
Government non- intervention is thus the very essence of the concept of liberal 
policy in shipping. 
Protectionism is a policy aimed at protecting the domestic industries from external 
competition. Customs duties levied on foreign products are the main form of this 
policy. In shipping there exist numerous and diversified forms of protectionism. The 
objectives of a protectionist policy in shipping are of a twofold nature : firs~ to 
maintain the already established position of a country's merchant marine, and 
second, to expand their own merchant fleet to the size and structure desired and 
detennined by the needs of the national economy of that country. But, there is also 
the opinion that protectionism has not yet caused significant inefficiencies m 
maritime transport. The major impact thus far has only been on market shares. 
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However, Vogel (1993) [1], an official at the UNCTAD seminar in Seoul, pointed 
out some difficulty that developing countries face, following liberalisation. He said 
that the conflict between liberalism and interventionism in maritime affairs is 
difficult to solve, in general, for those countries which have exercised a strong 
governmental involvement in shipping for several decades. At the same time, he 
recommended that the liberalisation of trade in shipping services may require a 
gradual, carefully phased approach, as many of these countries attach great 
importance to maintaining a national fleet for both economic and other reasons. 
As Glaskowsky (1990) [2] notes, deregulation means economic deregulation. It 
means relaxing or eliminating entry and rate deregulation. Therefore, economic 
liberalisation can directly impact upon shipping business and shipping markets. 
So far, since the shipping industry has been regarded as an infant industry for those 
developing countries, and has been treated as a coherent area of protectionism, these 
waves of liberalisation and openness which have begun to be realised in the [onn of 
market liberalisation, accompanied with deregulation policies have had substantial 
impacts on the Korean shipping market (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Container Trade Volumes by Sea in Korea (UnitTEU) 
1996 Division 1992 1993 1994 1995 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Grand Total 22,876,467 3,203,966 4,034,667 4,800,977 5,202,898 
Korean (rate in~'feased) (100°0) (100°'0) (1000 0) (l0000) (l0000) 
J>orts --------------------------------------______________________________________________________ _ 
Sub-total 
Import 
Export 
2,720,534 
1,190,457 
1,530,077 
2,940,651 3,440,659 3,941,679 4,260,240 
1,343,620 1,653,106 1,915,988 2,067,963 
1,597,031 1,787,553 2,025,691 2,192,277 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
J>usan 
J>ort 
TIS 
Total 
(rate occupied) 
155,933 
2,751,006 
(95.6%) 
263,315 594,008 859,298 942,658 
3,070,681 3,825,565 4,502,596 4,760,507 
(95.8~0) (93.8~o) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-total 
Import 
Export 
2,595,073 
1,131,347 
1,463,726 
2,807,366 3,231,557 3,643,298 3,819,155 
1,274,737 1,537,130 1,749,880 1,838,164 
1,532,629 1,694,427 1,893,418 1,980,991 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIS 155,933 263,315 594,008 859,298 941,352 
Total 117,618 112,860 174,620 236,641 348,727 
Inchon (rate occupied) (4.0~o) (3.5°0) (4.3%) ( 4.9'!0) (6.7°0) 
J>ort -------------------------------.---------.-.-------.---.------------------------.-.----------
Import 57,891 59,968 96,557 134,277 182,234 
Export 59,727 52,892 78,063 102,364 166,493 
Total 7,364 18,878 31,998 42,567 47,003 
Wulsan (rate occupied) (0.3%) (0.6%) (0.8°0) (0.9%) (O.9~0) 
J>ort ---------.-.---------------------.-----.-.-.------------------------------------------------
Sub-total 7,364 18,878 31,998 42,567 45,067 
Import 895 8,597 18,219 22,349 25,296 
Export 6,459 10,281 13,779 20,218 19,771 
---------------------------------------------------------------.-------.--------------------.--
TIS 7,636 
-------------------.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 479 1,547 2,484 7,347 27,867 
Masan (rate occupied) (0.1 °0) (0.1%) (0.10 0 ) (0.10 0) (0.1 °0) 
}lort ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Import 314 318 1,200 3,160 12,142 
Export 165 1,229 1,284 4,187 15,725 
------------i[~~~-----------------------------------------------------------ii~~2~------i6~~9;;---
K (0 3°0) (0.3°0) wang (rate occupied) . , 
){anl5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------}lort Import 6,322 8,500 
5 504 8,393 Export , 
------------i[~~~-------------------------------------------------------------------------i~S;oi----
(0.1 %) Kunsan (rate occupied) 
}lort -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------99-7----
Import 904 
------------~~~~~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: TIS (Trans-Shipment) 
Source : Reference [3] 
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3.1.2 Liberal Trend in Shipping 
European Study Service ( 1993) [4] also reVIews that efficient transport is a 
precondition for success in global markets. Accordingly, efficient transport is an 
essential facility for the exploitation or development of economic resources on a 
national or international scale. It allows articles or materials to be conveyed from 
areas of low utility to areas of high utility [5]. 
Liberalisation trends in all of the regions, coupled with global corporate strategies, 
will continue to encourage the development of global and regional markets. 
Regional markets will continue to be an important component of the global trading 
system for historical, cultural, geographic, and political reasons. F or many 
commodities, however, the continued drive for scale and technological advantage 
will encourage global, rather than regional players, as the final winners. 
Consequently, the outlook for either inter-regional or intra-regional trade can be 
quite strong depending upon the commodity [6]. 
In addition, free trade policies have brought about a rapid growth of world trade, 
particularly so in the manufactured goods sector - the major component of the 
container trade and container port throughput. The development of the containerised 
market is linked to macroeconomic development and reflected in a long tenn 
correlation between GDP growth, trade growth in general, and growth of 
containerised trades and container port throughput in particular [7]. For example, 
the rapid economic growth in East Asia, especially in China and north & south-east 
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Asia, has been the basis for a phenomenal expansion of the region's container trade 
[8]. 
The largest container liner and groupings have now developed beyond any historical 
restrictions on new trade, with the aim of providing a global or quasi-global service 
network. While, until quite recently, the aim of even the largest operators was to 
establish a presence on each of the main axial trades, carrier ambitions are now even 
greater and have extended to embrace an array of north-south and intra-regional 
services [9]. 
However, Glaskowsky (1990)[10] defmes that deregulators are those who favour 
few if any restrictions on carrier entry and ratemaking. Furthennore, following the 
liberalisation changes including the openness of shipping services to cross national 
trade, this has required national shipping operations to be restructured which has 
lead to the more competitive market for shipping activities for foreign shipping 
companIes. Foreign governments, as well as international institutions and 
pressure groups alike, have sought to deregulate the national restrictions which 
hinder the activity in the free shipping market. It is considered that this kind of 
action is strongly related to the benefit they see in penetrating other foreign national 
shipping industries and shipping companies in order to increase their market share. 
Conversely, as Middleton (1997) [11] points out, the foreign government is 
unwilling, or unable by virtue of its commitment to liberalisation, to ride to the 
rescue with policy-directed lending, subsidies, forced takeovers and the rest of the 
apparatus of intervention. 
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For example, European Study Service (1993) [12] discusses issues concenung 
degrees of complexity and agony between ED member countries in terms of 
liberalisation of sea transport, as below: 
" The 1986 package of shipping regulations still has to be 
elaborated and introduced. The need for free cabotage in 
the Community has already been mentioned in a wider 
context. Consortia either need to be brought within the 
ambit of the regulation on competition, or a separate regime 
similar to that applying to conferences should be introduced 
for consortia so that these modem forms of association 
between shipowners can benefit from the cartel ban 
exemption. (p.14)" 
U.S DOT Newsletter (1997) [13] said that investing in transportation is a top 
priority for America. Efficient, safe, and cost-effective transportation is vital to 
any prosperous nation, specially in our competitive global economy. 
In the mean time, US-flag liner carriers have to face up to the new era of US 
container shipping, which is heading towards deregulation. This is a world where 
conferences in all US trades have been deregulated (when the current US Ocean 
Reform Bill has finally been passed), where vessel subsidies are no longer 
guaranteed and where US Military Sealift Command cargoes are dwindling 
[14][15][16]. 
Clement (1997)[17] argues the deregulation of U.S transportation as follows: 
" Congress has been deregulating the U. s. transportation 
industry since the late 1970's. In 1984 Congress began 
deregulating the international ocean shipping 
industry ........ Compared to other modes of transportation, the 
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international shipping industry has historically been subject 
to little Government regulation of their commercial 
transactions. New shipping lines have never needed 
government approval before offering their services. The 
Government has never attempted to set their rates, as the 
government set or approved rates for the movement of goods 
on railroads and trucks. (p.l)" 
However, a discriminatory clause of the proposed US Ocean Shipping Reform Act 
has been amended by the Houses of Representatives, following criticisms by 
foreign governments [18]. Internationally, Members of the International Council 
of Containership Operators, known as the Box-Club, have also launched a campaign 
to reduce legislative restrictions and raise returns for the liner industry. The Club, 
which presents about 90% of containership operators, claims political interference is 
suppressing freight rates to such an extent that returns on investment will not be 
sufficient to cover the cost of the vast number of new-building currently being 
ordered [19]. 
In the case of port restrictions [20][21][22], Japan promised to lift port restrictions 
but this was not kept as Japan promised. Now, the FMC (Federal Maritime 
Commission in US) have imposed the fines, $ 100,000 per US call by Japanese 
carriers NYK, MOL and K- line on September 4, 1997. Recently, Japan has 
decided to take the necessary measures because of the US embargo December 1997. 
However, there is some perception that the performance of publicly quoted shipping 
companies was not thought to have affected public perception of the industry and an 
overwhelming 88% of delegates in the LSE conference [23] indicated that the 
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influence of free market forces, including the degree of scrutiny placed on these 
companies and their vulnerability to take-over, was healthy for the sector. As far as 
the port industry is concerned, Pinder (1997) [24] discusses that deregulation is not 
simply a policy driven by ideology. Instead it can be seen as a strategic initiative to 
solve what are considered to be very real problems associated with a major port 
servIce. 
3.1.3 The Concept of Liberalisation 
As seen above, it has been regarded as liberalisation in the shipping market is a 
widespread perception in contemporary world shipping industry. 
3.1.3.1 The Meaning 
By liberalisation in this context we mean the development and use of markets to 
detennine price and quantity rather than any closed system of allocation. In the 
investment context this means financial providers have access to the potential 
customers through the free operation of the market place. 
However, the practicalities, pace, and sequencing of trade liberalisation measures 
vary from one country to another, but such measures have a number of common 
features. They are the core of a more comprehensive set of structural adjustment 
measures which have often been adopted in response to the conditional fmance 
available from multilateral fmancial institutions, in particular the World Bank and 
IMF. 
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The pace and extent of liberalisation has varied greatly from country to country. 
Many of the countries of central and eastern Europe were liberalised in so far as 
they became market-oriented in the early 90's with the fall of Communism and the 
COMECON system [25]. As part of the transition process to democracy, market 
economics was rapidly adopted, reflecting in part an urgent need to act in the face 
of the disintegration of their economies [26]. Through the 1970s, the ASEAN 
economies were recording significant, steady growth, as were a number of 
economies in Latin America utilising the benefits of a market-driven economy. 
Appreciation of the flexibility provided by the market economy encouraged 
managers in these economies to develop further and to reduce the degree of 
regulation and protection. Countries both east and west accelerated domestic 
programmes to reduce regulation and cut trade barriers [27]. The global enthusiasm 
for free(r) trade and deregulation is not going to leave the West African region 
unscathed, and it is the major financial agencies, with their power over the 
international purse strings, that seem to be best placed to secure some market's 
liberalisation [28]. The success in some developing countries has led to replication 
in others following the same policies in order to promote growth. This change has 
been reflected in the deliberative forums of the UN. At a major UNCTAD 
conference in 1986, and at two special sessions of the UN General Assembly, there 
has been much greater reference to liberalisation and market forces than there had 
been in the past. 
Shafaeddin (1994) [29] argues that liberalisation has generally involved neutralizing 
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incentives for exports and imports at low tariff levels through : 
- removal of import quotas and other quantitative restriction or their 
conversion into tariffs . , 
- subsequent reductions in the level and the dispersion of import tariff rates 
have caused ; 
- compensatoI)' devaluation of the national currency; 
- removal or reduction of export taxes. 
McKinnon (1993) [30] also confmns the demerit of protectionism in terms of 
foreign trade, price controls and subsidies in domestic trade, and exclusive 
franchises for parastatals (state-owned enterprises) proliferate in all branches of 
industry. 
Table 3.2 Pre- and Post Uruguay Round Average Tariff Rates on 
Imports by Developing Economies from Industralised 
Economies, by Region of Origin and Destination (percent) 
===================================== 
Developing economies All economies 
--------.-.-.-------.-.-----------.-.--------------------------.-.---.- ---------.-.-----
America Asia Africa Europe Total 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
--------------.--------------------.-------------------------------------------------.-------------------------.------.----
USA 16.2 14.0 
EU 21.2 17.0 
Japan 28.5 22.1 
(A) 26.0 22.1 
(B) 16. 1 13.3 
(C) 18.9 15.7 
All economies 16.8 13.9 
16.0 10.9 
24.4 16.8 
23.9 16.4 
22.0 15.9 
16.011.1 
21.2 14.6 
20.9 14.6 
12.0 11.9 
23.623.6 
17.5 17.5 
23.022.1 
16.5 16.5 
22.1 22.1 
21.621.6 
17.0 14.3 
15.9 13.6 
18.016.1 
18.1 16.2 
11.19.3 
14.9 12.7 
14.4 12.3 
16.1 12.5 
20.8 16.2 
24.1 16.9 
22.1 16.3 
14.3 10.9 
19.6 14.7 
18.8 14.2 
4.8 3.2 
8.0 5.5 
8.1 5.6 
9.9 7.2 
3.6 2.1 
6.3 4.2 
6.3 4.3 
--------------.--------------------.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------.-.-. 
Note: trade -weighted tariffs. Columns indicate destination countries; rows, origin 
countries. (A) Other industralised Asia (B) Other industralised (C ) Total 
industralised economies 
Source : Reference [31] 
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Table 3.3 Average Pre- and Post Uruguay Round Protection 
== _______ Levels, by Importing Region (percent) 
--------== Manuf~tures =====================- Food ======= 
---------------------------------------------
Pre-Round Post-Round Average change Pre-Round Post-Round A vera£e chanee 
________________ tariff tariff in import prices tariff tariff in import price; 
DS&Canada -----~~;---------~~;------------~i~~------------i-~~7---------i-i~~----------~~~~-------
ED 6.5 3.9 -2.4 26.5 26.0 -0.3 
Japan 4.9 2.1 -2.7 87.8 56.1 -8.1 
S.Korea 16.1 8.2 -6.8 99.5 41.1 -17.9 
Indonesia 14.2 13.5 -0.6 21.9 15.5 -4.2 
Malaysia 1l.0 7.7 -2.9 87.9 34.3 -14.9 
Philippines 23.9 21.5 -1.8 86.9 33.4 -15.3 
Thailand 36.2 27.6 -5.9 59.8 34.5 -10.8 
Latin America 17.1 14.9 -1.6 2.3 l.5 -0.5 
Sub-Saharan 
Mrica 9.5 
South Asia 5 1.9 
Rest of world 10.6 
9.4 
37.1 
9.1 
-0.1 
-9.4 
-1.3 
15.6 
-3.5 
15.7 
12.4 
-4.4 
14.1 
-1.7 
-0.7 
-1.2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [32] 
3.1.3.2 The WTO and Shipping 
This decade began with a number of initiatives aimed at liberalising the movement 
of goods, service and capital and, though to a lesser extent, persons. 
Predominant examples are internal market of the European Community and the 
European Economic Area, but the same trends prevail in the GATT, the GEeD, as 
well as in regional agreements like that on the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFT A). The scope and modalities of these agreements may differ, as may the 
pace of implementation, but the direction seems clear. 
The agreements are intended to enhance economIC growth through improved 
efficiency stemming from increased competition, specialisation, rationalisation and 
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exploitation of econonues of scale. A consequence of liberalisatio~ and a 
precondition for achieving enhanced growth, is that investments are attracted to 
those countries and regions offering the most favourable business opportunities. 
But this implies also that competition will not be confined to that between 
individual enterprises. International liberalisation of trade and investments will, 
by nature, be accompanied by increased competition between national registrations 
and frameworks for business activities, reducing the possibilities of conducting 
national policies significantly different from those of other countries [33]. 
The WTO fonned in 1995 recognises the trend of globalisation in international 
markets for goods and services. Globalisation refers to the growing economic 
interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety 
of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, 
and also through the more rapid and wide-spread diffusion of technology [34]. 
Geneva 
Annecy 
Torquay 
Geneva 
Dillon 
Kennedy 
Tokyo 
Uruguay 
1947 
1949 
1950 
1956 
1961-2 
1962-7 
1973-9 
1986-94 
23 
33 
34 
22 
45 
48 
99 
III 
$ 10 billion 
Unavailable 
Unavailable 
$ 2.5 billion 
$ 4.9 billion 
$ 40 billion 
$ 155 billion 
$ 1000 billion 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [35] 
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The agreements spell out the principles of liberalization, and the pennitted 
exceptions. They include individual countries' commitments to lower customs 
tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services' markets. They 
set procedures for settling disputes. They prescribe special treatment for developing 
countries. They require governments to make their trade policies transparent by 
notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted, and through regular 
reports by the secretruiat on countries' trade policies [36]. 
As far as a direction in the development of the WTO era is concerned, it presents, 
fIrst, an endless competition era in the world economy that includes industrial 
products, agricultural products, services and intellectual property, and prohibits 
subsidies and trade barriers. So, it is a very urgent matter to cultivate corporate 
competitiveness, especially, in the manufacturing industry and associated services. 
New rounds in the treaty will address the issues of other factors in trade, such as a 
blue round (labour), green round (environment), techno round (R&D), and a 
competition round (competition policy). The WTO is required to act globally as 
well as locally [37]. In this sense, Korea has driven forward towards an 
improvement of national perception regarding trade and international relationships 
and the training of internationally minded managers [38]. 
The WTO's main agenda, named after the Marrakesh Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and the four appendices, i.e. Annex 1, 
Annex 1B and Annex le and Annex 2, includes a general agreement on services 
[39], an agreement on products and trade and an agreement on intellectual property 
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within the MTAs (Multilateral Trade Agreements). The Annex on Negotiations on 
Maritime Transport Services in the WTO is as shown as Appendix (3 to 6) in this 
thesis. 
At its Ministerial meeting m Marrakesh from 12 to 15 April 1994, the Trade 
Negotiations Committee of GATT adopted the Decision on Negotiations on 
Maritime Transport Services [40]. The Decision established the Negotiating 
Group on Maritime Transport Service (NGMTS) and requested it to hold its fIrst 
meeting no later than 16 May 1994. The mandate of the NGMTS is to hold 
comprehensive negotiations aiming at commitments in international shipping, 
auxiliary services and access to and use of port facilities, leading to the elimination 
of restrictions within a fixed time scale. 
By the end of 1994, 37 countries were member of the NGMTS, while 10 countries 
and 3 international organisations (World Bank, UNCTAD and OECD) had acquired 
observer status. Substantive deliberations of the three meetings held in 1994 
concentrated on the development of an information base that would provide details 
of the characteristics of the maritime sectors of the countries participating in the 
work of the NGMTS [41]. 
According to the services section of agreement in the WTD, maritime transport is 
described as follows [42] : 
"Maritime transport negotiations were originally scheduled 
to end in June 1996, but participants failed to agree on a 
package of commitments. The talks will resume with 
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the new services round due to start no later than 2000. 
Some commitments are already included in some 
countries' schedules covering the three main areas in 
this sector: access to and use of port facilities; auxiliary 
services; and ocean transport". 
According to the internal report of MOMAF [43], Korean government has 
considered that in fact, Korean shipping market is fully open to competition and that 
they also fully recognise that liberalisation of the national shipping market is 
beneficial to them. However as is the case worldwide, it is not ideal to open 
domestic short sea market, as "cabotage" is still practised elsewhere. They also 
consider that 0 ECD shipping rules (see, appendix 7 to 13) produces~ in fact~ real 
outcomes in terms of shipping liberalisation, rather than the yet to be applied WIO 
agreement that is still pending. 
3.1.3.3 Financial Liberalisation in Korea 
According to the OECD (1990) [44] report, liberalisation in the sense of the OEeD 
Codes means the abolition of governmental restrictions on the conclusion or 
execution of both transactions and transfers with respect to the operations specified 
in the Codes. In other words, the obligation to liberalise goes beyond the 
requirement that the transfer of funds to and from abroad should be free from 
exchange control restrictions. It also requires that the underlying transactions 
themselves should not be frustrated by legal or administrative regulations [45]. 
Akyuz (1993) [46] has pointed out that external fmancial liberalisation means 
policy actions that increase the degree of the pace with which residents can acquire 
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assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies and non-residents can 
operate in national fmancial markets, i.e. fmancial openness. Three broad types of 
transaction can be distinguished in this respect : fIrst, inward transactions, allowing 
residents to borrow freely in international fmancial markets, and non-residents to 
invest freely in domestic financial markets ; second, outward transactions, allowing 
residents to transfer capital and to hold fInancial assets abroad, and non-residents to 
issue loans and to borrow in domestic fmancial markets . third domestic , , 
transactions in foreign currencies, allowing debtor-creditor relations among 
residents in foreign currencIes such as bank deposits and lending in foreign 
currenCIes. These three policies have been exactly implemented by Korean 
financial market after financial crisis in Korea in 1998. 
The relationship between a developing country and financial openness was 
examined by Chapple (1991) [47] focusing on financial liberalisation in New 
Zealand between 1984-1990. He explains that the main lessons from New 
Zealand's fmancial liberalisation for developing countries are: as a miracle cure 
for all economic problems at low cost, it requires new attitudes and institutions, 
which are slow, painful and costly to develop ; it has the potential to create serious 
financial bubbles, unrealistic expectations and a boom and bust cycle which 
eventually undermines the chance for success of the liberalisation itself. 
The IMF paper by Kinnani and his staff (1994) [48], named 'International Trade 
Policies', illustrates a specific commitment in the fmancial service sector of Korea 
to market access as following : 
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Ta~~ 3:.5 Specific Commitments in the Financial Service Sector of Korea 
Limitations on-Ma~ket Ac~~~ ====== Li~itations on National T~~at~~~ 
IF-~;~i~~-i~~~~~~-~~~-i~-~~l;;~~~-~~------------------------------------------------------------------
certain restrictions, including ceilings 
on investment in stocks 
F or all financial services subsectors , 
cross-boarder supply of financial services 
and financial services supplied abroad to 
Korean consumers may not be settled in 
Korean currency. 
New financial products are subject to approval. 
Banking and other financial services 
(excluding insurance). Korea has not 
undertaken commitment regarding the 
cross-border supply of this category of services. 
Banking and other financial services 
(excluding insurance) .Korea has not 
undertaken commitment regarding 
the cross-boarder supply of this 
category of services 
Commercial presence in banking business 
(including deposit,loan,foreign exchange, 
settlement,and clearing services) is permitted 
only through representative offices and branches. 
No commitment is undertaken regarding 
financial-leasing services. 
Insurance of debentures is prohibited, and 
limitations apply to deposits and loans in 
foreign currency. 
Securities firms are required to have 
minimum amount of operating funds 
and are not allowed to establish 
multiple branches. 
Insurance and insurance-related services. 
Korea has not undertaken commitment 
regarding the cross-board supply for this 
category of services, except for marine 
cargo insurance, and reinsurance 
Insurance and insurance-re tated services. 
and retrocession. 
The establishment of a commercial presence 
is subject to an economic need test, and the 
number of sales offices that can be set up 
is limited. 
Ceding insurers are required to reinsure 
with priority given to reinsurance 
companies established in Korea, 
except export for aviation insurance. 
Top executive personnel of insurance 
establishments are required to 
reside in Korea. 
No commitment has been made with respect to 
claim settlement and actual businesses. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [49] 
The Korean government at the early stage of this crisis had emphasized that the 
Korean economy is something different from that of developing countries and that 
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the fundamentals in Korean economy are sound. The situation is not so simple as 
the Korean government would like to believe. The government has asked the IMF 
to give a stand-by credit loan which will be accompanied by a restructuring 
package for Korean economy to be applied by the IMF automatically [50]. However, 
the Korean economy will have to improve its transparency in fmancial matters if it 
is to be supported by the international community especially for the funds provided 
by the UN agencies and international bankers. The IMF has especially asked 
Korean government to alter Korean Chaebol structure so that cross-subsidisation 
between the components of the Chaebol can be more easily identified and 
understood. This may mean that some of the Korean conglomerates will be facing 
severe financial difficulties as their credit exposure becomes known [51]. In tenns 
of macro economic aspect, the IMF [52] is sticking to the demand that "Seoul" 
lowers its economic growth target for 1998 from that initially-set at 6 percent to 
less than 2.5 percent, Korea is calling for minimum growth of 3 percent, citing 
concerns over high unemployment and other adverse side effects. 
3.2 Korean Shipping and Shipbuilding Policy 
It is useful to describe government shipping and shipbuilding policy in general, 
including why a countIy needs its national fleet, and to study the special features of 
Korean shipping and shipbuilding policies, especially those relating to government 
subsidies. These are very important factors for Korean shipping and shipbuilding 
companies in relation to government shipping policies so far. However, these are 
also likely to be most important elements when we can consider investment 
liberalisation. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look into the past in this section and the 
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present liberal (in next sub-chapter 3.3) Korean shipping and shipbuilding policies. 
3.2.1 Korean Shipping Policy 
Shipping policy may be defmed as a totality of economic, legal and administrative 
measures by means of which the counny influences the position of its national fleet 
in the national economy and in the international fleet market. Furthermore, it 
constitutes a prot of a counny's transport policy which itself is an element of an 
overall economic policy. It is more or less developed in particular countries and 
consists of various elements depending on the size and the economic importance of 
the merchant fleets of these countries. Shipping policy has two different aspects : 
domestic, which is the attitude of the country towards its own merchant marines, 
and foreign, which is its attitude towards the fleets of other countries. 
3.2.1.1 Early History - Realities and Consequences -
From the early '60s, General Park lung-heels military government during the 
developing stages of Korea, conducted a national economic policy with a great 
emphasis on shipping because of its strategic and economic importance to South 
Korea. 
The first administrator of Korean Shipping and Port Administration (formerly 
KMP A, now, MOMAF, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fishery) was a retired 
military general, Mr. Kang, who had to justify his position by rapidly achieving 
favourable outcomes with regard to growth of the fleets and facilities for the 
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movement of goods by sea. It is essential for the institution and management to 
justify or present its existence as a means for attaining the targets set out by its 
superiors and in a hierarchical system such as the political structure seen in Korea 
during this period. Short-term targets were often achieved at the expense of long-
tenn stability. In this sense the Korean shipping industry was biased by an outcome-
oriented policy which would not consider the supply and demand of market 
equilibrium in the shipping market, thus, leading inevitably to market failure at 
some point [53]. The KMPA had concentrated on quantitative expansion, ignoring 
market situations and the dynamics of the global economy. 
This was a by-product of the way the Korean economy was run during the process 
of economic development in the 1970s. As a result, the Korean shipping industry 
was not expected to make profits due to fierce competition between national 
shipping companies with overcapacity. Especially, the small and old non-economic 
vessels deployed on certain trade routes were not as competitive as other 
international carriers. 
At the same time, a long shipping depression which began in the early 1980s, 
started a new phase for Korean shipping, this depression by exposing the weakness 
of Korean shipping to market-driven forces led to losses and this actually brought 
out the serious results of the Korean shipping industry that caused eventual troubles 
encountered in the late 1980s. 
As far as fmancial aspects are concerned, most shipping companies in Korea in the 
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1970s' and 80s' raised capital from outside fmancial institutions to build vessels but 
it has become a large burden upon shipping companies since they require to earn in 
foreign currency ever increasing sums to meet that debt even during periods of 
collapsing freight rates [54]. For many of the companies the fmancial cost 
exceeded their capability to repay the principal and interest. This situation caused 
serious doubts about the credit-worthiness of Korean shipping in general, which has 
led to Korean vessels being seized, and shipping companies being declared 
bankrupt (such as Pan Ocean shipping). However, a fresh opportunity to 
reconstruct the Korean shipping industry now presents itself for a more constructive 
long-term and durable future as a global player. 
3.2.1.2 Taxation in Shipping 
Today most of the world ocean shipping that competes internationally operates in a 
fiscal climate with little or no tax on profits, so called zero tax. In the maritime 
countries that stick to conventional taxation of their shipping industry, there is 
serious unrest within the industry [55]. It seems impossible to compete for 
equity capital against players who need not include tax on profits as a cost element. 
The consequences of joining or not joining the zero tax club must be considered by 
government [56]. 
Taxation in shipping has been given many benefits in terms of the tax system under 
the policy of the promotion of the shipping industry in Korea. Until 1980, a limited 
area was taxed and the present tax system has been in practice since 1990 [57]. 
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(1) customs duties : import tax (2.5% of ship price) - abolition from 1997. 
repair tax (2.5% of repair price). 
(2) corporate tax: overall tax like other industries 
(20% under 100 million Won, 34 % above 100 million). 
(3) local tax: registered tax (tax rate, 0.2/1,000), 
acquisition tax (50% reduction in tax rate 20/1,000), 
property tax (50% reduction in tax rate, 3/1,000), 
tax for joint extinguish facility (50%) reduction in 
0.16 % of local tax). 
There are some problems with the taxation system in Korea. Higher tariffs on ships 
in Korea weaken international competitiveness, which is not imposed on vessels in 
foreign countries. However, the income from the customs duties has contributed 
to the national economy, as the customs duties on vessels belong to the balance of 
payments. This compares with aircraft, with no customs duties when importing and 
repairing in Korea. It is also said that it is quite unreasonable to impose customs 
duties on BBC/HP vessels that Korean shipping companies charter and operate, 
after building them at Korean or foreign shipyards. It is a general rule to impose 
customs duties after acquiring ownership, because ship ownership can be acquired 
when the date of maturity for the principal and interest as foreign debt is finished. 
However, in Korea, as soon as the BBCIHP contract is made, customs duties were 
imposed, although this was abolished from 1997. 
For example, major maritime countries like Japan, USA, Norway, Taiwan, 
Singapore and the EU do not impose customs duties when repairing a ship, 
compared to the 2.5% customs duties imposition in Korea. Below is the comparison 
with tariffs on a 5,000 TED (ship price, $ 80m) containership in Korea and that of a 
Foe vessel in an advanced maritime country [58]. 
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Table 3.6 Tariff Comparison between Korean and FOC Vessel 
=====-------------------------------
division Korean VIL Foe VIL companson 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------local tax 
customs duties 
830,000$ 
2,000,000$ 
15,000$ 55 times 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
total 2,830,000$ 15,000$ 188 times 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [59] 
In advanced maritime countries, the imposition of corporate tax on marginal profits 
for ship sales and purchase has been deferred for a longer period, but a corporate 
tax is imposed in Korea and starts in the first year. Tax exemption of corporate tax 
on marginal profits applies over the long period outside Korea because tax is 
imposed on the delivery of the vessels rather than on the purchase date as is the case 
in Korea. (A long period must be spent before the delivery of the ship estimating the 
optimum size of the vessel in order to secure alternative vessels following ship 
sales.) As a reference, tax defennent on the marginal profit from ship sales and 
purchase is 3 years in Japan, 5 years in the UK and 9 years in Norway, and zero in 
Korea. The imposition of local taxes such as registration tax or acquisition tax on 
the vessel, is higher than that of aircraft, which makes Korean shipowners less 
competitive than those in advanced maritime countries. 
Table 3.7 The Comparison of Local Taxes between Ship 
and Aircraft in Korea 
=============================== 
division registered tax acquisition tax note 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ship 0.02% 1% In Panama as FOe country, 
and Norway, a little registered 
tax only, no acquisition tax 
aircraft 0.01 % nil 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [60] 
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This table is self-explanatory in comparing local taxes between ship and aircraft in 
Korea. 
3.2.2 Korean Shipbuilding Policy - Historical Views _ 
The shipbuilding industry is one of the industries which remarkably impacts on a 
national economy as it is a highly capital, labour and technologically intensive 
industry. It has both forward and backward linkage effects overall the sectors, i.e. 
machinery, steel, electrical, and electronics. It is sometimes regarded equivalent to 
exporting goods in a country like Korea. Since the early stages of the 1970s, the 
Korean shipbuilding companies were investing into the world shipbuilding market, 
by implementing an export-driven policy and a promotion policy for heavy industry 
by the Korean government. 
In the process of economic development, the Korean government has systematically 
fonnulated and implemented innovative support measures for shipbuilding and 
other sectors of the economy so as to achieve national targets. Because of this, 
relatively cheap materials, and an energetic and economic labour force, the industry 
has rapidly reached a prominent position [61]. 
As with almost every other aspect of shipping, the shipbuilding industry is a highly 
competitive entity in itself. Yard compete on cost, currency, finance, expertise and 
delivery for business and face their own cost pressures from labour, cost of 
materials, inflation, etc. [62]. 
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The real breakthrough for Korean shipbuilding yards in their fight for world market 
share came in 1985 and 1986, when their cut-throat marketing achieved a leap of 
more than 13 % in the space of just two years. That this happened at a time when 
global ordering activity was touching its lowest level for the decade under the 
influence of prolonged economic recession, served to emphasise the means by 
which this was achieved - prices which cut all competition [63]. 
Two important things that the Korean shipbuilding industry faced in 1989 was the 
rationalisation measures for the shipbuilding industry and conflict on trade 
negotiations. Because the Korean position in the world shipbuilding industry had 
improved, outsiders, e.g. the USA and European countries gradually pressed Korea 
on matters of unfair trade such as government subsidies and tax benefits [64]. 
Therefore, the Korean government formally became a member of the WP6 
(Working Party 6) of the OEeD on October 1990 on the need to improve 
international co-operation. 
However, the ban to build new capacity was lifted, in conjunction with the 
rationalisation measures in the shipbuilding industry in 1993. Korean shipbuilding 
tried to secure more advanced facilities and to adopt technological advances and 
to build higher value added vessels. At this stage, they regarded the chance of a 
second take-off for the Korean shipbuilding industry [65] as very likely. The 
Korean share of the world market was slightly higher than in following years, 
with a 28 % average share, against the 26 % noted in 1992. This involved the 
annual tonnage rising to around 5.6m GRT at the end of the 1990s, and falling to 
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5.0m GRT by 2005 [66]. 
3.3 Liberalisation in Korean Shipping and Shipbuilding 
3.3.1 The Liberal Shipping Policy in Korea 
New environments and periodical trends have made the Korean government think 
about and alter its current approach in the setting of a shipping policy. Korean 
shipping policy has changed to give greater autonomy and freedom of operation for 
shipowners. This change has enabled Korean shipping to cope actively with the 
international shipping environment and markets since 1988 when the rationalisation 
of the Korean shipping industry was completed. 
The Korean shipping policy, implemented during the period of shipping industry 
rationalisation beginning in 1984, focused on the severe control of trade routes and 
the licensing system then in operation. New licenses for shipping businesses were 
suspended and fIrms were forced to abstain from increasing their tonnage. What 
was needed however was to consider a more flexible approach to keep the profit 
and loss balance in the black while undergoing the required changes dictated by the 
environment of shipping post 1988. The basic direction of shipping policy from 
1989 has been concerned with a basic black-ink balance by expanding shipping 
business in a rationalised as well as a step by step process, and furthermore, by 
pushing forward liberalisation and globalisation of the shipping industry in 
response to the changes in the international environment. 
The Korean government has driven forward these changes to meet the challenges by 
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the altered scene m shipping. These changes include a flexible management of 
tonnage and the diversified way for fmancing ships [67]. Further, a gradual 
deregulation of the trade routes and licenses and the establishment of a 
counterplan to cope with the pressures resulting from openness of the Korean 
shipping market. 
The move towards liberalisation and deregulation was further emphasised, in the 
1990s [68]. The major goals of this policy were: first, to promote and to strengthen 
competitiveness of the shipping industry by aiming at a second take-off base of 
growth between 1988-1989 ; second, to build up international maritime co-
operation and to secure new shipping markets by extensively exchanging shipping 
with the northern countries with whom Korea at that time did not have diplomatic 
ties; third, to increase the competence of shipowning management in Korea by 
exposing them to the opportunities afforded by a more international market for the 
shipping services, thereby improving their administrative competence and 
competitive position in the international shipping market generally. 
3.3.1.1 Korean Shipping in the WTO 
The Korean shipping industry has grown rapidly along with the national economy 
since the early 1960s. Behind such a rapid growth, the government's active 
support for domestic shipping firms has been essential. The government's direct 
support is no longer possible because of Korea's entry into the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the launch of the World 
Trade Organisation in 1995 [69]. 
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As the OEeD (1994) [70] report indicated, Korean shipping in the world market 
had to change in order to survive and to compete with other shipping companies 
worldwide, it would not have any alternative except liberalisation. In Korea, the 
ocean-going shipping industry has experienced a great deal of change with the birth 
of a new world trade order, a deepening tendency to remove the trade blocks in 
the world economy following the settlement of DR negotiations in 1994, the 
reduction of scale in the waiver system, and the operation of a logistic information 
system, e.g. (permission to Casco to call at Pusan, etc.). 
The Korean government, therefore, is determined to sharpen the international 
competitiveness of the domestic shipping industry by employing all possible 
measures available, i.e. policy towards liberalisation and autonomy. There are many 
parts of the liberalisation measures in shipping and inland markets requested by the 
USA and others. The MOMAF (formerly, KMPA) has made changes such as 
improving the tax system, the ship acquiring system, and various kinds of 
deregulation to reinforce the international competitiveness of the Korean shipping 
industry. This is directly connected with the survival of Korean shipping in the 
world shipping markets which have been rapidly changing since 1995 when the 
WTO was established. At the same time, the shipping policy of Korean 
government has been altered in a direction of self-regulation taking into account the 
management ability of the enterprises. These changes were legislated in parliament 
after an in-depth study by related departments of government, shipping companies 
and related institutions. However, negotiations regarding further changes for the 
shipping services on items such as [mance, basic communications and labour 
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mobility are to be continued by the WTO, within the NGMTS (Negotiating Group 
on Maritime Transport Service) with the participation of contracting countries [71]. 
The WTO shipping sector arrangements provided by the Korean government have 
been to offer further liberalisation in the areas of ocean-going passenger 
transportation, ocean-going cargo transportation, ship's maintenance and repair 
services [72]. 
3.3.1.2 Future Plans towards Liberalisation in Korea 
European Study Service (1993) [73] confirms that the free movement of people and 
goods by road, rail, water and air creates cohesion between the Member States of 
European Union. Mobility in itself is capable of doing more than any directive to 
stimulate transfrontier economic processes. The situational changes associated 
with the free trade movement in Korean shipping and shipbuilding deregulation are 
one aspect towards an opening of Korean domestic markets generally. These 
changes have been widespread and affected Korean shipping and shipbuilding 
policies in general, such that shipping liberalisation is a main stream in maritime 
concern. Initiatives to end cargo reservation and other restrictive practices will be 
taken by the end of 1998 as Korea comes under increasing international pressure to 
open further its shipping markets to international competition [74]. 
Customs duties have been imposed when a ship is imported, either new or second-
hand. However, for the Korean shipowner customs duties on vessels imported 
were abolished from 1997. Furthennore, the imposition of a corporate tax on the 
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marginal profits of sales and purchase, and that of insurance in ocean-going ships 
can be deferred (more than 5 years). This will support and hopefully lead to the 
unprovement of the fmancial structure in shipping companies, together with raising 
fmancial resources. Local taxes are higher than elsewhere and the author suggests 
they should be lowered to the same level as aircraft in terms of the rate of registered 
tax and acquisition tax (see Table 3.7, earlier). 
3.3.1.3 Korean Shipping under the IMF situations 
The financial crisis starting from the foreign exchange liquidity crisis in Korea in 
late 1997 has made the Korean economy a temporary disaster area in this respect. 
The overall weakness in financial markets in the Asian money markets has hit 
Thailand, Indonesia and other Asian economies, with an impact on the Korean 
money market. Along with this, several Korean conglomerates dependent on 
funding a large portion of their capital through a high debt ratio have raised their 
capital by borrowing at a short-term high interest, which has caused a weak 
financial structure in the corporate economy which has led to catastrophic results. 
Nicholls (1997) [75] also analyses that in the past, Korea's banking system has 
fuelled domestic industrial expansion through debt financing, which has caused the 
acquisition of massive external short- and long-term debt. It now threatens to 
consume all industrial reserves being funnelled into the country. However, some 
foreign investors have already started to withdraw their money as soon as they 
noticed the unstable business situation in Korea. As the dollar reserves became 
deflected from the Korean financial markets, interest rates and exchange rates had 
to be hiked, the Korean Won has depreciated and this makes for a consumer's price 
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acceleration [76]. 
In the meantime, a WTO agreement liberalising global trade in the multi trillion-
dollar fmancial seIVices sector was sealed in the middle of December 1997 and 
provides companies with unprecedented opportunities in new markets and much-
needed capital for emerging economies [77]. The agreement opens markets 
representing more than 95 percent of trade in banking, insurance, securities and 
financial infonnation. Many developing countries, including most of Southeast 
Asia's (now wounded) "tiger" economies, have hitherto barred foreigners from 
entering their banking and insurance sectors in a bid to protect domestic industry. 
The WTO agreement, which will come into effect in 1999, should slash some of 
these barriers, allowing foreigners some kind of toe-hold in once off-limit sectors 
and bringing advances in technology to ineffective enterprises. 
South Korea's banking industry has experienced successive years of poor earnings, 
and the government introduced measures in May 1996 to ward off a banking crisis 
similar to that suffered by Japan. Such a crisis could be precipitated by the 
increased foreign competition which will arise from the wider market access and 
liberalisation accompanying South Korea's planned accession to the OECD [78]. 
However, it is worthwhile to note WSTS (1996) 's analysis [79] about the current 
crisis, forecasting in advance. 
" Currency crises tend to sharply reduce the flow of funds to 
emerging markets. The Mexican peso crisis was no 
exception, and may have made a significant contribution to 
the easier tone of world capital markets in 1995. As a 
result of the crisis, Mexico's fixed capital fonnation fell by 
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an estimated 42 percent in 1995. This eliminated the 
imbalance between saving and investment that had produced 
a huge external deficit in 1994. The so-called "Tequila 
Effect" also spread south. Brazil has tightened monetary 
policy to curb its external deficit. Argentina has seen a 
sharp contraction in investment and a rise in saving, 
shrinking its current account deficit (p. II-20) ....... At the 
other extreme, there are increasing fears that some of the 
countries in Southeast Asia - Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, in particular - may be overheating 
and could suffer a Mexican-style crisis (p. II-22)." 
At present the Korean shipping industry has suffered from higher interest rates 
owing to the financial crisis, and this matter is a major controversial issue between 
the Korean shipping industry and banks. Singapore Shipping Times Online (1998) 
[80] conveys as follows: 
" Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. and other South Korean 
shipping companies asked the government to help resolve a 
dispute with local banks over interest rates to protect their 
earnings. The move, coordinated by the Korea Shipowners 
Association, comes as several Korean banks refuse to allow 
companies to withdraw funds until they pay additional 
interest on loans levied after the country's fmancial crisis 
sent borrowing costs soaring ....... Some of the banks are now 
demanding the shipping companies pay additional interest of 
0.5 percentage point to 3 percentage points above the 
London Interbank Offered Rate, the official said. The 
shipping companies had secured 20-year loans, paying about 
1 percentage point above LiboL " 
The fmancial crisis in container shipping can be traced to three key areas [81] : 
- Poor utilisation of assets (specially ship space) 
- Inadequate freight rates 
- Operating inefficiencies 
LSE (1993) [82] also confirms that if the market remains depressed for an extended 
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period, three might not be sufficient resources to keep the venture afloat. Thus, the 
need might arise to dispose of assets (at unsatisfactory levels) to generate cash flow 
and, thereby devalue shareholdings. 
Internet Web Site (1996) [83] further describes as below: 
" P&O debts may force the company to sell off all major 
assets in order to survive. A huge US$3 . 19-billion debt run 
up by P&O looks set to provide the foundations for the 
shedding of various assets including some shipping sectors. " 
In shipping, the ship purchased with bank money has started to sell because 
company cannot afford to pay the principal as well as the interest rate under the this 
fmancial situations. For example, Hanjin shipping phased out total 23 container 
vessels. These are 13 ships (2,700TEU), 6 ships (1,200TEU), 1 ship (750 TEV), 2 
ships (Panamax), 1 ship (handy size) and chartered in the number of vessels sold 
that is employed on the routes. The investment has been delayed or scaled down 
because of either a lack of money following the bank refusing loans to business 
using the excuse of having to raise their capital adequacy ratio to confonn to BIS 
(Bank of International Settlements) requirements, or high interest rate although 
financier offers the money. Therefore it is not impossible for Korean shipping 
company to invest new project at this time. 
Asia's flllancial crisis means there's far more goods being exported to Europe and 
the US than are being imported back to the Far East. Hanscom (1998) [84] 
examines what effect this imbalance of container box is having on the liner industry. 
The problem is a direct consequence of the Asia currency and economic crisis that 
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has restricted the movement of goods into Asia and spurred the export of Far East 
goods to the US and Europe. Because the Asian export legs were traditionally 
strong, the impact was the wrong medicine for an indusUy dependent on balance. 
And it came as a deluge. 
There have been also some effects in the US port owmg to Asian currencles 
problems. Following Containerisation International (1998) [85], the Asian crisis has 
had a mixed effect on West Coast N Olth American ports during the first quarter of 
1998. As loaded imports surged, ranging from 13.9% at Poland to a massive 370/0 
in Seattle, loaded exports also dropped. Overall Vancouver BC and the Southern 
California ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles did best with 9%, 6.7% increases 
respectively. The massive switch in balance is attributed solely to problems with 
Asian currencies. The drop in the value of Asian currencies has made goods 
produced in those economies more attractive and North American exports more 
expenslve. 
3.3.2 Current Korean Shipbuilding 
3.3.2.1 Present Situation in Korean Shipbuilding 
Shipbuilding in Korea is still a very important part of the national economy 
accounting for nearly 5% of exports by value. Like some other basic industries it is 
becoming a victim of the country's success. Large sums are being invested in further 
automation in the yards but severe wage inflation means that labour costs are 
increasing faster than productivity gains. At least the liberalisation of the fmancial 
system should reduce double digit interest rates. Cheap finance was one of the 
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advantages the Japanese held over their Korean competitors, but a more 
liberalised market should eliminate that. 
The state of the global shipbuilding indusny is closely related to the production 
capacity relative to the new-building demand. For many years shipbuilding has 
played a significant role in the economies of many of the world's industrialised 
nations [86]. Korea saw a significant increase in its shipbuilding capacity, along 
with the improved self-sufficiency ratio of ship related materials, by the beginning 
of 1997 when the expansion projects of its shipbuilding facilities were completed. 
Production efficiencies and other factors have considerably narrowed the gaps 
existing between Japan and Korea in the area of non-price competitiveness, such as 
technological skills and quality. Korea has succeeded in maintaining the level of 
quality comparable with that of Japan - in so far as the hull structure is concerned -
by building up the construction performances of a large quantity of diverse types of 
ships and marine structures throughout the 1980s, however, it is still lagging behind 
Japan in such areas as marine engines and ship related equipment [87]. 
In 1996, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) had defended the increase in capacity as 
an absolute necessity to remain competitive. Since it was committed to retaining its 
then current 12,000 shipbuilding workforce, increasing facilities was the only way 
to raise output per man. Samsung opened its new VLCC dock, the biggest in 
Korea, and had secured its first order in 1996 of that class from the Yukong Line. It 
is adding export VLCC orders to its list as well as getting in on the LNG tenders for 
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which it had prepared itself with considerable investment. Hanjin has to move out 
of its crowded Pusan centre site some time in the next ten years for environmental 
reasons. The yard has the benefit of a considerable demand for tonnage from Hanjin 
Shipping and its affiliate Keoyang Shipping. Daewoo steadfastly maintains that it 
was right not to expand even though the growth of other yards had dropped it from 
second to fourth place in tenus of capacity in a country where league tables matter 
[88]. 
3.3.2.2 Government Development Plan 
The OECD shipbuilding negotiations were settled and implemented from January 
1995, and are aimed at reducing subsidies and restricting dumping practices. The 
Department of Trade and Industry in Korea has assumed that the impact on 
industries in Korea will be great and therefore, have prepared a development plan 
for the shipbuilding industry. 
The Korean government has suggested three technological tasks to develop the 
future shipbuilding industry in Korea, which includes ship design and CSDP 
(Computer Supported Design Project), super high-speed vessels, and advanced 
technology for efficient operation. The technologies will be developed with related 
Korean industries. Furthennore, the Korean government intends to improve the 
business environments e.g. SOC (Social Overhead Capital) expansion and to 
deregulate various sectors that have hindered the development of the Korean 
shipbuilding industry so far, and to prepare plans to reinforce international 
cooperation between world shipbuilding countries [89]. 
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By pennission of the GECD shipbuilding agreement regarding partial development 
of technology through government subsidy, the Department of Trade and Industry 
will help to ease the bottleneck of development projects in the future. In addition 
to that, the government has decided to support projects which require advanced 
technology through the joint participation in industry, academia and institutes under 
the categoty permitted by the multilateral shipbuilding agreement. In order to do 
that, the government has put 12 billion Won (unit of Korean currency) into the 
second stage of the CSDP over four years which started in 1996, and jointly 
supported the development of a high-speed vessel design by putting 33 billion Won 
over six years starting from 1996 - 1997. Furthermore, five major shipbuilding 
companies have formed a technology research association with government 
planning and an investment of 7 billion Won in the industry. 
The Korean government, in pursuit of the policy to expand shipbuilding 
construction [mance gradually, is planning to secure more than 1 billion Won 
annually to support the construction fmance of BBC (bareboat charter on condition 
that the shipowners obtain Korean registry). Through the consultation with related 
departments such as the Finance and Economic Board, etc., the government is 
studying the concept to utilise the deferred-payment system to support export 
fmance on BBC ship construction. Regulations will be moderated and these include 
the abolition of the license approval for the BBC vessel built in domestic yards, and 
the requirement to use mechanical equipment produced in Korea for the 
construction of BBC vessels. 
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It is also intended that the government will withdraw general subsidies especially 
for large shipbuilding companies and they will be required to conduct their 
business without government interference as far as new entry and exit from the 
shipbuilding industry including expansion of capacity are concerned [90]. For the 
small shipbuilding companies, the government has decided to support technological 
innovations by establishing the small and medium shipbuilding institute for 
technology. 
The Korean government has set out to develop several items of prime technology, 
such as navigation and communication equipment that is difficult to produce locally, 
in order to develop these products for the shipbuilding industIy. Moreover, the 
sixty items of common technology which cause bottlenecks in the production 
process such as various control systems will be developed, which will pull the rate 
of local production up to 95 % by the year of 2000. The Korean government is 
determined to expand the use of mechanical equipment produced locally in the 
construction of government and public vessels. As a consequence the five major 
shipbuilding companies are obliged to use mechanical equipment produced locally. 
3.4 The Provisions by Korean Government and Banking 
3.4.1 Government Sector - Past -
3.4.1.1 Impediments to Liberalisation 
Any interference with, or distortion of, supply and demand in the market for 
international maritime transport serVIces is an impediment to trade. These 
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impediments restrict the freedom of choice of the buyers of transport servIces 
(shippers) andlor the freedom of the sellers (the carriers) to supply services to the 
market and to compete on equal tenus with each other. Schrier et al (1985) [91] 
defmed that impediments to trade in international maritime transport services deri\'e 
(i) from government actions, (ii) from private actions of groups of co-operating 
carriers and (iii) from contractual relations between selected shippers and carriers. 
3.4.1.2 Barrier to Entry 
The regulatory forms to foreigners in Korean shipping are largely categorised by : 
barrier to entry, restriction of the domestic market and investment in Korean 
companIes. In the book by Farthing (1993) [92] and the KMI (1990) [93] report, 
these points are elaborated as follows. First, investment by foreigners has been 
prohibited in the area of port facilities and its operation. Second, it has been 
restricted in areas of i) short sea feny and cargo services, ocean going cargo 
services (excluded in LNG, LPG and cross trade cargo service), ii) inland feny and 
cargo services, iii) pilotage, iv) freight forwarding, and v) cargo brokerage. Third, 
foreigners have been restricted by the Korean Shipping Act (regulation.no 27), 
which stipulates that Korean nationality has to hold the majority of shares and 
possess 3/5 voting rights on the board of directors in a company where there is 
foreigner investment into a Korean shipping company. 
Odeke (1984) [94] defmed the waiver system as both cargo reservation in a narrow 
sense, and cargo preference and cargo distribution in a broad sense. However, the 
Korean government puts the Korean shipper under an obligation to make use of 
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Korean flag vessels when transporting major designated cargoes (imported cargo 9 
items, exported cargo 2 items) by enforcement of the regulations of a waiver system 
(Korean Shipping Promotion Act, reg. 16) with a cargo reservation system. As far 
as cargo services by liner shipping are concerned, the Korean government allows 
Korean shippers only to load cargo on Korean flagged vessels. Waivers (a written 
confmnation to be exempt from using a Korean flagged ship) are issued in the case 
of a shipment not being able to be carried as cargo on a Korean flagged vessel, 
which makes it possible to use foreign flagged vessels. This waiver system has been 
judged as a contribution to both a stable transport system for import/export cargoes 
and a basis for business expansion. 
3.4.1.3 Subsidy System 
Government subsidies to the shipbuilding industry, either direct to owners or 
indirectly through national yards, have been an intrinsic part of new-building deals 
over the course of the last 25 years. However, during the early 1980s, it was 
generally thought that governments, endeavouring to generate employment for new-
building yards, compounded shipping problems by launching new-buildings into a 
market which was already significantly over-tonnaged. As a result, a steady 
stream of negotiations has taken place in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s 
designed to wind down government aid to the shipping industry. 
Nonetheless, problems do exists. Shipyard subsidies still exist in many countries, 
and while some governments are quite open about their aid to yards, others are more 
secretive [95]. The subsidised measure associated with new-building is of grant 
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benefit fmancially within the range of 80 percent in raIsmg domestic capital 
(Korean Shipping Promotion Act. reg. 4). Moreover, it is also possible for the 
Korean government to assist a loss caused in ocean going trade routes as well as 
allowances of an operational subsidy, which complies with the operational subsidy 
measures (Korean Shipping Promotion Act. reg. 14&5). This operational subsidy 
was recently suspended owing to the limitations of government fmance for the 
sector. 
3.4.2 Ship Acquisition Systems in Banking Sector -Past -
According to the method of raising capital studied by KMP A (1996) [96], Korean 
shipowners have three options for financing a ship. These can be classified into (i) 
planned shipbuilding fmanced by the Industrial Bank of Korea, (ii) BBCIHP 
financed from foreign banks at the level of fmancing permitted by the Korean 
government and (iii) the purchase of secondhand vessels via a foreign currency loan 
from the Korean Central Bank (KFX). 
3.4.2.1 Planned Shipbuilding 
This system, planned shipbuilding, is based on the Korean Shipping Industry 
Promotion Act 1976. This programme gives fmancial and monetary support to a 
government appointed end user on the condition that it orders ships from a shipyard 
in Korea. The government's purpose, for the linkage promotion for the development 
between the shipping and shipbuilding industry in Korea [97], was its only way to 
secure the newbuilding of ships. Total tonnage built by this method has reached 
4,730,000 GIT in 1996, which is 45 % of the overall ocean-going tonnage. 
However, this system has resulted recently in a notable reduction in the number of 
ocean-going vessels built, since the introduction of the new method to fmance ne\v-
building, namely BBCIHP fmancing with more favourable fmancial packages from 
foreign financiers. Moreover, in 1995, the actual record of planned shipbuilding 
utilised by the old method was under utilised. The fund allocated to the Industrial 
Bank of Korea was of 50 billion Won (Korea national currency unit) in order to 
promote the planned shipbuilding programme for ocean-going ships in 1996. 
3.4.2.2 BBCIHP 
This system is a method for financing new-building by a Korean shipowner who 
borrows capital from a foreign financier within the limit of funds permitted by the 
financing policy authorities. First, a paper company is established by a foreign 
fmancier in the third country, mainly FOC (Flag of Convenience) countries such as 
Panama, Liberia, etc,. Second, the order is undertaken by the paper company at a 
Korean or foreign yard. Third, the Korean shipping company takes a bareboat 
charter and operates the ship under the conditions of purchase on a deferred 
payment basis. Fourth, when repayment for the ship is ftnished, this ship can obtain 
a Korean flag. This system currently is the most popular method of securing vessels 
with Korean shipowners [98]. Ocean-going ships constructed at Korean yards by 
the way of BBCIHP were approximately 50 %, 5.28 million GIT, of the total of 
ocean-going ships in Korea between 1989 and 1995. 
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3.4.2.3 Purchase of Second-hand Ship 
At the end of 1992, the 'support policy for security of national fleet' decided upon 
by the 'Industry Policy Committee' announced the pennission to purchase second-
hand vessels within the 30 % of total tonnage needed annually. Capital for second-
hand ships' purchase was raised, mainly, by foreign currency reserves from the 
Korean Central Bank. 
3.4.2.4 Problems in Acquiring a Ship 
This system is supported by foreign currency courtesy of the Industrial Bank of 
Korea, but it is less advantageous than BBCIHP financing in tenns of loan interest, 
financing proportion, and the attached costs. However, an improvement of financial 
tenns over planned shipbuilding are needed to better utilise the capital for ocean-
going shipping companies. 
Recently, the way to secure ocean-going ships by Korean shipowners was by the 
BBCIHP method. Of the total capital spent in financing shipping in 1996, BBC/HP 
financing accounted for $1.8 billion, which is 86% of the total supporting capital, 
compared with the planned shipbuilding at 50 billion Won, and KFX at $ 200 
million for the second-hand ships which made up the remaining 14 %. The reason 
why Korean ocean-going shipping companies prefers BBCIHP over the planned 
shipbuilding and KFX system are that of the more favourable financial conditions 
offered by BBC/HP fmancing. The fmancing policy authority limits the use of 
BBCIHP fmancing annually due to foreign exchange and monetary management 
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policies. This attitude causes a surplus in demand, and causes some problems in 
securing new-building on time. This makes Korean shipping non-competitive and 
disadvantageous in terms of international competitiveness, compared with shipping 
companIes in advanced maritime countries that have no restrictions on ship 
financing. In 1996, the demand for BBCIHP fmancing in Korean shipping 
indusny was $ 3.9 billion, but the limit for BBCIHP financing was $ 1.8 billion, 
only 46 % of the demand. 
Table 3.8 Comparison between Limits for BBCIHP Financing 
and its Demand ( 'DOOm $) 
================================================ 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
limits amount 
for financing (A) 10 10 10 18 
demand (B) 15 18 26 39 
deficit 5 8 16 21 
proportion (AlB) 67% 56% 38 % 46% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [99] 
Table 3.9 The Financial Conditions between BBCIHP 
and the Planned Shipbuilding ___________ _ 
==--=--=========BBC7HP--=======Pl~~ed Shipbuildi~;------
s~~;~~-~-i~~~i~~-----.-f;;~i~~-fi-~~~~i~~------------~-f~r~i~~~~~~~~~-~fi~d~-~t-;i~l-b-~~k 
. LIBOR +a . application to quarterly floating 
loan rate 
repayment 
period, 
etc., 
.100% of ship price contracted 
.12 years after ship delivery 
. contract commission 
(0.5375 % of not 
drawing-out money) 
interest of industrial bank 
. 80% of ship price estimated 
· repayment in 8 years within 
max. of a five years' grace period 
· buying a certain level of industry 
financing bond 
· customs duties on imported 
materials (13 % of imported price) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Reference [100] 
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From the table the tenns available for the BBC/HP borrower seem more favourable 
in that they afford greater flexibility for the shipowner in meeting the change of 
market demand, and utilising potentially lower global costs. 
Even in 1995, the purchase of a secondhand ship less than 13 years old was 
pennitted on the condition that there were some restrictions, such as a ban to 
purchase Japanese-built containerships. A standard of ship purchase was prepared 
by the notice for diversified sources (notice of Department of Trade and Industry) in 
December 29, 1995. The standard includes a ban on the importing of vessels more 
than 20 years old, and vessels less than 1,000 tons. However, shipowners were able 
to import a vessel freely if the vessel was less than 15 years old without an import 
license. 
3.S The Changed Provisions by Shipping and Shipbuilding 
3.S.1 Government Side 
3.S.1.1 The Present Status of Liberalisation 
Full liberalisation and deregulation of the Korean shipping industry will be 
completed in the next couple of years. Since 1990, Korea was among the most 
active nations in freeing its shipping sector as part of the country's efforts to attain 
GEeD status which Korea gained in 1997. 
After 1988, the Korean government has been driving for market liberalisation 
through a gradual process, which includes the permission of foreign investment for 
the shipping-related businesses [101], the deregulation of the waiver system, and 
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pennission for foreign shipping companies to set up their agencies in Korea. The 
number of foreign shipping companies have been increasing and have begun calling 
at Korean ports. There were 222 companies in 1986 and 348 companies in 1989. 
The number has been increasing continuously since then, although at the time of 
uniting the figures have not yet been published for 1997- 8. 
lou (1994) [102] also explored shipping liberalisation in relation to cooperation and 
says that liberalisation in maritime transport should aim at a closer cooperation 
between the traditional maritime nations (TMNs) and the less developed countries 
(LDCs). Under the WTO rules it would be considered good practice for co-
operation between the developed and less developed countries in the maritime 
sectors utilising where possible cheap manpower of the less developed countries 
and cheaper capital available in the developed countries, thereby enhancing the 
efficiency of the maritime sector. In the Korean shipping sector, four overseas 
shipping companies (international passenger and cargo services, two companies in 
each sector) entered into the Korean market as freight forwarders and agents in a 
fonn of joint ventures, although the short sea cargo service still has restrictions 
upon foreign investment. 
In the international shipping industry, as shipping is an area where international co-
operation is essential, a multilateral agreement in relation to 100 items concerning 
cargo sharing, quality standards, qualifications, safety and environmental standards, 
etc. has been adopted under the supervision of various international institutions. 
Among them, only 60 items have yet taken effect. Korea has adopted major 
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agreements such as the code of conduct in liner shipping and has participated in 
international co-operation by implementing the treaty on the agreement. Below is 
the Korean government's offer list to the Uruguay Round of the GATT on the 
matter of shipping. 
Table 3.10 The Initial Offer to the UR on Shipping in Korea 
--------------------------------------- -
sector 
ocean-gomg 
passenger 
servIce 
service supply condition,Iimitation 
pattern on market access 
I 
II 
unlimited,unconditional, 
but government permission 
needed in liner (Shipping 
Act.reg.4) 
unlimited or unconditional 
III representative as Korean, 
J. V permitted in less than 
50% of foreigner's 
investment share 
(Shipping Act,reg.2) 
condit~on, qualification 
on natIOnal treatment 
unconditional or 
no qualification needed 
unconditional or 
no qualification needed 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ocean-gomg 
cargo 
servIce 
I flag preference system 
abolished (1,1995) 
unconditional or 
no qualification needed 
II unlimited or unconditional unconditional or 
ITI 
no qualification needed 
set up of branch office 
permitted (Shipping Act,reg.26). 
as Korean representative, 
J. V permitted for liner and 
special cargo 
~i:i~~~~--------------------i-------------~;:~~~~~---------------------------~~~~~~~-------
-related 
servIce 
(brokerage, 
agent, 
shipping 
management, 
ship lease) 
II 
III 
unlimited or unconditional 
as Korean representative, 
J. V permitted in less than 
50% offoreigner's 
investment share 
(Shipping Act,reg.27) 
- when J.V in shipping 
agent by foreign shipping 
company, the extent of 
business activity is 
limited on their cargo 
unconditional or 
no qualification needed 
none 
;o~~-:-;;-~~~~-~~~::e~~:x;;~~~~~-;~~~h;~;i~;-s~~~~-;~~~~-;~;;;~~-~ff~~-;i;;-----
III 
~~TN.TNCIW/61! on 8 service sectors submitted to UR/GNS at January, 1991. 
11) Roman ch~rter IS meant supply pattern of service that has (I) cross-board supply 
(II) consumptwn abroad (III) commercial presence (IV) movement of labour 
Source : Reference [103] . 
It can be seen from this table that there is a positive attempt by the Korean authority 
to substantially liberalise its maritime trade reflecting the general view that trade 
liberalisation and shipping is part of a general liberalisation policy for the economy 
at large. 
3.5.1.2 Policies Changes 
(1) Operational Aspects 
Owners will no longer have to go through a bureaucratic system of government 
approval before launching international services. From 1996, the licensing system 
for ocean-going shipping was scrapped. Other moves have included the easing of 
shipping route restrictions, the ending of restrictions on sale and purchase of vessels 
and the ending of the waiver system for liner trades. 
Under the reserved cargoes system, Korean shipping firms have had an exclusive 
operating right for certain, government-designated cargoes. Starting in 1997, the 
number of items which are subject to the cargo reservation system has been reduced 
to three - raw materials i.e. iron, coal and liquefied gas will be added to the list 
enabling foreign shipping lines to have full access to the market. This system of 
cargo reservation is to be completely abolished in January 1999, thus fully opening 
the domestic market to foreign competitors. Under these moves, the exclusiye right 
of domestic owners to cany a percentage of the country's grain, petrochemical, and 
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crude oil imports and exports will also be scrapped. 
Foreign carriers have been allowed to set up full branch offices in Korea since 1989 
and from May 1995 they were allowed to invest up to 50% of the shares in 
shipping-related businesses in Korea such as shipping agents and freight forwarders. 
In June 1993 the Korean Shipping Act was revised to allow 100 % investment by 
foreigners, removing all investment restrictions. 
(2) Financial Aspects 
Most issues relating to liberalisation in shipping are related to a reduction of the 
barriers to domestic market accesses. Financial issues in Korean shipping are 
related to the acquisition of vessels and the abolition of the 2.5 % customs duties 
on the introduction of vessels on to the flag, either new or second-hand from abroad, 
from January of 1997 [104], and the increases in advances from Korean and foreign 
banks which shipowners can use when they secure a vessel in Korean or foreign 
yard. Korean bank have not in the past offered more favourable terms than that of 
foreign banks. Sometimes, Korean shipowner has raised the money by syndicated 
loans participated in foreign banks [105]. 
In the present IMF involved circumstances with the economy in financial 
difficulties it is possible that even more foreign sources of fmance can be favoured 
by the shipping sector in Korea. However, according to the liberalisation moves, 
every part of the shipping industry benefits from a more open or relaxed financial 
system relating to ship acquisition, i.e. planned shipbuilding, BBCIHP and second-
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hand purchase options. The room for state support for the indusny is narrowing 
and it is unlikely that shipbuilding subsidies will feature as a main stimulus for 
shipowner investment in the future. 
(3) Shipbuilding Negotiations 
Multilateral shipbuilding negotiations have been carried on through OEeD since 
October, 1989 by the USA shipbuilding industry appealing to USTR (United States 
Trade Representative) in June, 1989 because four countries, Korea, W.Gennany 
(then), Japan and Norway, supplied their domestic shipbuilding industry with 
subsidies. More than four years of negotiations between the parties have led to 
many points in dispute to be agreed upon. Especially, following the settlement of 
the UR negotiations, the multilateral negotiations on the shipbuilding and steel 
industry that were in progress at the same time as the UR, were directly affected. 
Accordingly, both the Korean government and the shipbuilding industry together 
planned to cope with the settlement of the negotiations, and tried to minimise the 
expected impacts on the shipbuilding industry in Korea [106]. 
3.5.2 Banking Sector 
3.5.2.1 Improvement for Ship Finance in Korea 
As far as shipping finance in Korea is concerned, improvement has been more 
accelerated by IMF options to ask the Korean government to open the full financial 
market and abolish the barrier to entIy in the Korean domestic markets. some points 
has to be improved. First, as a reference, BBCIHP financing in 1996 was $ 1.8 
billion, compared with $ 1 billion in 1995, although the amount available was 
1l~ 
greater, it was insufficient compared to the demand from the industry. };ow, the 
limit on capital for BBC/HP ship construction has been abolished and possible to 
acquire foreign capital without a limit on capital they need. However, according 
to the agreement with IMF at November 1997 after the fmancial crisis, the Korean 
government has allowed the shipowners to have capital without limit to acquire a 
ship at either Korean or foreign yards per year, and also has simplified the process 
of capital raising on the BBC/HP option [107]. 
As far as planned shipbuilding is concerned, an attached condition such as the 
buying of industrial bank debentures for the improvement of the loan conditions has 
been relaxed, then, it is possible to activate capital for planned shipbuilding 
supported by the Industrial Bank of Korea. But, this scheme is more 
disadvantageous than BBC/HP fmancing in terms of interest rates. But, the 
possession of ships in the name of local overseas corporations established by 
Korean shipping companies should be allowed in order to secure an economic 
vessel as well as to diversify the method of securing ships. Furthermore, the 
reserved foreign currency by the Korean Central Bank (KFX) should not be limited 
to the purchase of secondhand vessels, it should be enlarged. Most importantly, 
Korean shipping companies should strengthen their industrial competitiveness and 
reduce their financial costs systematically. 
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Chapter IV: The Preparatory Step to Statistical Analysis 
4.1 The Process of Hypothesis Testing 
The statistical tests in this dissertation were conducted on a sample survey of 
business executives in the Korean shipping industries such as shipping, bank, 
government and shipbuilding industry sample during the period December 1996. 
A total of 71 respondents of which there were 30 shipping companies (16 liners and 
14 tramps), 14 from the banking sectors, 13 government officials and 14 from the 
shipbuilding industry. 
In order to perfonn a hypothesis test, the methodology adopted is that we make 
some assumptions about the sample of the population that it confonns to the 
manager groups in the industry as a whole. The null hypothesis (HO), that 
managers see no difference in the decision-making process as a result of trade 
liberalisation, is tested against the alternative hypothesis (HA), that managers do 
have differences resulting from the adoption of free trade principles. On the basis of 
our sample fmdings, we either accept or reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative. The failure to reject the null hypothesis does not imply that the null is 
true. It simply means that the sample evidence is inconclusive to lead to a rejection 
of it. 
The process of hypothesis testing must be carried out in a precise manner. There are 
basically four steps for the completion of test. First, is to detennine the hypothesis 
under consideration. This requires that we decide if it is a one-tailed or two-tailed 
test in this case it is two-tailed test because the comparators are at the extreme ends , 
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of the distribution (see Appendix. 14). Second, we have to calculate the critical value 
of significance for the sample statistic. Third, we have to fonnulate a decision rule 
based on the critical value. Fourth, we have to draw a proper conclusion or 
inference according to the decision rules chosen. These four steps can be 
summarised as follows [1] : 
Step 1. Fonnulate the hypothesis. 
Step 2. Calculate the critical value. 
Step 3. Detennine the decision rule. 
Step 4. State the conclusion of the test regarding rejection of the rule, 
and any interpretation that might be derived from that conclusion. 
4.2 Sampling Procedure 
The survey had to encompass all the large Korean shipping companies, banks, 
government and shipbuilding companies involved in shipping investment. A total 
population of 102 Korean companies was identified for the study, extracted from 
the Yearbook of Korean Shipping Industry published by the Korea Shipping 
Gazette (1996) [2]. The survey questionnaire was faxed to target respondents and 
answers were faxed back or by post or direct collection by surveyor's visit. The 
sample chosen includes 20 ocean-going liners and 20 tramp shipping companies, 16 
banks, 20 respondents from government (Ministry of Korea Maritime and Fishery) 
and 20 shipbuilding companies. The sample was selected because they are directly 
or indirectly linked with shipping investment. Among the 98 total target 
respondents, 71 persons responded to the survey. This was supplemented by 
interviews and telephone conversations in order to identify the manager's attitudes 
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In a number of areas associated with their decision-making and what possible 
effects the changes in liberalisation of their industry would have on their thinking. 
Respondents were estimated as highly reliable persons who have worked in the 
shipping finance departments in shipping company and banks, in the shipping 
policy department of government and in sales department in shipbuilding 
companies for more than 10 years. The collection of questionnaire is especially 
valuable because in shipping sectors, it was from a limited but significant number of 
the sample group chosen from the whole population of the target group. Second, it 
is a such a difficult matter to get an opinion from government officials and the 
government sponsored bank in Korea in relation to their direct policy making, 
especially in developing counny characterised as a conservative and bureaucratic 
society such as Korea. It was fortunate for the thesis to have responses from those 
sectors through several supporters highly positioned in the four sectors who helped 
to organise contacts with other respondents and to distribute the questionnaire 
themselves. 
4.3 The Method of Analysis 
The methods adopted were to use, first applying SPSS, a "t- test" for testing the 
null hypothesis that the two population means are equal, and second the "Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test", which is a nonparametric procedure used with two 
related samples to test the null hypothesis that the distributions of two variables are 
the same. The latter makes no assumptions about the shapes of the distribution of 
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the two variables, and the absolute values of the differences between the two 
variables are calculated for each case and ranked from smallest to largest, and 
furthennore, the test statistic is based on the sums of ranks for negative and positive 
differences. 
The reason why this method is chosen is because the nature and pattern of responses 
are related to a comparison between before and after results, under one factor, that 
is liberalisation. The merit of the method chosen is also to provide the influential 
level and change which has occurred between two points that are applied to one 
standard. Therefore, this two way analysis is properly used to interpret each 
question posed. Accordingly, the level of significance was tested by mean, and the 
significant difference by the p-value of critical factors in the questionnaire, and the 
strategies were analysed for future consideration of the fmancial managers, 
regarding the pre- and post-liberalisation environments. First is examination of the 
perceptions within the four groups of shipping, bank, government and shipbuilding 
sector in chapter 5 (breakdown of survey result is shown on Appendix 2.1 to chapter 
5 ), second, is an examination of the differences between four groups as to their 
conception of the Korean shipping sector to be analysed in chapter 6 (breakdown of 
survey result is given in Appendix 2.2 to chapter 6 ). 
4.4 Deductive Results 
The deductive approach method is applied by either accepting or rejecting the 
hypothesis already set up, which assumes there is no significant difference between 
the before- and after-liberalisation by shipping market as it affects shipping 
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investment in Korea. 
Tests are to be performed on independent and paired samples given a confidence 
interval of 95%), and nonparametric tests are employed to investigate any 
significant differences between before and after liberalisation attitudes of the 
respondennts. 
The rust stage is to test the hypothesis that there is no significant difference within 
four sectors in relation to shipping investment, comparing before- and after-
liberalisation in Korean shipping. In order to test this hypothesis, a paired-samples 
t - test, frequencies and nonparametric analysis is used, that is the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test (2 related samples test) is adopted because the 
nature of this survey is to test a significant difference of changes under the same 
group. The result is given in chapter 5 and Appendix 2.1. 
The second stage is to test any differences between four groups, as regards 
shipping investment, comparing the before and after liberalisation. The result is 
given in chapter 6 and Appendix 2.2. The methodology taken is to use a paired-
samples t - test that is measured on a Likert one-to-five scale to identify whether 
there is no difference between mean scores for survey variables, as well as the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. 
Third, six major models set up at chapter 2 are also re-interpreted, discussed in 
chapter 8. 
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4.5 Determinant of Shipping Investment 
In this thesis some factors are used as determinants of investment in the shipping 
companies and these are regarded as the potentially important factors determining 
investment for new vessels, the conversion of existing tonnage or the purchase of 
second-hand ships are concepts supported by shipping economists and practitioners 
[3]. It is natural for a financial manager in a shipping company to utilise these 
factors in assessing shipping investment. 
Seven factors, and associated sub-factors, were presented to participants in order to 
test the hypothesis, as listed below: 
4.5.1 The Present Government Shipping Policy 
- current government subsidy 
- the current impediment to the liberalisation 
- the effect on government regulations 
4.5.2 The Shipping Market Situation 
- shipping cycles 
- change in market situation 
- supply and demand of ships 
- trade routes 
- ship types 
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4.5.3 Shipping Finance 
- macro-source of [mance 
- micro-source of [mance 
- fmancial conditions 
- capital structure 
- capital cost 
- rate of loan 
- external factors of investment 
- investor's attitude towards risk 
- timing of shipping investment 
- factors regarding ship operations 
- fmancial conditions in Korea 
- methods of ship acquisition 
4.5.4 The Return on Shipping Investment 
- return on investment 
- methods of investment evaluation 
4.5.5 Choice of Shipyard 
- selection of yard 
- factors considered as yard selection 
- ship registry 
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4.5.6 Depreciation in Ships 
- period of depreciation 
4.5.7 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
- purpose of alliance 
- preference of partners in a potential alliance 
There were no additional factors suggested by respondents, who filled in the 
questionnaire. The selection of the factors above was considered an appropriate 
means to measure a respondent's views of shipping investment both before- and 
after-liberalisation. 
4.6 Testing Hypotheses Using the Differences in Means 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics may be an early step in exploring and understanding a new set 
of data. Before deciding what it describes ( the location or centre of the 
distribution, its spread, etc.), the type of variables present should be analysed. 
For many statistical purposes, counts are treated as measured variables. Arithmetic 
calculations like average and differences make sense for both measurements and 
counts, but not for the codes of unordered categorical variables. 
The most common statistical descriptors are appropriate for quantitative variables. 
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In particular, mean and standard deviations are appropriate for quantitative variables, 
especially those that follow a normal distribution. Often, however, real data do not 
meet this assumption of normality, because the distribution is skewed or contains 
outliers, gaps, or other problems. 
4.6.2 Tests for Comparing Means 
The t - Test and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) procedures, test the hypotheses 
about means of quantitative variables. The purpose is to draw conclusions about 
population parameters based on statistics observed in the sample. These tests are 
available from the Compare Means and the ANOV A Model menus. When the data 
comes from markedly non-nonnal distributions, a nonparametric test may be more 
appropriate and often essential for qualitative variables. Rather than using the data 
as recorded, several of the tests use ranks. While the nonparametric test statistics 
drop the assumption of normality, they do have assumptions similar to their 
parametric counterparts. 
4.6.2.1 The t-test for Paired Observations 
Independent-Samples and the t - test procedure test whether the means of a single 
variable for subjects in one group differ from that of another group. The Mann-
Whitney rank sum test is a nonparametric analog for the two-sample t test. It is used 
to test that two samples come from identically distributed populations - i.e. there is 
no shift in the centre of location. The test is not completely distribution-free, since 
it assumes that the populations have the same shape. Thus, the groups may differ 
132 
with respect to their centre of location, but they should have the same variability 
and skewness. Other nonparametric tests for two independent samples are the 
Moses test of extreme reactions, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the Wald-
W olfowitz runs test. These tests were not chosen for this dissertation an , 
explanation of which is shown in Appendix 14). 
The paired-samples t - test procedure (also known as a dependent t test) to test 
whether the mean of the casewise differences between two variables differs or 
equals zero. A typical study design for this test could include a 'before' and 'after' 
measure for each subject. The before and after measures are stored as separate 
variables, and this method is adopted in this thesis. This test is also appropriate for 
a matched pairs design, where subjects are matched on a variable that is related to 
the measure studied [4]. 
As far as a two-tailed hypothesis test for the population mean is concerned, there are 
numerous instances in which it may need to test a hypothesis about the value of the 
population mean. In essence, a large number of business decisions are based on the 
popUlation mean. If evidence regarding this parameter can be gathered, those 
decisions are more reliable and are likely to produce more favorable outcomes [5]. 
It is also noted that tests of significance are particularly appropriate when the data 
come from a controlled experiment [6]. 
4.6.2.2 The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Rank Test 
The Wilcoxon procedure looks very attractive, even preferable to the t-procedure, 
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but it is not assumption-free. The assumptions under which the results quoted apply, 
both for the t-test and for the Wilcoxon test, include three quite restrictive 
assumptions [7]. First, all of the observations must have been sampled from the 
same popUlation (F). This implies, among other things, that each of the observations 
must have the same variance (provided the variance exists). Second, the 
observations must be statistically independent of one another. Often this assumption 
fails, particularly when the observations are taken sequentially in time. Third, (F) 
the distribution must be symmetric. 
The Mann-Whitney and the related Wilcoxon tests are nonparametric alternatives to 
the independent-samples t test. Like the t test, Mann-Whitney tests the null 
hypothesis that two independent samples come from the same population. Rather 
than being based on parameters of a nonnal distribution like mean and variance, the 
Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney statistics are based on links. The Wilcoxon statistics 
(W) is calculated by ranking the pooled observations of the two samples, and 
obtaining the sum of the ranks of the popUlation with the smaller sample size. The 
Mann-Whitney statistics (U) which is equivalent to the Wilcoxon statistics, is 
obtained by counting the number of times an observation from the group with the 
smaller samples size precedes an observation from the larger group. 
The Mann-Whitney U - test (or simply the U - test) tests the equality of two 
population distributions. It is based on the assumption that two random samples are 
independently drawn from continuous variables. In this broadest sense, the null 
hypothesis states that the distributions of two populations are identical. However, 
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the test can be tailored to examine the equality of two population means or medians. 
To test the equality of mean, it should be assumed that the populations are 
symmetrical and have the same variance. Under these conditions the Marm-Whitney 
U test serves as the nonparametric alternative to the t-test, except it does not require 
the assumption of normality. If the assumption of symmetry is dropped, the median 
replaces the mean as the test statistics [8]. 
However, the Mann-Whitney U test is the same as the Wilcoxon rank sum test, but 
differs from the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test that is used in this thesis. 
The sign test is carried out in terms of the signs of the differences between matched 
pairs of observations, without regard to the magnitudes of these differences. The 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test is another nonparametric test for 
significant differences between paired observations, which does take account of the 
magnitudes of the differences. Therefore when the differences between paired 
observations can be quantitatively measured rather than merely assigned rankings 
[9], the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test is preferable to the sign test. Both 
the sign test and the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test may be considered 
substitutes for the analogous parametric t test for paired observations. However, 
while the parametric t test for paired observations requires the assumption that the 
underlying population of differences is normally distributed, the nonparametric tests 
have the advantage of making no assumption about the population distributions [10]. 
As a nonparametric analog to the paired t test, the SPSS system provides the sign 
test and the Wilcoxon signed -rank test. For each pair of observations, the sign test 
uses only the direction of the differences (positive or negative), while the Wilcoxon 
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signed-rank test begins by ranking the differences without considering the signs, 
restoring the sign to each rank, and fmally summing the ranks separately for the 
positive and negative differences. 
4.6.3 One-way and Factorial Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of variance is an extension of the two-samples t test to more than two 
groups. This analysis examines the variability among the sample means relative to 
the spread of the observations within each group. The null hypothesis is that the 
samples of values come from populations with equal means. 
For a one-way analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA), groups or cells are defined 
. using the levels of a single grouping factor that has two or more levels. In a factorial 
ANOVA, cells are defmed using the cross-classification of two or more factors. 
4.6.4 Testing Relationships 
In selecting a statistic to measure the relationship between variables, it should 
identify what types of variables it is investigating. If the values are categories, it 
will be fmding an appropriate measure in the 'Crosstabs' procedure. If the values are 
from a quantitative distribution that can be considered nonnal, a linear model may 
be used e.g. Regression or a Pearson correlation in the Bivariate Correlation 
procedure. If nonnality is too strong an assumption to make, the Spearman 
correlation might be considered ( see Appendix. 14). 
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4.7 Using SPSS 
4.7.1 The Function of the SPSS 
The SPSS system used in this thesis is a comprehensive and flexible statistical 
analysis and data management system. SPS S can take data from almost any type 
of file and use them to generate tabulated reports, charts and plots of distributions 
and trends, descliptive statistics, and complex statistical analyses [11]. 
4.7.2 Data Analysis in SPSS 
SPSS is a comprehensive statistical software system that aids the data analysis 
process at any level, with procedures ranging from data listings, tabulations, and 
descriptive statistics to complex statistical analyses. Integrated with the statistical 
procedures are graphics for screening data, understanding and interpreting analyses, 
and communication results. This is the statistical package used in this dissertation. 
137 
References 
[1] Webster, Allen L. (1995), Applied Statistics for Business and Economics, 
Chicago, Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
[2] Korea Shipping Gazette (1996), Yearbook of Korean Shipping IndustIy, Seoul. 
[3] Branch, Alan.E (1994), Economics of Shipping Practice and Management, 
Chapman and Hall, London. 
[4] SPSS (1996), Base 7.0 Applications Guide, Chicago, SPSS Inc. 
[5] Webster (1995), op.cit. 
[6] Harvey, A.C (1982), The Econometric Analysis of Time Series, Philip Allan 
Publishers Ltd., Oxford, UK. 
[7] Thisted, Ronald A., Elements of Statistical Computing, Numerical Computation, 
The University of Chicago. USA 
[8] Webster (1995), op.cit. 
[9] Huntsberger, Davis V., Croft, DJames., Billingsley, Patrick (1980), Statistical 
Inference for Management and Economics, Statistical Inference for Management 
and Economics, Allyn and Bacon, Inc, Boston, 2nd ed. 
[10] Hamburg, Morris (1977), Statistical Analysis for Decision Making, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. New York, USA. 
[11] SPSS (1993), SPSS for Windows: Base System User's Guide Release 6.0, 
Chicago, Marketing Department, SPSS Inc. 
138 
Chapter V: Analysis of Survey Results within Four Groups 
5.1 Total Survey Result within Four Sectors 
This chapter investigates the null hypothesis that there are no significant differences 
and changes in the investment decision-making process between pre and post 
liberalisation of the Korean shipping, bank, government and shipbuilding industry. 
The breakdown of survey result is given in Appendix 2 (2.1). 
5.2 Government Shipping Policy 
Table 5.1 Significant Difference in Government Shipping Policy 
==============~=========~====================== 
item CHANGED UNCHANGED 
---- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------- --(A) 6 5 (a-e) 1 (t) 
(B) 11 9 (a-h, k) 2 (i-j) 
---- -----------------.---------------- ---------------------------------- --(C) 4 1 (d) 3 (a-c) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) Government Subsidy 
(a : operational subsidy, b: construction subsidy, c: financial aid, d: waiver system, 
e : cargo preference, f : tax benefit) 
(B) The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation 
(a : appointed route, b : route license, c : investment restriction to foreigners, d : ban to buy 
second-hand vessel, e : limits on business expansion, f: waiver system in liner shipping, 
g : waiver system in bulk shipping, h : ship acquisition system, i : vessel-related tax, 
j : ship registry system, k : seafarer policy) 
(C) General Regulations by Country 
(a: FMC, b: DG IV, c: Intll regulations(IMO, UNCTAD,etc), d : Korean regulations) 
Respondents generally recognise the changes in government shipping policy of 
Korean shipping industry following liberalisation. As far as government subsidy 
is concerned, the null hypothesis set up was rej ected for all factors except tax 
matters, which means this beneficial aspect is reduced by change, on the other hand, 
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the obligatory and non-beneficial side such as tax remams as it was, by an 
unchanged observation. 
It is also revealed that the respondents expressed dissatisfaction on tax matters, by 
continually mentioning the no change in the vessel-related tax and ship registry 
system as important factors impeding the liberalisation policy (it is supposed that 
second ship registry system is to be launched in 1999.1.1). However, respondents 
on the regulatory matters answered that there has been a change in relation to 
Korean regulations and the null hypothesis is rejected in this respect. Accordingly, 
the survey result show that the liberalisation brought some changes into Korean 
shipping in general tenus, except for tax matters. 
5.3 Shipping Market Situation 
Table 5.2 Significant Difference in Shipping Market Situations 
==~========~================~=~=============~== 
item CHANGED UNCHANGED 
(A) 1 1 (a) o 
---- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------- -. (B) 
(C) 
7 
6 
3 (b, c, t) 4 (a,d,e,g) 
5 (a-c, e,t) 1 (d) 
---- ---------------------------------- -.-------------------------------- --(D) 7 7 (a-g) 0 
---- ------------.--------------------- -.-------------------------------- --(E) 5 5 (a-e) 0 
----.- ---------------.------------------ ----.---------------------------- ----
(A) Shipping Cycle 
(a : shipping cycle) 
(B) Shipping Market Situation 
(a : rates, b: trade volumes, c : tonn.a~e, d: ship price, e: number of demolition, 
f: operational performance & productIvIty, g: shipping cycle) 
(C) Supply and Demand of Ship 
(a : rates, b: market expectatIOns, c: capital availability, d: shipbuilding capability, 
l~O 
e : unit cost of shipyard, f: construction subsidy) 
(D) Trade Route 
(a : transpacific route, b: European route, c: trans-Atlantic route, d: intra-Asia route, 
e : Korean-Japanese route, f: south-north route, g: niche route) 
(E) Type of Tonnage 
(a : container ship, b: bulk ship, c: tanker, d: specialised ship, e: other ships) 
As for the shipping market situation, respondents replied that after liberalisation, the 
shipping cycle will get rapidly shorter, with greater emphasis on freight rates 
influencing tonnage and a general movement in favour of containerisation in the 
Trans Pacific routes. 
In the shipping cycle responses, the results come out differently when analysed in 
absolute and relative terms. In some cases, they have recognised changes in trade 
volume and tonnage being built, but responded to some factors such as rates 
(restoration) still as unchanged following liberalisation. Furthennore, it is also 
judged that although the fluctuation to supply and demand of shipping market does 
influence rates, the rate will stay as it was if new-building increases at the same rate 
as trade volumes changes were observed in all areas other than shipbuilding 
capability. All trade routes were considered to be influenced by liberalisation, abd 
type of tonnage, likewise resulted in a rejected hypothesis. As a consequence, 
respondents demonstrated that shipping liberalisation should make decisive changes 
and influences in the shipping market. 
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5.4 Shipping Finance 
Table 5.3 Significant Difference in Shipping Finance 
======================================= 
item CHANGED UNCHANGED 
(~) -3-- -------------i---(b)-------------- ---------------i(~~)------------- --
---- ---------------------------------- ------------.------(B) 3 2 (a,c) 1 (b )-------------- --
(C) -7-- -------------7-~~~)-------------- -----------------C;---------------- --
(D) --1-- --------------()------------------ ----------------i(~)-------------- --
---- ---------------------------------- ----------.----------------------- --(E) 1 0 l(a) 
(F) 
(G) 
(H) 
(1) 
1 
8 
1 
1 
o 1 (a) 
6 (a-e, h) 2 (fg) 
o 1 (a) 
.-------------------------------- --
1 (a) o 
.----- --------------------------------- .---------------------------------
(1) 7 4 (a,b,e,g) 3 (b,d,f) 
--.- -.-------------------------------- ---------------------------------- .-(K) 3 0 3 (a-c) 
---- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------- .-
(L) 1 1 (a) 0 
.------------------------------------------------_._----_._---------------------
(A) Source of Finance 
(a : domestic capital, b: foreign capital, c: internal capital) 
(B) External Method of Finance 
(a : shipyard credit, b: bank finance, c: lease finance) 
(C) Financial Conditions 
(a : financial source, b: interest rate, c: loan rate, d: repayment period, e: tax, 
f: exchange rate, g: inflation rate) 
(D) Capital Structure 
(a : capital structure) 
(E) Capital Cost 
(a : capital cost) 
(F) Rate of Loan 
(a : rate of loan) 
(G) External Factor to Investment Decision-making 
(a : period ofROI, b: decision-maker's attitude towards risk, c: shipping cycle, 
d : timing factors, e: capital structure, f: confidence in decision-making, g: bank's 
attitude, h: financial service level) 
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(H) Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
(a : investor's attitude towards risk) 
(I) Timing of Shipping Investment 
(a : timing of shipping investment) 
(1) Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation 
(a : market share, b: profitability (rates), c: load factor, d: fixed cost, e: floating 
cost, f: choice on routes, g: operational service level) 
(K) Financial Conditions in Acquiring a Ship 
(a : planned shipbuilding, b: bareboat charter on hire purchase, c: secondhand ship 
purchase) 
(L) Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
(a : method of ship acquisition in Korea) 
As far as shipping finance is concerned, in nearly all the factors, while the order of 
priority is the same between before and after liberalisation, the significance of risk 
averse behaviour decreases relatively and a proportion of risk-mixed behaviour 
increases after liberalisation, which suggests a more rational and active investment 
process in terms of the investor' s attitude after liberalisation. 
Liberalisation can be also expected to activate more shipping investment as a result 
of the changes in financial conditions, considering that the fmancial conditions for 
shipping investment for new-building is very important and a kind of precondition 
to shipping investment liberalisation will have a significant effect on this matter. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that (although investment attitude following 
liberalisation is not affected) on account of the change in external factors to 
investment, as well as the fmancial conditions prevailing, the shipping investor 
would undertake more rational and prudent investment activities (risk mixed) when 
making a shipping investment decision. Furthennore, the process of acquiring a 
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ship will be changed by liberalisation according to the respondents. As a whole, 
the factors concerning shipping fInance will be strongly influenced by liberalisation. 
5.5 Return on Shipping Investment 
Table 5.4 Significant Difference in Return on Shipping Investment 
=~====================~======================== 
item CHANGED UNCHANGED 
(A) 1 o 1 (a) 
---- ---------------------------------- ----.----------------------------. .-
(B) 1 o l(a) 
------ .---------------------.---------- --------------------------------- .---
(A) Return on Shipping Investment 
(a : return on shipping investment) 
(B) Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
(a : evaluation method on shipping investment) 
Although there is revealed no change in the shipping investment return there is the 
view that investment horizons are now going to be much shorter term and 
liberalisation will result in a change in investment policies 
5.6 Choice of Shi pyard 
Table 5.5 Significant Difference in Choice of Shipyard 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
======~======================================== 
item CHANGED UNCHANGED 
---- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------- --
1 o 1 (a) 
---- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------- --
8 6 (c-h) 2 (a,b) 
---- -------------------------- ------- ---------------------------------- ---
I 0 1 (~ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) Country's Shipyard 
(a : country's shipyard) 
(B) Shipyard Selection 
(a : construction capability, b: labour force, c: technology, d: ship-linked industry, 
e : price competitiveness, f: non-price competitiveness, g: exchange rate in market, 
h : int'l competitiveness) 
(C) Ship Registry Country 
(a : ship registry country) 
As for choice of shipyard, price competitiveness (ship price) and technology are still 
the most important factors and there is much change due to liberalisation. 
Especially, respondents point out that Korea is considered as the best world 
shipbuilding country even though the level of significance decreases relatively, and 
nearly all factors are affected by liberalisation in conjunction with shipyard 
selection. Panama is regarded the most favorite country for an Foe regime. In 
conclusion, respondents noted that liberalisation impacts on shipyard selection 
decisively, and at present this choice of shipyard still remains favourable to Korea, 
and that of registry goes to Panama. 
5.7 Depreciation in Ships 
Table 5.6 Significant Difference in Depreciation in Ships 
=~==~========================~================= 
(A) Depreciation in Ship 
(a : depreciation in ship) 
Changes in the rate of depreciation are as a consequence of the shorter investment 
horizon, hence the null hypothesis is again rejected. 
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5.8 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Table 5.7 Significant Difference in Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
========================================= 
item CHANGED 
(A) 1 1 (a) 
(B) 1 o 
(A) Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
(a : strategic alliance in shipping) 
(B) Preference to Partnership 
(a : preference to partnership) 
UNCHANGED 
o 
l(a) 
In relation to strategic alliance in shipping, respondents believe that there will be a 
shift from market expansion to cost savings as a reason for such alliances after trade 
liberalisation. It also noted that preference to partnership is not a factor to be 
influenced by the liberalisation moves. In other words, a strategic alliance is 
required in order to cope with market changes (trade routes, supply and demand of 
ship, etc.) as previously shown. 
Generally speaking, shipping investment in Korea has been decisively affected by 
liberalisation moves. This tells us that shipping liberalisation will make a sort of 
epoch-making turning point for the industry in Korea. 
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Chapter VI: The Comparison of Survey Results between Four Groups 
6.1 Survey Result of Each Group between Four Sectors 
This chapter examines four groups of the shipping sector in order to evaluate the 
limits of liberalisation in the Korean shipping industry. It will test the significant 
differences between shipping companies, banks, government and the shipbuilding 
industry before and after liberalisation. 
The attribute to be investigated is in relation to government shipping policy, 
shipping market situation, shipping finance, choice of shipyard, depreciation policy 
in shipping, and alliances (or consortia) in shipping. The analysis chosen will also 
identify any bias in the results in this chapter which may be caused by the decision-
makers in the four different sectors having substantially different views of the 
future, resulting in different priorities to that of the decision-makers in the four 
sectors. T-tests are used to indicate the scale of significance and Nonparametric 
tests with 2 related samples confirm the suitability of the sample. Four groups were 
compared in relation to each of the factors in the questionnaire. The breakdown of 
survey result is given in appendix 2 (2.2). 
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6.2 Government Shipping Policy 
Table 6.1 Comparison with Government Shipping Policy 
ltem CHANGE ____ _____ NO CHANGE 
___ S/c:----i3~~---(}~~;----SnB---- ---~ic:----Eia~----Ci~~~---5;nB----
6 - ----4--------i--------j--------i----- -----i------:i--------j---------S-----(A) 
(B) 
____ _~::~:~ _____ ~~~!. __ ~~,~-:!. ____ 5~! _______ ~~:~! __ (c-f) (b,c,f) (b-f) 
11 10 1 6 1 - io------S---------io-----
_____ ~~:~,~} ____ ~~!. __ ~~:':':~~_~___ (t) J) (a-j) (d,f,h,i,k) (a-e,g-k) 
(C) 4 1 0 0 ---0--- --3--------4--------4--------4"------
_______ ~~~_______________ (a-c) (a-d) (a~) (a-d) 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB: Shipbuilding Company 
(A) Government Subsidy 
(a : operational subsidy, b: construction subsidy, c: financial aid, d: waiver system, e: 
cargo preference, f: tax benefit) 
(B) The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation 
(a : appointed route, b : route license, c : investment restriction to foreigners, d : ban to buy 
second-hand vessel, e : limits on business expansion, f: waiver system in liner shipping, 
g : waiver system in bulk shipping, h : ship acquisition system, i : vessel-related tax, 
j : ship registry system, k : seafarer policy) 
(C) General Regulations by Country 
(a: FMC, b: DG IV, c: Int'l regulations(IMO, UNCTAD,etc), d: Korean regulations) 
This question is set to test the relationship between shipping policy and 
liberalisation in Korean shipping. The factors that Korean shipping policy includes. 
are : government subsidy, barriers to liberalisation and regulations 
First of all, the comparison was done between the four groups In relation to 
government shipping policy. So the respondents' replies on government subsidy 
show that shipping companies consider that this element has the highest possible 
level of change, and next in order, government, banks and shipbuilding companies 
They all consider aid and tax matters in the financial aspects as the most important 
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From the first row of table 6.1 it can be seen that of the six items under A, referring to 
government subsidy, the shipping companies perceive a change on 4 items Ca, d, e, f) and 
no change in 2 items (b, c). Other responses can be interpreted in a corresponding way 
factors. The remarkable point is that all respondents reject the null hypothesis 
regarding a continuation of the operational subsidy, pointing to a reduction of the 
operational subsidy for shipping companies after trade liberalisation. Shipping 
companies responses were more uniform than the others on these factors perhaps 
due to the focus of the questions themselves !. 
Shipping companies generally put weight on ship acquisition systems and ship 
registry matters, both banks and government emphasised tax matters, and 
shipbuilding companies were concerned with seafarer policy. 
The answer relating to level of influence of general regulations by country is 
presented negatively In general. It is shown that all groups except the banks 
generally point to Korean regulations as the most important factor before 
liberalisation, All groups except government display an awareness of international 
regulations in relative terms after liberalisation. Indeed a government response 
emphasised the importance of the FMC of the U.S after liberalisation. Respondents 
from shipping companies recognise significant differences in Korean regulations, 
but others do not recognise this to the same degree. Government officials even 
suggested that the Korean regulations would not be affected by liberalisation. This 
can be translated as that they regard liberalisation had been already achieved in 
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some cases. Through additional interviews with the respondents there was little 
difference in terms of the beginning point of liberalisation between WTO/OECD 
established in this thesis and their actual perception of it. 
6.3 The Shipping Market Situation 
Table 6.2 Comparison with The Shipping Market Situation 
:==-===~==~~~====~======--==============~=====--== 
item CHANGE NO CHANGE 
---- ---si(5----i3~k----(}~~~----siB---- ---~iC:-----B~----Ci~~~---~nB----
(J\) -1-- ----i--------o--------o--------o----- -----o--------i--------i--------i-----
w w w w 
---- ------------------------------------- --.---------------------.-.-----------
(B) 7 2 0 0 1 5 7 7 6 
(c, g) (c) (a,b,d,e,f) (a-g) (a-g) (a,b,d-g) 
---- ------------------------------------- ------------------------.-.-----------(C) 6 4 1 0 1 2 5 6 5 
(a,b,e,f) (b) (e) (c,d) (a,c-f) (a-f) (a-d,f) 
.--. ------------------------------------- --------------------------.-----------
CD) 7 5 0 1 3 2 7 6 4 
(c-g) (g) (c-e) (a,b) (a-g) (a-f) (a,b,f,g) 
.--- ------------------------------------- --------------------------.-----------
(E) 5 2 0 1 2 3 5 4 3 
(b,d) (b) (a) (a,d) (a,c,e) (a-e) (b-e) (b,c,e) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB : Shipbuilding Company 
(A) Shipping Cycle 
(a: shipping cycle) 
(B) Shipping Market Situation 
(a : rates, b: trade volumes, c: tonnage, d: ship price, e: number of demolition, 
f: operational perfonnance & productivity, g: shipping cycle) 
(C) Supply and Demand of Ship 
(a: rates, b: market expectations, c: capital availability, d: shipbuilding capability, 
e : unit cost of shipyard, f: construction subsidy) 
(D) Trade Route (a: transpacific route, b: European route, c: trans-Atlantic route, d: intra-Asia route, 
e : Korean-Japanese route, f: south-north route, g: niche route) 
(E) Type of Tonnage . 
(a : container ship, b: bulk ship, c: tanker, d: specialised ship, e: other shlps) 
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This question verifies the relationship between the shipping market situation and 
liberalisation. The questionnaire on the shipping market situation refers to the 
shipping cycle, the shipping market situation, supply and demand, trade route and 
type of tonnage. 
It is noted that all four groups agree that the shipping cycle gets shorter after 
liberalisation, in other words, this means the trend of the shipping cycle, previously 
inclined toward 10-20 years and centred on 5-10 years, is now inclined toward 5-10 
years centred on 1-5 years. Shipping companies claim a significant difference in 
the shipping cycle between the two stages of liberalisation. 
A first priority in terms of level of importance is placed on tonnage, by shipping and 
shipbuilding companies especially, following the recent over tonnage in the 
industry. Freight rates were seen as more important by banks and government after 
liberalisation. Respondents were generally interested in the state of management of 
shipping companies, stressing the changes likely to influence profitability. The null 
hypothesis is rejected, as far as tonnage and shipping cycles are concerned (as 
shown previously) by shipping companies, and tonnage by shipbuilding companies. 
All four groups indicated that freight rates is a major factor for performance both 
before and after liberalisation. Rates affect the supply and demand of ships. As for 
any significant difference in this matter, rates and unit cost of shipyard (ship price) 
by shipping companies and unit cost of shipyard (ship price) by shipbuilding 
companies are seen as likely to change after liberalisation .. 
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Transpacific trade routes were emphasised by the respondents. Three groups other 
than the government respondents (who chose the European route,) mentioned the 
transpacific route as the most important trade route after liberalisation. This shows 
the transport demand according to trade with the American continent still continues 
to be the most important. The Korean government, however concentrated on the 
European route as the most important route to change, that is, they placed more 
weight on the transport demand and trade relationships with Europe giving it equal 
status with the transpacific route. Respondents claimed that there will be a 
significant difference after liberalisation in relation to all trade routes, with primacy 
for the Transpacific and European routes by shipping companies, niche markets by 
government, and the Trans-Atlantic route and Intra-Asia route favoured by the 
shipbuilding companies. 
In the matter of tonnage, , a high level of significance is given to bulk shipping by 
shipping companies, container shipping by banks, bulk shipping and container 
shipping by government, and tankers and container shipping by shipbuilding 
companies after liberalisation. Especially of note are the government shift in 
priority from bulk shipping to container shipping, and shipbuilding companies 
priority from tankers of the VLCC type to container shipping, after liberalisation. 
The null hypothesis is rejected for bulk shipping and for specialised shipping by 
shipping companies, container shipping by government, and container shipping and 
specialised shipping by shipbuilding companies. 
152 
6.4 Shipping Finance 
Table 6.3 Comparison with Shipping Finance 
~---------
. ---------- ---------~==========~--== 
item CHANGE NO CHANGE 
---- ---Sic:----El~k----(]~~~----SfB---- ---~;c:-----B~----Ci~~;;---5;~----
(J\) -3-- ----i--------i--------o--------i----- -----2--------2--------3--------2-----
(b) (b) (b) (a,c) (a,c) (a-c) (a,c) 
(13) -3-- ----2--------i--------0--------6----- -----i--------i--------3--------3-----
(b,c) (a) (a) (b,c) (a-c) (a-c) 
(C) -~- ----3--------1--------0--------6----- -----4--------6--------7--------i-----
(c,d,f) (f) (a-f) (a,b,e,g) (a-e,g) (a-g) (g) 
(I)) -i-- ----0--------0--------0--------0----- -----i--------i--------i--------i-----
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
(E) 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------.-----------------------------(F) 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------(G) 8 6 5 0 4 2 3 8 4 
(a,c-f,h) (b-e,h) (a,b,g,h) (b,g) (a,f,g) (a-h) (c-f) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------(H) 1 0 0 0 0 I I 1 I 
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
(I) 1 1 0 0 0 0 I I I 
(a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
(1) 7 3 1 0 2 4 6 7 5 
(d,f,g) (e) (b,g) (a-c,e) (a-d,f,g) (a-g) (a,c-f) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
(K) 3 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 2 
(b) (a-c) (a-c) (a-c) (a,c) 
---- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
(L) 1 o o o 1 
(a) 
1 
(a) 
1 
(a) 
1 
(a) 
o 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB: Shipbuilding Company 
The numbers in the table indicate the number of changed (unchanged) items from the list below 
(A) Source of Finance 
(a: domestic capital, b: foreign capital, c: internal capital) 
(B) External Method of Finance 
(a : shipyard credit, b: bank finance, c: lease finance) 
(C) Financial Conditions 
(a : financial source, b: interest rate, c: loan rate, d: repayment period, e: tax, 
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f : exchange rate, g: inflation rate) 
(D) Capital Structure 
(a : capital structure) 
(E) Capital Cost 
(a : capital cost) 
(F) Rate of Loan 
(a : rate of loan) 
(G) External Factor to Investment Decision-making 
(a : ~er~od ofROI, b: dec,ision-maker's attitude towards risk, c: shipping cycle, 
d : tImmg factors, e: capItal structure, f: confidence in decision-making g: bank's 
attitude, h: financial service level) , 
(H) Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
(a : investor's attitude towards risk) 
(I) Timing of Shipping Investment 
(a : timing of shipping investment) 
(1) Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation 
(a : market share, b: profitability (rates), c: load factor, d: fixed cost, e: floating 
cost, f: choice on routes, g: operational service level) 
(K) Financial Conditions in Acquiring a Ship 
(a : planned shipbuilding, b: bareboat charter on hire purchase, c : secondhand ship 
purchase) 
(L) Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
(a : method of ship acquisition in Korea) 
The questionnaire concernIng shipping finance addresses issues conernlng the 
source of finance and 11 other attributes, a total of 12 questions. All four groups 
placed emphasis on the availability of foreign capital after liberalisation, however, 
the groups excepting the government, suggested a significant change towards the 
provision of foreign capital following liberalisation, As far as the relationship 
between the financial conditions and liberalisation is concerned, shipping 
companies and banks gave interest rates their top priority in importance, but interest 
rates before liberalisation and exchange rates after liberalisation were the order of 
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priority by the Government and shipbuilding companies. This adds weight to 
foreign exchange as a factor in the decision making process especially after 
liberalisation. The shipbuilders however 
did not consider the inflation rate of all the factors affecting the financial conditions 
to be affected by liberalisation. Thus the null hypothesis is largely rejected for these 
factors. 
As far as the external factors affecting investment decision-making are concerned. 
the shipping companies took into account the timing factors for both before and 
after liberalisation, the other three groups emphasised the decision-maker's attitude 
towards risk after liberalisation. Accordingly, it can be figured out that in general 
the investor's attitude toward timing and risk is important to decision-making in 
shipping investment. In terms of change there are significant differences in all 
factors except decision-maker's attitude towards risk and bank's attitude" when 
borrowing which were considered to be unaltered, and the null hypothesis is mainly 
rejected. 
Considering the level of significance for ship acquisition, the shipbuilding 
companies suggested that there would be a movement from planned shipbuilding 
before liberalisation to BBCIHP after liberalisation. The other three groups believe 
that the use of BBCIHP was changing irrespective of the before and after 
liberalisation situation. The hypothesis established is rejected by shipbuilding 
company in particular. 
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6.5 Return on Shipping Investment 
Table 6.4 Comparison with Return on Shipping Investment 
item CHANGE NO CHANGE 
---- ---Sic:----~~k----(}~~~----siEl--- ---~/c:----B~----Ci~~~----S-n3----
(J\) -il- ----0--------0--------0--------0----- -----i--------i--------i--------i-----
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
(13) ---i ----0--------0--------0--------0----- -----i--------i--------i--------i-----
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
---- ------------------------------------- -------------------------------------- --
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB : Shipbuilding Company 
The numbers in the table indicate the number of changed (unchanged) items from the list 
below 
(A) Return on Shipping Investment 
(a : return on shipping investment) 
(B) Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
(a : evaluation method on shipping investment) 
All respondents considered 'between 10 and 15 years' the top priority in both pre 
and post liberalisation, but there is only a little difference in relative terms. In other 
words, the period given by the shipping companies gets shorter as 'less than 10 
years', but in case of the banks, it extends to 'between 15 and 20 years', and 
government placed weight on 'between 10 and 15 years' and more. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that shipping companies and shipbuilding companies which are exposed 
to very sensitive shipping market situations look to a shorter ROI, but banks and 
government remain wedded to a longer time horizon. There is no significant 
difference between before and after liberalisation on this question. Further more the 
NPV evaluation method for shipping investment was adopted by all respondents in 
general, suggesting constistency with wealth creation. 
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6.6 Choice of Shipyard 
Table 6.5 Comparison with Choice of Shipyard 
item CHANGE NO CHANGE 
---- ----------------------------------.-- ----------------.--------------------- --
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB: Shipbuilding Company 
The numbers in the table indicate the number of changed (unchanged) items from the list 
below 
(A) Country's Shipyard 
(a : country's shipyard) 
(B) Shipyard Selection 
(a : construction capability, b: labour force, c: technology, d: ship-linked industry, 
e : price competitiveness, f: non-price competitiveness, g: exchange rate in market, 
h : int'l competitiveness) 
(C) Ship Registry Country 
(a : ship registry country) 
This question is aimed at shipyard selection and ship registry country. All groups 
gave consideration to Korea as the shipbuilding country, but there were interesting 
differences on other points. In the after liberalisation situation, shipping companies 
considered that Japan as a shipbuilder, would have a higher in preference than 
before liberalisation. Korea is regarded by the hanks, as remaining exclusively the 
choice even after liberalisation, and for government both before and after 
liberalisation. The Korean government emphasised that Korean shipping companies 
should build their ships in Korean yards no matter what outcome would arise after 
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6.7 Depreciation in Ships 
Table 6.6 Comparison with Depreciation in Ships 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------.---
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB : Shipbuilding Company 
The numbers in the table indicate the number of changed items, i.e. whether depreciation is to 
change or not. 
(A) Depreciation in Ship 
(a : depreciation in ship) 
Various responses were shown in relation to the treatment of depreciation in ships. 
Generally, 'between 15 and 20 years' is the most common range pre and post 
liberalisation, but there is a relative change already in vogue whereby the duration 
for depreciation of ships is already getting shorter and this policy will accelerate 
after liberalisation but not simply because of it. 
159 
6.8 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Table 6.7 Comparison with Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
item--======CHANGE =====-====~ NOCHANGE-===~----
---- ---si<=----~~k----(]~~;----sfB---- ---~ic:----i3~----Ci~~~----5;fB---­
(J\) -i-- ----o--------o--------o--------i----- -----i--------i--------i--------C;----
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
(I3) -i-- ----6--------6--------6--------0----- -----i--------i--------i--------i-----
(a) (a) (a) (a) 
---- ------------------------------------- -------------------------.------------ --
Note: SIC: Shipping Company SIB: Shipbuilding Company 
The numbers in the table indicates the number of changed (unchanged) items from the list 
below 
(A) Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
(a : strategic alliance in shipping) 
(B) Preference to Partnership 
(a: preference to partnership) 
The survey was designed to test the reasons for and preference for partnerships or 
strategic alliances in shipping. Nearly all the shipping companies who had 
highlighted the objectives as an expansion of services before liberalisation had 
changed to cost saving after liberalisation, (banks pointed out cost saving in both 
the before and after cases) .. 
Choice of company or national flag differed, the Korean Government favouring a 
u.s. shipping partnership both pre and post liberalisation, while the other three 
groups indicated a preference for a European partnership. This response from 
government is consistent, as they regard the FMC regulations of U.S as the most 
important factor influencing the post liberalisation situation as stated previously. 
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Chapter VII: The Significant Findings and an Interpretation of 
Total Survey 
7.1 Introduction 
By the analysis of the questionnaires answered by respondents, i.e. fmancial 
managers from shipping companies and banks, policy-makers from government and 
sales managers from shipbuilding companies, it was possible to get some significant 
findings and an interpretation of the same. The values arrived at from the statistical 
calculations revealed that there were a number of external aspects influencing the 
respondents' replies, e.g. government policies, market situation, or internal aspects 
i.e. companies' policies or in some cases simply the respondents' attitudes and 
judgment. Results are shown in appendix 2 (especially, 2.1). 
7.2 Government Shipping Policy 
There were three questions related to government shipping policy tested in the 
survey ; these were : government subsidy, the level of impediments to liberalisation 
and the general regulations on the industry. Generally speaking, the respondents 
thought that the liberalisation trend had affected their investment decision-making 
in relation to government shipping policy. 
As far as government subsidy is concerned, the results revealed that tax benefits and 
fmancial aid were the most significant factors in both before- and after-liberalisation. 
In fact, the most important factor for the shipping industry as in other industries was 
probably tax. In some senses, the success and failure in shipping as a capital 
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intensive industry have been dependent upon how the shipowner can manage the 
fmancial aid provided by government or how tax has affected outcomes. 
As far as the level of impediments to liberalisation, two factors, namely vessel-
related tax issues and the ship registry system, were the most important ones. 
Given that ship registry is strongly related to tax, and vice versa, in order to get tax 
relief, deregulation of the ship registry system and the creation of a second 
international registry are seen as top priorities. 
The respondents suggest that Korean regulations are the most important factors 
influencing their shipping business before liberalisation, but American FMC is now 
seen as important after liberalisation, the emphasis of the Transpacific trade after 
liberalisation is much greater. 
7.3 The Shipping Market Situation 
In a modem open economy, shipping is exposed to a severely competitive market, 
every industry including shipping regards the conditions in the market as more 
important than government aid. The market situation in shipping is largely 
dependent upon the general economic situation that produces the trade volumes for 
the shippers (demand side), and tonnage undertaken by shipping companies (supply 
side). The freight rates reflect the supply and demand under a fluctuating, volatile 
and cyclic market. 
The respondents regarded the shipping cycle as getting shorter, implying that the 
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world trade market is changing more frequently given the more complex trade 
patterns and the emergence of developing countries in this field. The "product life 
cycle" of shipping services as well as the ship itself is getting shorter because R&D 
progress is rapid in response to complex customers' needs in the modern economic 
world. 
The respondents considered that the freight rates are one of the most important 
factors and that the rates for a shipping company are the most important elements 
for them in making a shipping investment both before and after liberalisation. They 
determine the profitability, as a "going concern", and the decision to supply new 
tonnage. After liberalisation, tonnage was seen as of rising importance implying 
that the over-tonnage in present shipping markets is the current reason for poor rates 
and that in the absence of government subsidies the rates will be determined by the 
global availability of tonnage on each route. 
With regard to the respondents' replies to trade routes, the Transpacific route, in 
which the United States have the most influence, requires a high frequency of 
service in shipping transportation. They also suggest that the European route is of 
secondary importance, and of rising importance is the emerging Intra-Asia route 
rather than the purely Atlantic route, because of the recent rapid growth in trade 
volumes in recent years post liberalisation. 
The tonnage influence was divided with bulk shipping related first and liner second 
before liberalisation, but the order changed after liberalisation. 
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Respondents had generally admitted some changes m shipping investment 
following the liberalisation of trade in Korea. They identified an increasing 
importance for the factors arising from the fact that shipping investment was no 
longer set by the availability of government support or regulation, but largely 
detennined by the commercial ROI principles involving a business plan which 
would take account of forecast earnings and costs determined by the global shipping 
market rates. 
7.4 Shipping Finance 
Shipping fmance was considered the prime component of the decision-making 
process and was also the first aspect to be reviewed by a fmancial manager. The 
survey analysis shows a range of concepts employed by the shipping-related 
managers in Korea with regard to shipping investment. Post-liberalisation, financial 
managers are much more aware of risk externalities influencing the investment 
decision, such as general interest rates for loans, the freight conditions on the 
various routes, and alterations by the government agencies in the regulations 
concerning ship acquisition. The general atmosphere at present in Korean 
management with regard to shipping fmance is that the respondents are now 
recogrusmg the impact of liberalisation in their investment decision-making 
process. 
Of primary concern among the respondents was, as they saw it, access to foreign 
capital and its much more advantageous terms for borrowing, compared with 
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domestic capital. In addition, it was revealed that they prefer using bank finance 
rather than shipyard credits and their associated restrictive conditions. 
Of all the fmancial conditions mentioned, respondents said that interest rates were 
the most significant element for the reduction of the fmancial costs, and this is the 
reason for Korean shipping using foreign capital because of the generally lower 
interest rates available outside Korea. In fact, in the case of a syndicated loan 
which includes a foreign bank, Korean shipowners pay less interest than with a 
purely Korean bank. 
The question relating to capital structure, demonstrated a desire for a higher equity 
base than was the case before liberalisation, because of the increased risks of the 
funding arrangements. As far as capital costs are concerned, respondents felt 
that they were getting lower because of the financial relaxation following the 
current wave of liberalisation. 
The question regarding the percentage of loan currently employed revealed that the 
nonnal borrowing ratio at this time was '800/0 or more'. This would be considered 
high in markets other than shipping, but global practice in the shipping sector 
suggests a figure of 80% as nonnal. Therefore, a target of 800/0 would be considered 
acceptable in the post-liberalisation period. 
Another external factor affecting shipping investment, is the timing of a loan and 
the period of return on the investment. Given the volatile situation of the shipping 
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market, it is absolutely necessary for shipowners to pick the right timing for the 
investment, especially as there is a business cycle associated with shipping. 
Investing at the wrong part of the cycle can be disastrous. Early returns on 
investment often take priority. 
As to investors' attitudes towards risk, it is common knowledge that the shipping 
industry is heavily involved with risk because of the unpredictable and volatile 
market situation. It is necessary to predict the future shipping market within 
shipping cycles in order to reduce risk. Shipowners' attitudes towards risk are 
appraised in the survey. Respondents demonstrated a risk-mixed (prone+averse) 
attitude both before and after liberalisation. To the some extent risk-aversion 
before liberalisation transformed to a risk-mixed situation (prone+averse) after 
liberalisation. 
In relation to timing of shipping investment, respondents put weight on the "turning 
point" ie when the business cycle turns from downward to upward and vice versa, 
as a fITst priority between the two stages of liberalisation. In investment factors 
affected by ship operation, the respondents chose freight rates as the most important, 
both before- liberalisation and after-liberalisation. As far as financial conditions 
in acquiring a ship are concerned, the interest rate is seen as the most important 
factor, and becoming of higher significance. 
The BBC/HP option was favoured by all respondents. 
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7.5 Return on Shipping Investment 
Respondents indicated that they would be expecting a shorter period for calculating 
the ROI because the shipping cycle appears to be getting shorter, especially now 
that there is greater competition generally and liberalisation will accelerate this 
trend. 
The traditional method of evaluation on a shipping investment, was shown to be the 
net present value approach. Since tl}is system remains a common practice for 
bankers, both national and international, it poses no difficulty for the post-
liberalisation era, and it is also consistently used in shipping and shipbuilding. 
However, the IRR method is relatively more popular after liberalisation. For single 
project evaluations the two methods should give the same accept or reject decisions. 
However, when comparing projects the IRR method may be potentially misleading 
because it is only a relative measure and the economic value of a project can change 
through time. The net present value approach would be more consistent with wealth 
creation. 
7.6 Choice of Shipyard 
Korean shipyards were chosen as the builders of choice by most of the respondents. 
This was to be expected, given the pride with which most Koreans have in past 
economIC success. In the past, Korean shipowners were obliged to have their ships 
built in Korean yards. However, in the after-liberalisation situation, they may be 
willing to order at other yards such as Japanese ones, where technology and or ship 
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price dictates. 
In the question relating to shipyard selection, respondents chose pnce 
competitiveness and technology as the order of priority before liberalisation and 
after liberalisation. These two factors are the most important ones, where the lower 
prices of ships have been preferred and the degree of ship automation based on 
advanced technology lowers the operational cost of a vessel. 
Panama was the registration counny of choice by our respondents. Their 
advantageous packages are mainly related to tax matters and the level of safety 
standards accepted by world shipowners. Korean shipowners have asked the 
Korean government to relax the tax situation and deregulate the Korean ship 
registIy system (The Korean second registry was set up at 1 January, 1999). 
7.7 Depreciation in Ships 
With a shorter shipping cycle now in vogue the period of depreciation is getting 
shorter. Respondents would expect larger depreciation rates to apply in the future, 
making some investment even more risk prone than was the case. 
7.8 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Within the present shipping market, strategic alliances have been the main issue for 
most shipowners. The diversified needs of shippers require shipowners to expand 
service areas, to upgrade service frequencies, and be better attuned to customer 
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needs at competitive rates. Shipowners should ally with other shipping companies, 
in order to meet by co-operation the user's needs in this globalised shipping market. 
Therefore, seeking strategic alliances is part of the shipowner's decision-making 
process in shipping investment. 
Respondents suggested that the aim of the alliance was in order to facilitate the 
expansion of the service and achieve cost savings in the before-liberalisation period, 
but the priority was changed to fIrst cost saving and then to the expansion of 
service after liberalisation, because of the present severe competitive market in rates 
and service provision. 
The respondents' VIew of partnerships with European and American shipping 
companies was generally favourable, reflecting their existence on principal trade 
routes. 
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Chapter VIII: The Strategic Model Revisited 
8.1 Introduction 
In order to test the main hypothesis in this thesis we asked fmancial managers in 
Korean shipping, who make investment decisions, to consider what changes they 
would make to their decisions after the liberalisation of the shipping business. The 
results show that some strategies were implied by respondents in order to raise 
capital under the new system of trading. These strategies are examined and a 
strategic model developed which can be a useful guide to financial managers. 
8.2 Modifications to the Strategic Model 
The basic strategic model for shipping was outlined in Chapter 2 where in section 
2.2.2 the listed attributes were given: 
(i) The Korean shipping industry is a regulated industry of its own government. 
A characteristic of shipping in a developing country is that the regulations imposed 
by its own country have always been regarded as the most important element. This 
is because the shipping industry is defmed as an infant industry and a government 
subsidy is usually an essential. For the research results of this survey, it can be 
shown that foreign regulations such as FMC of the U.S are now a more powerful 
mechanism influencing Korean shipping in particular, rather than that of its own 
country (Korea). This means that this shipping industry is no longer limited by its 
need for national protectionist measures, but it is affected by international 
regulations especially those of the U.S.A, which is the largest trading country in the 
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world. 
(ii) Shipping investment IS largely influenced by demand side of the shipping 
market. 
Shipping investment has in the past been regarded as influenced by a derived 
demand for trade volumes. This survey reveals that shipping investment largely 
depends upon tonnage in use and is a supply side condition,. This would appear to 
differ from the presumptions of the nonnal consumption led model of demand. 
However the supply and demand equation for trade volumes is still the inherent 
force which influences demand for investment. Say's Law of the market, where 
supply creates demand, is a relevant factor in the case of shipping provision in 
Korea. The industry is a strategic element in the South Korean defence effort, 
confronted as it was in the past by hostile neighbours and isolated from its political 
and military allies. Supply of available sea transport became a strategic necessity 
and consequently encouraged the maritime orientation of the industrial effort to self 
sufficiency. 
(iii) Shipping has a medium stage cycle. 
Shipping volumes are bound to fluctuate with the general economic cycle relating to 
trade. The experience of the past few decades has been that these cycles are 
getting shorter and the investment decisions as well as the strategies for profit 
maximisation dictate a shorter tenn horizon for investment decisions and a shorter 
depreciation period. 
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(iv) Shipping ftnance in Korea is directly controlled by government. 
Shipping [mance in Korea had in the past relied upon government initiatives. 
Government regulations would be used to rescue shipbuilding companies. Because 
of the political imperatives associated with national security, the government 
controlled the availability of shipping [mance, in order to prevent over-borrowing 
by the industry, where the financial consequences were often shielded by other 
government supports such as subsidies. In this research, it is shown that demand for 
shipping fmance is now largely decided by the prevailing interest rates, determined 
by the market. Shipping investment activities will in future be detennined by 
commercial considerations and to achieve a more manageable portfolio of 
investment risk as a consequence of liberalisation. 
(v) The attitude of shipping investors in Korea is passive. 
Investors' attitudes towards shipping investment are detennined largely by the 
current shipping market situation. They reacted in the past in a passive way to the 
perceived changes in the market, often later than necessary to avoid ftnancial 
troubles and had to be bailed out from the consequences by the government. This 
survey reveals that their attitude has changed from risk-averse to risk mixed 
(prone+averse) in pursuit of more profitable investments. They are willing now to 
be pro-active in investment choices and timing, and recognise the less 
interventionist policies implied by liberalisation of the market. 
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(vi) Shipbuilding is sourced nationally. 
In relation to choice of shipyard, Korean shipyards have been selected by Korean 
shipping companies as a matter of national policy. The survey results indicate that 
after liberalisation, Korea remains the country of choice. However Japanese yards 
are seen as alternatives, especially where a more favourable financial package, as 
well as technological factors, favours the Japanese. 
(vii) Strategic alliances are used for expansion of service. 
The survey results show that cost saving is becoming the more frequent reason for a 
strategic alliance in order to compete with other carriers in the world shipping 
markets after liberalisation. The efficient utilisation of common resources by means 
of a strategic alliance, can reduce costs and improve service quality and efficiency. 
Korean shippers need, however, global alliances with other foreign shipowners, if 
they are to successfully enter new markets and the survey responses were reflective 
of these views. 
(viii) Partnership with an Asian shipping company. 
In the past there was the commonly held perception of having a partnership with 
another Asian shipowner would best suit the needs of the Korean shipowners 
because of geographical proximity, common trade routes and shipping practices. 
Indeed the regional and cultural factors were considered paramount. The survey 
has shown that the post liberalisation shipowners and others related to the industry 
would now look favourably on U.S. and European partnerships, because of the need 
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for a global presence in the market and the internationalisation of the financial 
provisions. The U.S. partnership route was mentioned by most respondents because 
of the importance of the Transpacific routes for Korean shipping. 
The trend for Korean shipping is marked by the greater emphasis on external 
sources of [mance, shipbuilding, foreign partnerships and a more pro-active role for 
developing shipping services, investment and profitability, given the exposure to the 
competitive forces unleashed by liberalisation. 
Chapter IX: Cases Reviewed since the Current Financial Crisis 
9.1 Introduction 
Cases have been observed smce the current fmancial cnSlS ill Korea. Five 
interviews were carried out after the emergence of the fmancial crisis in Korea. The 
respondents were chosen from the sample used in the initial survey to determine 
whether their views would have altered given the traumatic events of the crisis. The 
interviews were conducted personally by the author and were intended to act as a 
check on the validity of the opinions shown in the survey. In essence the 
respondents had not changed their views on the liberalisation policies of the 
government. If any, the change in opinion was more resolute towards the 
liberalisation policies. 
9.2 Five Cases Examined 
9.2.1 Case: One 
( 1) The Present Government Shipping Policy 
The evidence from this later interview has shown that there will not be any major 
changes to the government's position, regarding its policy of trade liberalisation 
following the present fmancial crisis. 
(2) The Shipping Market Situation 
The view of this respondent was that the fmancial crisis at this time in Korea could 
have positive impacts on the shipping market. It may be difficult for Korean-related 
industries, but it will function as a brake on the economy where over-production 
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was leading to unsustainable growth and a possible crisis later in the cycle which 
could have had a global reach and lead to a later deeper world depression. The 
Asian economic bubble economies based on high property values and burgeoning 
export surpluses have now seen a sharp correction, which, if handled with some 
alterations in currency values and adjustments to securities prices, should allow a 
gradual recovery with support from the other economies less affected. 
F or South Korea, the economy has some fundamental strengths, and although the 
corrections will apply with some severity, the economy is more likely to recover 
quickly if the IMF loans and the conditions for their support are implemented by the 
new government. Examination of the past shipping cycles suggests that trade 
volumes in the next few years are set to rise as are the freight rates for seaborne 
trade. 
(3) Shipping Finance (as a Core Sector of the Shipping Business) 
In the view of the respondent the financial markets have already adjusted resulting 
in lower values for bonds and derivatives as well as equity prices. This has 
resulted in a much higher threshold for investment returns and higher interest rates. 
Consequently the shipowners are under pressure to modify their means of fmancing 
ship acquisitions and operational practices. The future policy will be to seek more 
equity based loans, longer term debt fmancing and foreign loans in hard currencies 
where earnings can be focused on hard currency markets. 
176 
(4) The Return on Shipping Investment 
His view was that the returns on shipping investment in the past were usually higher 
than most domestic industries given the perceived higher risk elements in transport 
services generally. The changed financial circumstances will encourage investors to 
seek an even higher premium for this sort of investment putting added pressure on 
the bottom line outcomes of such investment chosen. 
Additionally the period for duration of such loans will have to be longer, if the 
industry is to be able to compete in the international market where loan tenns of the 
competitors are likely to remain advantageous and the period of the loans are 
already longer than those available to Korean shipowners. 
(5) Choice of Shipyard 
The reply as to the choice of shipyard for construction was that it is likely to remain 
the same as before simply because the devalued Won will be beneficial to those 
industries whose earnings are in foreign currencies with appreciating values. The 
South Korean yards are still as efficient as ever, but will probably concentrate on 
vessels with higher value added, given the likely competition from other Asian 
yards with even lower currency values following the recent fmancial crisis. 
(6) Depreciation Methods in Shipping 
The view was that considering the volatility in shipping markets, motivation to 
investment at this time is low. Therefore, ship depreciation is longer than before. 
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(7) Alliance (or Consortia) in Shipping 
The respondent was unwilling to consider this question as there were several 
possible outcomes quite unrelated to the fmancial crisis. 
(8) Attitude to Liberalisation (in relation to the Current Financial Crisis) 
The respondent felt that it is always good policy for shipping and shipbuilding to be 
opened to both competition and transparency and the IMF will be contributing to 
this openness through the conditions imposed by the loans. Liberalisation was 
seen as a very necessary process. 
(Respondent is from Daewoo Shipbuilding Co.). 
9.2.2 Case: Two 
(1) The Present Government Shipping Policy 
The respondent here felt that there will be no policy changes following the fmancial 
tunnoil in Korea. However, private alternatives will be sought more frequently by 
the Korean shipping companies making government initiatives less important in the 
future. 
(2) The Shipping Market Situation 
His view was that there has been already some evidence from the shipping market. 
Imports have dropped, leading to a lower load factor for the vessels. The exchange 
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rate effect has not yet influenced the market significantly since shipping earnings 
are still US$ based. However, the trade volumes are getting lower, in particular for 
the port of Inchon, the biggest importing port in Korea, is very inactive now, as is 
the port of Pusan. 
(3) Shipping Finance (as a core part of the Shipping Business) 
The response was that the BBCIHP funding requires the investing partner to obtain 
guarantees from domestic banks, at this time the credit worthiness of many Korean 
banks is suspect and it is getting difficult to obtain the necessary guarantees of the 
quality necessary to meet international requirements. 
(4) The Return on Shipping Investment 
His opinion was that the length of ROI is certainly going to be longer, but the ROJ 
rate may not alter. 
(5) Choice of Shipyard 
In his view Korean and foreign shipyards are asking for US$ tenns for construction 
which reduces the disadvantage of a depreciated Won. However, the technological 
competence in Korean shipyards is very high, so shipowners will still be likely to 
choose a Korean yard when acquiring a ship. 
(6) Depreciation Methods in Shipping 
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The response was that the duration or rate of depreciation in ships has not been 
affected by this fmancial crisis because that process is an area for corporate 
accounting standards within the flnn. [ However, the interview could have argued 
that the standards relate to the method adopted and not to the rate on deviation.] 
(7) Alliance ( or Consortia) in Shipping 
The respondent believed that his company was nothing to do with making policy 
decisions with regard to this possible strategy. 
(8) Attitude to Liberalisation (in relation to the Current Financial Crisis) 
He felt that in the liberalisation process in Korean shipping nearly all of relevant 
provisions have been deregulated according to the timetable of the OECD rules. 
(Respondent is from the Korean Shipowner's Association, who had previously 
worked in a bulk company, when he originally answered the questionnaire.) 
9.2.3 Case: Three 
(1) The Present Government Shipping Policy 
This respondent was of the opffilon that there would be some changes to the 
national policy given the crisis at present. The policy of hands-off would lead to 
some difflculties for some shipping companies which might encourage intervention 
and a watering down or delay in the liberalisation process, especially now that 
unemployment is likely to feature as a problem for the economy in the near future. 
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(2) The Shipping Market Situation 
From the perspective of this respondent the crisis has already had an impact on the 
markets such that rates have already lowered. The rate for a Panamax in grain has 
dropped between 20-30 % and the fall of 20-30% oil consumption has hit the tanker 
market in Korea. 
(3) Shipping Finance (as a core part of the Shipping Business) 
He believed that there will be some room for shipowners, with flexibility in terms 
of shipping finance, where they can raise money at the appropriate time whenever 
they need, unlike in the past where shipping investment was at the mercy of 
government policy and the plan for that year. 
The shipowners have in the past not been free to raIse funds abroad, instead 
merchant banks were given this task usually by borrowing short term from overseas 
lenders and then lend to the shipping company and others on a longer-term basis. 
The financial crisis has led to these banks becoming strapped for cash, resulting in 
the calling in of overdrafts and the cancelling of such contracts, it being impossible 
for borrowers to delay repaying the loans. It is at this time impossible for 
shipowners to avail themselves of this means of obtaining appropriate long term 
fmance. 
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(4) The Return on Shipping Investment 
This respondent was uncertain as to the likely effects the crisis would have on the 
ROI given that much of the past investment is in place with ROI figures set for 
those loans. Clearly the shortage of demand or supply will have an effect, but 
which will be larger is still unclear at this time. 
(5) Choice of Shipyard 
The respondent believed that at present the huge rise in interest rates would prevent 
any investment in shipping other than that already committed. The shipyards would 
be hard hit as a consequence. 
(6) Depreciation Methods in Shipping 
The period of depreciation was longer than before, about 18 years or more. 
(7) Alliance ( or Consortia) in Shipping 
The view was that the shipping market is very uncertain because of the fall in trade 
volumes, therefore in order to share the risks as well as profit, a strategic alliance 
should be encouraged and this will raise the efficiency in ship operations. The 
area imbalance in trade volumes and employment of routes etc. should be shared 
between the several shipping companies. 
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(8) Attitude to Liberalisation (in relation to the Current Financial Crisis) 
The respondent felt that liberalisation in shipping has been a little late ; it should 
have done earlier. In Korea the decision was delayed for too long and we had to 
suddenly try to catch up with the others with as yet an incomplete process. This 
opportunity caused by the crisis and the IMF intervention is good for liberalisation. 
In particular~ for the seafaring side of the economy, the competitiveness implied 
will be of great benefit to the industry. 
(Respondent is from Hyundai Merchant Marine.) 
9.2.4 Case: Four 
(1) The Present Government Shipping Policy 
This respondent suggests that there is no relationship between government shipping 
policy and the present financial problems. The money for BBCIHP has been already 
provided to shipowners with long-term loans and it is up to the industry to avail 
itself of the provisions to date. 
(2) The Shipping Market Situation 
The view was put that there is no direct relationship with this crisis because the IMF 
is involved with domestic industries in Korea, not with international business, i.e. 
shipping. However, the situation in Indonesia and Thailand will affect long-tenn 
shipping markets since they are not only competitors in shipping provision, they 
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also offer major markets for trade and shipment. 
(3) Shipping Finance (as a core part of the Shipping Business) 
According to the respondent the present situation is that sources of [mance are 
withering, which make it impossible to borrow at present, for the more they borrow, 
the rate of interest rises. Therefore, it is natural for shipping companies to reduce 
their investments as well as new ship acquisition excepting vessels ordered aheady 
before this crisis. 
(4) The Return on Shipping Investment 
The response to this question was that there are various variables in relation to 
ROI : market situation, changes of cost structure, and profitability of the investment. 
At present, the freight rate is falling, therefore ROI is naturally longer. If the 
shipping market recovers, the ROI is likely to return to the present value. 
The situation of ROI is bad for the short term, it may improve in the long term 
because at the present time freight rates are believed to be at the bottom of the cycle 
(lowest rate of freight rate) and in the future the rates are likely to rise. 
(5) Choice of Shipyard 
The view expressed here is that, from now on, foreign shipowners will be worried 
about delivery of ships ordered in Korean Shipyards because of the instability of the 
financial structure of Korean builders. However, Korean builders may still be able 
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to undertake new-building contracts with their sister shipping companies within the 
Chaebol system if it continues. 
(6) Depreciation Methods in Shipping 
The view here is that the duration of depreciation in ship has nothing to do with this 
fmancial crisis because that is an area for corporate accounting standards. 
(7) Alliance (or Consortia) in Shipping 
The response was that this is not a new issue and is already a matter of policy for 
many shipowners. Alliances between several shipowners still leave the risk that 
the Korean or other partners may suffer fmancial collapse because of this crisis. 
This might result in a breakup of the consortia or put strains on the alliance such 
that those not directly connected to the financial crisis might be effected and thereby 
be less willing to proceed with alliances already decided. 
(8) Attitude to Liberalisation (in relation to the Current Financial Crisis) 
The respondent felt that according to the IMF principles, a company's transparency, 
as well as the deregulation achieved, ensures that liberalisation in shipping could be 
accomplished and in fact is still being pursued irrespective of the crisis. 
(Respondent is from Hanjin Shipping Co.) 
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9.2.5 Case: Five 
(1) The Present Government Shipping Policy 
This respondent believed that government shipping policies could be affected by the 
present fmancial difficulties because it is basically impossible for a shipowner to 
have funds for construction or improvements. 
(2) The Shipping Market Situation 
He felt that the situation of shippers is difficult, leading to shipping companies 
having difficulty in marketing activity. Import and export markets are not so well 
operated in a financial crisis as there is the problem of credit and payments, and the 
fall in trade volumes would impact on shipping companies. For example, if 
Indonesia goes for a moratorium on payments of debt, trade transition would be 
stopped, and the recovery would take a long time. Exchange rates as well as money 
markets would be unstable which would cause the movement of trade volumes to 
weaken adding to the problems of shippers. All these impacts will affect particularly 
the liner shipping industry. 
(3) Shipping Finance (as a core element in the Shipping Business) 
The view here is that the industty will have a tough time fmding willing investors in 
a situation where existing US$ loans will be difficult to repay and locally funded 
operations will have to be postponed given the funding shortage within the 
economy. In the case of LNG construction, it is impossible for a company to 
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borrow the additional money required, and have to meet an even higher interest rate 
if they can borrow. 
(4) The Return on Shipping Investment 
The respondent would not comment on any likely changes in this respect simply 
because of the range of variables which go to determining this factor. 
(5) Choice of Shipyard 
The comment here was that the shipyards themselves will lose credibility if they 
cannot offer fmance to customers and given the close links through the Chaebol 
system they may become exposed as high risk businesses if the Chaebols 
themselves have to be split up (according to possible interpretations of the IMF 
rules). 
(6) Depreciation in Ship 
An important point was raised by this question : a ship is recorded as a fixed debt 
on the book value. When the Won depreciates, the amount of debt is increased and 
the amount of depreciation is also increased automatically. [However, the interview 
could have mentioned, firstly, that whether the debt increases depend on the 
currency denomination of the debt and , secondly, the asset book value would be 
unaffected unless it was recorded in a foreign branch or subsidiary's accounts.] 
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(7) Alliance (or Consortia) in Shipping. 
The respondent declined to voice an opinion on this topic as it was felt that the 
alliances being pursued would probably have several factors unrelated to the present 
fmancial crisis which would impinge on this policy. 
(8) Attitude to Liberalisation (in relation to the Current Financial Crisis) 
The response was that, basically, liberalisation in shipping should be done and if 
there is an area yet un-deregulated, it has to be done, regardless of the financial 
cnsls. 
(Respondent is from the Korea Marine Transport Co.) 
9.3 Summary 
It can be seen from the above responses that the financial crisis is influencing much 
of the policy deliberations of the management in the industry. The main issues are 
in addressing the short term problems associated with the shortage of funds and the 
decline in trade. When these have been overcome, or adjusted to, the respondents 
were particularly sanguine about the future and were universally in support of the 
further deregulation of their industry and the trade liberalisation this would bring. 
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Chapter X: Conclusion 
10.1 Hypothesis and Model Tested 
This study, first of all, has been aimed at analysing and testing the impact upon 
Korean s,hipping of the liberalisation phenomenon, as represented by the 
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WTO/OEeD rules. For this purpose, a null hypothesis was set up that assumes there 
is no change in the Korean shipping industry following liberalisation. The 
hypothesised model (see, chapter II), which was concerned with Korean shipping 
and how the nature of the shipping industry itself is established, was also 
investigated by analysing the responses from Korean shipping managers and policy 
makers. 
In order to do this, the survey was carried out involving the main players in Korean 
shipping, such as fmancial managers of shipping companies and banks, policy-
makers from government and sales managers from shipbuilding companies. In 
addition to the questionnaires, interviews and telephone conversations were an 
integral part of the data collection stage. 
Especially, the theoretical approaches in the literature review in the early part of the 
thesis were very useful and the parts analysed and compared were classified into 
four different groups. Moreover, another survey was also done in relation to the 
current financial crisis in Korea using five random respondents. 
10.2 Concluding Results 
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The main conclusion of this research is that Korean shipping has been vel)' strongly 
influenced by shipping liberalisation. The questionnaires addressed seven key 
issues : government shipping policy, the shipping market situation, shipping 
investment, shipping fmance, shipyards, depreciation and strategic alliance. 
Respondents clearly indicated that they recognised a significant change in Korean 
shipping following liberalisation. In particular, they nearly all acknowledged 
changes to regulatol)' impediment factors and financial conditions in shipping 
investment. 
In response to the impact on Korean shipping following liberalisation, the results, 
perhaps surprisingly, show a unity between the shipping companies, banks, 
government and shipbuilding companies. As to the research analysis between the 
four groups, the level of perception to the changes by shipping companies is higher 
than for the other groups, implying that shipping companies lie at the front line in 
the shipping market and are therefore more seriously affected by the consequences 
of a more liberalised trade. 
Satisfactol)' results were derived from testing the hypothesised seven factor model 
of the existing Korean and general shipping industry. This actually identifies that 
there have been many changes in accordance with the existing perception of Korean 
shipping and other shipping matters. As stated previously in chapter 8, it was 
discovered that there are changes in regulatol)' and operational terms, such that the 
market principle is more predominant following liberalisation. Also there are 
trends to prefer Japanese shipyards and alliance partnerships are more directed 
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towards U.S. shipping companies. Shipping investment has moved away from being 
demand-orientated to supply-orientated, and business cycles in shipping are getting 
shorter, which implies market players have to respond faster. 
As to the fmancial crisis in Korea which was previously mentioned, shipping 
companies have appealed to the government to lower interest rates, and randomly 
selected respondents also expect this opportunity may be a constructive turning 
point, in bringing about a change in the financial system in Korea, promoting a 
more transparent mechanism. 
In conclusion, this thesis reveals, fIrst, that the Korean shipping industry has been 
undoubtedly changed by the impact of shipping liberalisation and, second, that the 
hypothesised Korean general shipping model has been severely challenged. 
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Appendix 1 : Main Survey Questionnaire 
The decision-making of shipping investment 
in Korean shipping and liberalisation 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the changes of fmancial manager's attitude 
towards shipping investment between the before- and the after-liberalisation as a 
part of openness being accelerated nationally and internationally, and it is also 
tested significant differences of fmancial managers who make a decision in shipping 
investment between two stages of liberalisation in Korea. The turning point that 
liberalisation begins was set up the time on the settlement ofWTO as well as join of 
DEeD membership. 
However, as for the following questions, please, indicate the scale of preference or 
pick up an appropriate answer as example. 
Ex) please, indicate the scale of significance as you think about.. ......... . 
(1: the least important, 5 : the most important) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
1234 5 1 2345 
1)AAA 
2)BBB 
3)CCC 
1------1------1------1------1------1 1------1------1------1------1------1 
1------1------1------1------1------1 1------1------1------1------1------1 
1------1------1------1------1------1 1------1------1------1------1------1 
Ex) What would you think about.. ............. . 
before liberalisation ( ) after liberalisation ( ) 
1) AAA 2) BBB 3) CCC 
1. please, give an answer what sort of shipping company you have been engaged in, if you 
are working for shipping company? 
1) shipping company ( ) 
2) bank ( ) 
3) government ( ) 
4) shipbuilding company 
--------========--====================== 
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I. The following question is related to government shipping policy 
1. please, indicate the level of preference among government subsidies system, if you 
decide to make a shipping investment. 
(1: the least important, 5 : the most important) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
1) operational subsidy 
2) construction subsidy 
3) financial aid 
4) waiver system 
5) cargo preference 
6) tax benefit 
12345 12345 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----/-----/---__ / 
/-----/-----/-----/-----/-----/ /-----/-----/-----/-----/-----/ 
1-----/-----1-----/-----/-----/ /-----/-----/-----/-----/ _____ 1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----I 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
2. In Korea, what would you think the level of impediment of the existing regulations 
against liberalisation (the changes to be required in order to implement the WTO 
regulations relatively). 
1) appointed route 
2) route license 
3) investment restriction 
to foreigners 
5) ban to buy second-
-hand viI 
6) limits on business 
expanSIon 
7) waiver system in liner 
shipping 
8) waiver system 
9) ship security system 
10) vessel-related tax 
11) ship registry system 
12) seafarer policy 
before liberalisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
/-----1-----1-----1-----/-----1 
/-----/-----1-----1-----1-----1 
/-----1-----1-----/-----/-----/ 
/-----/-----/-----/-----/-----/ 
/-----/-----/-----/-----/-----/ 
/-----/-----/-----/-----/-----/ 
1-----/-----/-----/-----1-----1 
/-----/-----/-----1-----/-----/ 
/-----/-----/-----/-----1-----1 
/-----/-----/-----/-----1-----1 
/-----/-----/-----/-----/-----1 
(1: the least, 5 : the most) 
after liberalisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
/-----/-----/-----/-----/-----/ 
/-----/-----/-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----/-----/-----/ 
1-----/-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----/-----/-----/-----1-----/ 
1-----1-----1-----/-----/-----1 
1-----1-----/-----/-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3. please, indicate the level of influences of general regulations by country when you make 
shipping investment. 
I) FMC 
2)DG IV 
3) Int'l regulations. 
(lMO, UNCT AD, etc) 
4) Korean regulations 
(l: the least influential 5: the most influential) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
/-----/-----/-----1-----/-----/ 1-----1-----1-----/-----/-----/ 
/-----/-----1-----/-----1-----1 1-----/-----/-----/-----/-----1 
/-----/-----1-----1-----/-----/ 1-----1-----1-----1-----/-----/ 
/-----1-----1-----1-----/-----/ /-----1-----/-----/-----/-----1 
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ll. The following question is related to shipping market situations 
1. how long would you think the term of shipping cycle is ? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) 1-5 years 2) 5-10 years 3) 10-20 years 4) 20-30 years 5) 30-50 years 6) others 
2. please, point out the level of changes of shipping market situations due to liberalisation. 
(1: the least, smallest, shortest 5: the most, largest, longest) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) rates 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
2) trade volumes 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3) tonnage 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
4) ship price 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
5) number of scrapings 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
6) operational performance 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
& productivity 
7) shipping cycle 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3. please, indicate the significance of factors below influenced by ship's supply and 
demand in decision-making process of shipping investment. 
(1: the least important 5: the most important) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) rates 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
2) market expectations 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3) capital availability 
4) shipbuilding capacity 
5) unit cost of shipyard 
6) construction subsidy 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----I 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
4. how much would you think the rate on trade routes influences the decision-making 
process in shipping investment? 
(1: the least influential 
1) transpacific route 
2) European route 
3) transatlantic route 
4) intra-Asia route 
5) Korean-I apanese route 
6) south-north route 
7) niche route 
before liberalisation 
12345 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
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5: the most influential) 
after liberalisation 
12345 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
5. how much would you think the type of vessel influences the shipping market? 
(1: the least influential 5: the most influential) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) container ship 
2) bulk ship 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1- - -I 1 1 1 1 1 I - - ----- ---.- ---- .-.-..-.-. 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ---- ----- ---.- _.-.- ---- --.-. 
3) tanker 
4) specialised ship 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1--- -I 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -.-.- ----- ----..-.-. -----
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
5) other ships 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
m. The following question is related to shipping finance 
1. please, indicate the level of utilisation of the source of finance, when you make a 
financial decision-making in shipping investment. 
(1 : the least 5: the most) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) domestic capital 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
2) foreign capital 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3) internal capital 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
2. please, indicate the level of utilisation of an external financing source among basic 
methods of acquiring a capital. 
(1: the least 5: the most) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) shipyard credit 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 2) bank finance 
3) lease finance 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3. please, indicate the scale of significance in relation to financial conditions in making a 
decision of shipping investment. 
(I: the least important 
I) financial source 
2) interest rate 
3) loan rate 
4) repayment period 
5) tax 
6) exchange rate 
7) inflation rate 
before liberalisation 
I 2 3 4 5 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
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5: the most important ) 
after liberalisation 
1 234 5 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----I 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
4. how would you feel the structure of capital in your company? 
(1 : the most unstable 5: the most stable) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
5. please, indicate the cost of capital when you make a financial decision in shipping 
investment. 
(1 : the lowest 5: the highest) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
6. how would you think the degree of a reasonable rate of loan in shipping finance? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) less than 10% 2) between 10-20 % 3) between 20-30 % 
4) between 30-50 % 5) between 50-80 % 6) more than 800/0 
7. please, indicate the degree of influence of external factors in making shipping 
investment decision. 
1) period ofROl 
2) decision-maker's attitude 
towards risk 
3) shipping cycle 
4) timing factors 
5) capital structure 
6) confidence in 
decision-making 
7) bank's attitude 
8) financial service level 
(1: the least influence,S: the most influence) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
8. how would you think investor's desirable attitude towards risk in financial decision-
making in shipping investment? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) risk-prone 2) risk-averse 3) risk mixed (prone+averse) 4) other 
9. when would you think suitable timing on investment is : ., 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after hberahsatton> ( ) 
11 top of cycle 2) bottom of cycle 3) turning point 4) other 
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10. pleas.e, ~oint out t~e lev~l of imp~rtance of factors considered into investment decision 
III shlppmg regardmg ship operatIOn. 
(1: the least importance, 5 : the most importance) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) market share 
2) profitability (rates) 
3) load factor 
4) fixed cost 
5) floating cost 
6) choice on route 
7) operational service level 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1 - 1 I 1 1 1 - --. ----- ---.- ----- -----
1-----1-----1-----1--- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -- ----- ----. ----- ----- ----- .-.-. 
1-----1-----1-----1-- - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - ----- ----..-.-. ----- ---- -----
1-----1-----1-----1--- 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 -- ----- ----- --.-. ----- ----. -----
1-----1-----1-----1--- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -- ----- -.--- ----- .-.-. ----- -----
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ----- ---.- ----- ----- --.-. 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
11. what would you think the most important one among financial conditions, when you 
acquire a ship in Korea, is ? 
(1) the planned shipping 
(2) bareboat charter on hire purchase 
(3) secondhand ship purchase 
<before liberalisation> 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
<after liberalisation> 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
1) source of finance 2) interest rate 3) loan rate 4) repayment period 5) tax 
12. what would you think the most preferable method of acquiring a ship in Korea is, as 
you make a decision in shipping investment? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) planned shipbuilding 2) bbc/hp 3) second-hand ship 
IV. The following question is related to return on shipping investment 
1. what would you think the most desirable period of return on investment in shipping is ? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) less than 10 years 2) between 10 and 15 years 3) between 15 
and 20 years 4) between 20-25 years 5) more than 25 years 6) other 
2. please, tick up what your evaluation method on investment i.s. . 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberahsatIOn> ( ) 
1) net present value 2) internal rate of return 3) payback method 
4) sensitivity analysis 5) other 
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v. The following question is related to shipyard 
1. which shipyard of countries would you prefer most? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) Korea 2) United States 3) Japan 4) ED 5) Others 
2. please, indicate the level of significance of f~ctors considered in selecting the shipyard. 
(1: the least 1m ortant, 5 : the most im ortant) 
before liberalisation after liberalisation 
12345 12345 
1) construction capability 
2) labour force 
3) technology 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
4) ship-linked industry 
5) price competitiveness 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
6) non-price 
competitiveness 
7)exchange rate in market 
8 int'l com etitiveness 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 1-----1-----1-----1-----1-----1 
3. which ship registry country would you prefer most as you build a ship? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) Panama 2) Liberia 3) Greece 4) Korea 5) Others 
VI. The following question is related to depreciation 
1. how long would you think the period of depreciation is ? 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) less than 15 years 2) between 15-20 years 3) more than 20 years 4) other 
VII. The following question is related to strategic alliance in shipping 
1. please, indicate what the most important factor as you make a strategic alliance in 
shipping, is. 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( 
1) expansion of service 2) upgrade of service frequency 3) reduction of transit time 
4) providing the inland service 5) cost saving 
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) 
2. please, indicate preference to shipping company as partner when you make a strategic 
alliance in shipping. 
<before liberalisation> ( ) <after liberalisation> ( ) 
1) American shipping co. 2) European shipping co. 3) Taiwanese shipping co. 
4) Hong Kong shipping co. 4) Japanese shipping co. 
========================================================= 
name: 
name of company: 
position: 
telephone no.: 
I sincerely give you the great gratitude for your considerable responses. 
Jin-Hwan Kim 
Plymouth Business School (Ph.D. Candidate) 
University of Plymouth, U.K. 
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Appendix 2 : Breakdown of Survey Results 
Appendix 2.1 to Chapter. 5 Analysis of Survey Results within Four Groups 
Table (2)5.1 -- Table (2)5.30, (pp.206-235) 
(2)5.1 Government Shipping Policy 
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(2)5.2 Shipping Market Situation 
5.2. 1 Shipping Cycle 
5.2.2 Shipping Market Situation 
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5.2.4 Trade Routes 
5.2.5 Type of Tonnage 
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5.3.1 Source of Finance 
5.3.2 External Method of Finance 
5.3.3 Financial Conditions 
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5.3.5 Capital Cost 
5.3.6 Rate of Loan 
5.3.7 External Factors to Investment Decision-making 
5.3.8 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
5.3.9 Timing of Shipping Investment 
5.3.10 Investment Factors Mfected by Ship Operation 
5.3.11 Financial Conditions in Acquiring a Ship 
(1) Planned Shipbuilding 
(2) Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase (BBCIHP) 
(3) Secondhand Ship Purchase 
5.3.12 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
(2)5.4 Return on Shipping Investment 
5.4.1 Return on Shipping Investment 
5.4.2 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
(2)5.5 Choice of Shipyard 
5.5.1 Choice of Country 
5.5.2 Shipyard Selection 
5.5.3 Ship Registry Country 
(2)5.6 Depreciation in Ships 
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5.6.1 Depreciation in Ship 
(2)5.7 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
5.7.1 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
5.7.2 Preference to Partnership 
Appendix 2.2 to Chapter 6. Comparison between the Four Groups 
Table (2)6.1- Table (2)6.30, (pp.236-281) 
(2)6.1 Government Shipping Policy 
(2)6.l.1 Government Subsidy 
( 1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.l.2 The Level of Impediments to Liberalisation 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
( 4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.1.3 General Regulations by Country 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.2 Shipping Market Situation 
(2)6.2.1 Shipping Cycle 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.2.2 Shipping Market Situation 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.2.3 Supply and Demand of Ships 
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(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.2.4 Trade Routes 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.2.5 Type of Tonnage 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3 Shipping Finance 
(2)6.3.1 Source of Finance 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Sector 
(2)6.3.2 External Method of Finance 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.3 Financial Conditions 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.4 Capital Structure 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Sector 
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(2)6.3.5 Capital Cost 
(1) Shipping Sector 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.6 Rate of Loan 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.7 External Factors to Investment Decision-making 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Sector 
(2)6.3.8 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.9 Timing of Shipping Investment 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.10 Investment Factors Mfected by Ship Operation 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.3.11 Financial Conditions in Acquiring a Ship 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
203 
(2)6.3.12 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
( 4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.4 Return on Shipping Investment 
(2)6.4.1 Return on Shipping Investment 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.4.2 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.5 Choice of Shipyard 
(2)6.5.1 Choice of Country 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
( 4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.5.2 Shipyard Selection 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.5.3 Ship Registry Country 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
( 4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.6 Depreciation in Ships 
(2)6.6.1 Depreciation in Ship 
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(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.7 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
(2)6.7.1 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
(2)6.7.2 Preference to Partnership 
(1) Shipping Company 
(2) Banking Sector 
(3) Government Sector 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
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Appendix 2.1 to Chapter. 5 Analysis of Survey Results within Four Groups 
(2)5.1 Government Shipping Policy 
In order to test the hypothesis that the liberalisation move will not affect the Korean 
shipping, bank, government and shipbuilding industry, this government's shipping 
policy was examined first. Three questions related to government 
subsidy, other impediments of the existing regulations against liberalisation and the 
general international regulations requiring changes. 
5.1.1 Government Subsidy 
The question of government subsidy was drawn to test how respondents consider 
this factor, before they make a decision to fmance shipping investment. Like 
shipping is known as a protected industry, especially in a developing country, Korea 
also practiced this mechanism of protectionism in world shipping). The financial 
managers of Korean shipping were asked to indicate the scale of importance of a 
number of issues, comparing the before- and after-liberalisation in Korean shipping, 
as set out in the Table (2)5.1. 
This Table (2)5.1 demonstrates the difference in the importance of a government 
subsidy between before- and after-liberalisation when the financial managers, 
policy makers and sales managers in four sectors decides to make a 
shipping investment. 
Table (2)5.1 Government Subsidy (Mean Likert Score) 
operational subsidy 
construction subsidy 
fmancial aid 
waiver system 
cargo preference 
tax benefit 
Overall mean 
Before After 
3.1719 2.4219 
3.3594 2.7969 
4.0000 3.5075 
3.4000 2.5385 
3.2813 2.4844 
3.9254 4.1194 
3.5230 2.9781 
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With regard to the period of before-liberalisation, both fmancial aid (m=4.00) and 
the tax benefit (m=3.92) of the government subsidy system were at the same time 
given the highest priority, and operational subsidy (m==3.17) was of 
lowest importance. On the other hand, for the after-liberalisation period, these two 
factors (tax benefit m=4.11, fmancial aid m==3.50) were also regarded being of 
greater importance by respondents, and operational subsidy (m==2.42) and cargo 
preference (m=2.48) were of lowest importance. The priority in order was slightly 
changed for this matter. Therefore, this analysis reveals that respondents within four 
groups tend to regard these two factors, tax benefit and financial aid, as the 
most importance factors in terms of the government subsidy system, when 
they invest. They tended to place the greatest emphasis upon the tax benefit factor 
for the after-liberalisation period. 
The decline in the overall mean score following liberalisation demonstrates that 
government subsidies are becoming less significant. 
5.1.2 The Level of Impediments to Liberalisation 
Table (2)5.2 measures the difference in mean Likert score between before- and 
after- liberalisation in relation to the impediment level of the existing regulations 
against liberalisation, that is, factors regarded as a kind of barrier which the changes 
are required to implement the liberalised regulations as WTO and OEeD. 
Table (2)5.2 The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation (Mean Likert Score) 
appointed route 
route license 
investment restriction to foreigners 
ban to buy second-hand vessel 
limits on business expansion 
waiver system in liner shipping 
waiver system in bulk shipping 
ship acquisition system 
vessel-related tax 
ship registry system 
Before After 
3.4839 2.7258 
3.6719 2.9375 
3.5846 2.7846 
3.6154 2.9077 
3.4923 2.7538 
3.1587 2.4603 
3.4688 2.7656 
3.6364 2.9545 
3.5152 3.6667 
3.5758 3.2879 
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(continued) 
seafarer policy 3.4615 3.0154 
Overall mean 3.5150 2.9327 
For the before-liberalisation period, route license (m==3.67) and ship acquisition 
system (m==3.63) among the impediment levels were a higher priority, and the 
waiver system in liner shipping (m==3.15) and seafarer policy (m==3.46) were of 
lower importance. It also indicates that for after-liberalisation, vessel-related tax 
(m==3.66) and the ship registry system (m==3.28) were also given greater importance 
and meanwhile, two factors namely seafarer policy (m==1.19) and the waiver 
system in liner shipping (m=2.46) were regarded as of lesser importance. As far as 
this analysis is concerned, the respondents in Korean shipping regard the route 
license and the vessel-related tax as most important factors in the existing Korean 
regulations which were impediments to liberalisation. It was, however, implied by 
respondents that ship acquisition system and the ship registry system is a hot issue 
at the present time in Korea. 
The reduction in the overall mean score following liberalisation demonstrates a 
reduction in the level of impediment over time. 
5.1.3 General Regulations by Country 
In Table (2)5.3 is set out the difference in mean Likert score for the before- and 
after-liberalisation periods, regarding the level of influence of the regulations by 
country, for decision-making in shipping investment. 
Table (2)5.3 General Regulations by Country (Mean Likert Score) 
FMC 
DGIV 
Int'l regulations. 
(IMO, UNCTAD,etc) 
Korean regulations 
Before After 
3.0820 4.0328 
2.9180 3.0492 
3.2031 3.4219 
3.8730 3.4921 
Overall mean 3.2690 3.4990 
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In the before liberalisation case, Korean regulations (m==3.87) among the general 
regulations was a higher priority, and DG IV of European Union (m=2.91) was of 
lower priority. The different pattern of responses for the after-liberalisation case 
was disclosed, such that FMC of American regulation (m==4.03) was given the most 
preference, and DG IV of European Union (from m==2.91 to m=3.04) was of the 
least importance among general regulations by country. Therefore, the Korean 
regulation and American one were taken into account as factors 
to influence investment decision-making. The American regulation after 
liberalisation was regarded as the most influential item regarding 
shipping investment, which Korean shipowner heavily dependent on transpacific 
market think getting more important route as it was. 
Although the mean score for the influence of regulations have 
slightly increased overall, there was a reduction in the level of importance of 
Korean regulations. 
(2)5.2 Shi pping Market Situation 
The following analysis was done. These include the shipping cycle, the market 
situation, the supply and demand of ships, trade routes, and types of tonnage. 
5.2.1 Shipping Cycle 
In relation to the shipping cycle, each fmancial manager was asked to mention the 
difference in the level of importance for the before- and after-liberalisation periods. 
Frequencies and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs signed-Ranks Test, are shown in Table 
(2)5.4. 
Table (2)5.4 Shipping Cycle 
Before Li beraIisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 7 10.0 10.0 
2 41 58.6 68.6 
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(continued) 
10-20 years 3 19 27.1 95.7 
20-30 years 4 3 4.3 100.0 
---.---
-------
Total 70 100.0 
- ----- --- - -- ----- ---------- --- --- - -
After Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1-5 years 1 23 33.8 33.8 
5-10 years 2 35 51.5 85.3 
10-20 years 3 9 13.2 98.5 
20-30 years 4 1 1.5 100.0 
------- -------
Total 68 100.0 
Significance Probability for Wilcoxon test (SPSS output) = 0.0001 
The results of the analysis reveal that 58.6 % of total respondents to the shipping 
cycle answered 5-10 years, 27.1 % answered 10-20 years, in the case of before-
liberalisation. As far as after-liberalisation is concerned, 51.5% and 33.8% for each 
sample size said 5-10 years and 1-5 years. Therefore, it seems that the period of 
shipping cycle was getting moved from 5-10 years and 10-20 years to 1-5 years in 
the after-liberalisation case, comparing the before-liberalisation case. 
There was significant difference (p=0.0001) between the before-liberalisation and 
the after-liberalisation case, investigated by using Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks Test. 
5.2.2 Shipping Market Situation 
Respondents were asked for a scale of importance regarding the factors affecting 
the market situation for the before- and after-liberalisation case, the result was 
shown in Table (2)5.5. 
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Table (2)5.5 Shipping Market Situations (Mean Likert Score) 
rates 
trade volumes 
tonnage 
ship price 
number of demolition 
operational performance 
& productivity. 
shipping cycle 
Overall mean 
Before After 
3.2609 3.4493 
3.1324 3.4412 
3.0870 3.6667 
3.1618 3.2353 
2.6716 2.9104 
2.9853 3.3088 
3.1739 2.9710 
3.0676 3.2832 
It was revealed, for the before- liberalisation case, that rates (m=3.26) and shipping 
cycle (m=3.17) were of higher importance, and the number of scrapings (m=2.67) 
was of least importance, in connection with the changes in market situation. The 
financial managers, policy makers and sales managers placed 
more importance upon tonnage (m=3.66) and rates (m=3.44), and lower 
significance upon the number of scrapings (m=2.91) and shipping cycle (m=2.97) 
after liberalisation. It tells us that respondents in Korean shipping regarded rates, 
supply and demand of tonnage among shipping market situations as the 
most important factors when they decide to invest in shipping. This is also the 
fundamental factors considered in real shipping market all the time, which tonnage 
taking into account over-capacity causes lower level of rates in shipping market, as 
a pending question in shipping industry. One interesting point is that the shipping 
cycle moved from the second most important in the before-liberalisation case to the 
second least important in the after-liberalisation case. 
Overall there was an increase in the mean response to the importance of shipping 
market factors following liberalisation. 
5.2.3 Supply and Demand of Ships 
Each respondents were asked to indicate the scale of importance of various items 
regarding a ship's supply and demand, as shown in Table (2)5.6. 
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Table (2)5.6 Supply and Demand of Ship (Mean Likert Score) 
rates 
market expectations 
capital availability 
shipbuilding capability 
unit cost of shipyard 
construction subsidy 
Overall mean 
Before After 
4.1884 4.3623 
3.8286 4.0429 
3.5000 3.7143 
3.1143 3.2143 
3.0857 3.3286 
3.4507 2.9859 
3.5280 3.6081 
This analysis reveals that rates (m=4.18) and market expectations (m==3.82) were a 
higher priority and the unit cost of a shipyard (ship price) (m=2.90) was the least 
priority before liberalisation. At the same time, there was the same pattelll of 
responses for this question after liberalisation, in which rates (m==4.36) and market 
expectations (m=4.04) were of higher preference and construction subsidy (m=2.98) 
was the lowest. Each group managers in Korean shipping deemed these two 
factors, rates and market expectations, as most important ones in relation to the 
factors that affect a ship's supply and demand between both stages of liberalisation. 
The survey remarkably notes that now, respondents no longer consider the ship 
price (unit cost of shipyard) as an important factor taken into account when 
they order a vessel. 
5.2.4 Trade Routes 
Mean Likert responses are indicated for the following routes (see Table (2)5.7). 
Table (2)5.7 Trade Route (Mean Likert Score) 
transpacific route 
European route 
trans-Atlantic route 
intra-Asia route 
Korean-l apanese route 
south-north route 
niche route 
Overall mean 
Before 
3.6724 
3.4310 
2.9474 
3.3000 
2.8305 
2.1228 
2.5370 
2.9773 
212 
After 
3.9310 
3.7241 
3.2982 
3.7167 
3.2712 
2.5789 
3.0000 
3.3600 
The transpacific route (m=3.67) and the European route (m=3.43), the so-called 
principal routes, were of higher significance and the north-south trade (m=2.12) and 
niche route (m=2.53) were of lower significance before liberalisation. As shown at 
before liberalisation, there was more weight placed on the transpacific route 
(m=3.93) and European routes (m=3.72), and less weight on the north-south route 
(m=2.57) and the niche market (m=3.00) after liberalisation. Each managers in 
Korean shipping showed that the rates on the transpacific route, European route 
was of most importance when they take account of shipping investment, at both 
before- and after-liberalisation. 
Obviously, it is true for Korean shipping to place a weight upon these two routes 
because of the importance and share it occupies. Surprisingly, there were significant 
differences between before and after liberalisation on all the routes. This may be 
translated as the marketability of all trade routes, gaining in importance because of 
changes in global shipping routes and environments. Therefore, it can be identified 
that respondents actually recognised the present route situations affected by the 
global and liberalised shipping markets in world. 
5.2.5 Type of Tonnage 
The level of importance in tonnage was determined according to the ship's type. 
Table (2)5.8 Type of Tonnage (Mean Likert Score) 
container ship 
bulk ship 
tanker 
specialised ship 
other ships 
Overall mean 
Before 
3.5714 
3.6308 
3.4032 
2.5714 
2.3043 
3.0962 
After 
4.0635 
3.8769 
3.5968 
2.9206 
2.5652 
3.4046 
The results show that the bulk ship (m=3.63) and container ship (m=3.57) were of 
higher importance and other ship such as cruise vessel (m=2.30) and specialised 
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ship (m=2.57) were of less importance before liberalisation. The ordering priority of 
top two priority was conversely situated between two stages of liberalisation. This 
means container shipping is the sector that has been much more emphasised at the 
present time of container shipping, including the Korea. Furthermore, all factors 
were found more important after liberalisation, compared with before liberalisation. 
(2)5.3 Shipping Finance 
The following questions were considered in terms of the hypothesis : the source of 
finance, external method of financing, fmancial conditions, capital structure, capital 
cost, rate of loa~ external factors to influence an investment decision, investor's 
attitude towards risk, timing of investment, investment factors affected by 
ship operation, fmancial conditions in relation to ship acquisition in Korea, and 
preference in ship acquisition method. 
5.3.1 Source of Finance 
The each group managers were asked to indicate the utility level of source of 
finance both before and after liberalisation. 
Table (2)5.9 Source of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
domestic capital 
foreign capital 
internal capital 
Overall mean 
Before 
3.1250 
3.4655 
2.3750 
2.9885 
After 
2.9821 
4.2931 
2.3214 
3.1989 
In this analysis, it was revealed that the foreign capital (m=3 .46) as the fmancial 
source had the highest priority and the lowest one was internal capital (m=2.37) 
before liberalisation. Equally, it had a same pattern of responses after liberalisation. 
As expected, it was revealed that the foreign capital (m==4.29) was considered as of 
highest priority after liberalisation, because its presumed lower rate of interest. 
5.3.2 External Method of Finance 
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In Table (2)5.10 is shown the significant difference in the utility level of external 
sources of fmance for raising capital in shipping [mance, with comparisons between 
before and after liberalisation. 
Table (2)5.10 External Method of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
shipyard credit 2.8000 2.3818 
bank [mance 3.7018 3.8246 
lease finance 2.9818 3.5273 
Overall mean 3.1612 3.2446 
Bank finance (m=3.70) is seen as the top priority and shipyard credit (m=2.80) was 
the lowest before liberalisation. It has the same ordering after 
liberalisation. Consequently, each group managers in Korean shipping took bank 
finance as the most important factor in deciding to raise capital. Particularly, it was 
shown that bank finance (m=3.82) was the most significant factor after 
liberalisation. 
5.3.3 Financial Conditions 
This analysis is related to the significant difference in fmanciaI conditions 
considered by respondents joined in the survey before and after liberalisation. 
Table (2)5.11 Financial Conditions (Mean Likert Score) 
fmancial source 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
exchange rate 
inflation rate 
Overall mean 
Before After 
3.5088 3.7544 
4.2241 4.4655 
3.8621 4.0690 
3.7544 4.0877 
3.3860 3.7544 
3.2982 4.0351 
3.1053 3.4035 
3.5913 3.9385 
It was observed that interest rates (from m=4.22 to m==4.46) held the higher priority 
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and of lowest significance was the inflation rate (from m==3.10 to m=3.40) for both 
stages of liberalisation. Hence, it can be said that interest rate was more significant 
among fmancial conditions for decision makers ill Korean 
shipping investment. Especially, this was the most important factors after 
liberalisation. 
Each fmancial factor was of higher significance after liberalisation. 
5.3.4 Capital Structure 
Table (2)5.12 reveals the results of the significance of stability in the capital 
structure of a Korean shipping company, for the pre and post stages of 
liberalisatioll. 
Table (2)5.12 Capital Structure (Mean Likert Score) 
capital structure 
Before 
3.2000 
After 
3.3600 
As for the stability of capital structure, the significance (from m=3.20 to m=3.36) 
was higher after liberalisation than before liberalisation. 
5.3.5 Capital Cost 
The next aspect concerns the difference in capital cost in financial decision-
making in a Korean shipping company before and after liberalisation. 
Table (2)5.13 Capital Cost (Mean Likert Score) 
Before 
capital cost 3.0588 
After 
3.0392 
The capital cost factor became less important after liberalisation than before, 
although the differences are very small. 
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5.3.6 Rate of Loan 
Table (2)5.14 is based on the analysis of the significant differences between the 
rate of loan fmanced from a bank in tenns of the percentage of price, pre and post 
liberalisation periods, using both Frequencies test and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-ranks Test. 
Table (2)5.14 Rate of Loan 
Before LiberaIisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
less than 10% 1 3 5.3 5.3 
between 10-20% 2 3 5.3 10.5 
between 20-30% 3 7 12.3 22.8 
between 30-50% 4 8 14.0 36.8 
between 50-80% 5 12 21.1 57.9 
more than 80% 6 24 42.1 100.0 
------- -------
Total 57 100.0 
---- - --------- ------------ ----- ----
After Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
less than 10% 1 2 3.4 3.4 
between 10-20% 2 3 5.2 8.6 
between 20-30% 3 7 12.1 20.7 
between 30-50% 4 5 8.6 29.3 
between 50-80% 5 15 25.9 55.2 
more than 80% 6 26 44.8 100.0 
.------ -------
Total 58 100.0 
Significance Probability for Wilcoxon test (SPSS output) = 0.1996 
From the frequencies, 42.1% of the total respondents thought 'more than 80%' and 
21.1 % of them said 'between 50-80%' as the reasonable rate of loan before 
liberalisation, and the same ordering was shown after liberalisation. Therefore, 
'more than 800/0' of the loan rate was the most important factor after liberalisation~ 
and before. It was again tested by a Nonparametric test to know the significant 
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difference between the before- and the after-liberalisation. However, the answer 
(p=O.1996) shows that there was no significant difference. 
5.3.7 External Factors to Investment Decision-making 
The next section analyses the difference in the external factors, influencing in the 
decision-making process, between the before- and the after-liberalisation periods. 
Table(2) 5.15 External Factor to Investment Decision-making ('lean Likert Score) 
period ofROI 
decision-maker's attitude towards risk 
shipping cycle 
timing factors 
capital structure 
confidence in decision-making 
bank's attitude 
fmancial service level 
Overall mean 
Before After 
3.7193 4.1579 
3.6140 4.0526 
3.5789 3.8947 
3.7544 4.1579 
3.3860 3.7719 
3.2500 3.3929 
3. 1754 3.4 211 
3.1228 3.5614 
3.4501 3.8013 
Two factors, timing factors (m=3.75) and period ofretum on investment (m=3.71), 
were of higher preference, and financial service level (m=3.12) and bank's attitude 
(m=3.17) together were of lower significance before liberalisation. There was 
change in order of preference after liberalisation, such as aforesaid two factors have 
same price (m=4.15) of higher importance and confidence in decision-making 
(m=3.39) and bank's attitude (m=3.42) of lower importance. Accordingly, it 
transpired that these two factors, timing factors of investment and period of 
return on investment, were considered the most important ones when each group 
managers in Korean shipping decide to make a shipping investment. The timing 
factors and period of return on investment was regarded as more important factors 
after liberalisation. 
All external factors were found to be becoming more important to investment 
decision-making after liberalisation. 
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5.3.8 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
Table (2)5.16 relates to the differences between the investor's attitude towards risk 
before- and after-liberalisation periods, using Frequencies and 2 related samples of 
Nonparametric Tests. 
Table (2)5.16 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Value Frequency 
1 5 
2 24 
3 29 
Total 58 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
8.6 8.6 
41.4 50.0 
50.0 100.0 
100.0 
--- - --- - -- - ---- ---- - -- ----- - - -- - - - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Value Frequency 
1 5 
2 17 
3 36 
Total 58 
Percent 
8.6 
29.3 
62.1 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3298 
Cum 
Percent 
8.6 
37.9 
100.0 
By using frequencies, 50.0% of total respondents answered 'risk-mixed (prone+ 
averse)' and 41.4% of them responded 'risk averse' for the before-liberalisation case. 
As far as the after-liberalisation period is concerned, 62.1% of them pointed out 
'risk mixed' and 29.3% of total respondents indicated risk-averse. Accordingly, 
respondents regarded the 'risk mixed' case as the most important factor in both 
before and after liberalisation. However, by the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks Test, there is no significant difference (p=0.3298) between two stages of 
liberalisation. 
5.3.9 Timing of Shipping Investment 
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The next question regards the timing of investment in shipping in order to look at a 
significant difference between the situations before and after liberalisation. 
Table (2)5.17 Timing of Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
top of cycle 1 12 20.3 20.3 
bottom of cycle 2 23 39.0 59.3 
turning point 3 23 39.0 98.3 
other 4 1 1.7 100.0 
------- -------
Total 59 100.0 
- - - -- - - - - - -- --- ----- - - ---- - -- - - - - - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
top of cycle 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
other 
Value Frequency 
1 2 
2 23 
3 32 
4 2 
Total 59 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
3.4 3.4 
39.0 42.4 
54.2 96.6 
3.4 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0045 
From the frequencies analysis, 39.00/0 of the total responded 'bottom of cycle' and 
'turning point', 20.3% of them indicated 'top of cycle' as an important factor before 
liberalisation. Meanwhile, 54.2%, of respondents answered 'turning point' and 
39.0% of them said 'bottom of cycle' after liberalisation. So, it can be observed that 
the 'turning point' was regarded as the more important factor in both before and after 
liberalisation. 
Based on N onparametric testing, it was revealed that there is a significant difference 
(p=0.0045) between the before- and the after-liberalisation case. 
5.3.10 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation 
The following tables indicates differences, for the factors associated with 
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ship operation in the investment decision-making process, between the before- and 
the after- liberalisation periods. 
Table (2)5.18 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation(Mean Likert Score) 
market share 
profitability (rates) 
load factor 
fixed cost 
floating cost 
choice on routes 
operational service level 
Overall mean 
Befo re After 
3.3455 3.7091 
4.1455 4.5091 
3.5098 3.6667 
3.4364 3.6182 
3.3636 3.6182 
3.5926 3.7963 
3.4444 3.9815 
3.5483 3.8427 
Profitability (rates) (m=4.14) and choice on routes (m=3.59) were a higher 
preference and market share (m=3.34) was of the lowest importance before 
liberalisation. For the after-liberalisation stage, profitability (rates) (m=4.50) 
and operational service level (m=3.98) were the more important factors, and fixed 
cost (m=3.61) and the floating cost (m=3.61) were of lower significance. 
Profitability (rates) and operational service level were considered as more important 
factors, and in particular, profitability (rates) during the after-liberalisation periods 
was a top priority. As far as operational service level is concerned, it reflects a 
growmg concern and the importance of the customer's service in the present 
shipping market. 
Each factor was rated of higher importance after liberalisation. 
5.3.11 Financial Conditions in Acquiring a Ship 
The next three results test whether there is a significant difference in fmancial 
conditions in securing a ship by Korean investors, by a way of planned 
shipbuilding, bareboat charter on hire purchase (BBCIHP) and secondhand 
purchase. Comparisons made between the before- and the after-liberalisation 
periods. 
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(1) Planned Shipbuilding 
Table (2)5.19 Planned Shipbuilding 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
source of fmance 1 11 19.3 19.3 
interest rate 2 32 56.1 75.4 
loan rate 3 11 19.3 94.7 
repayment period 4 1 l.8 96.5 
tax 5 2 3.5 100.0 
------- -------
Total 57 100.0 
- - - --- - ---- - ----- - - - - - --- - ----- - - - -
After Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
source of finance 1 3 5.3 5.3 
mterest rate 2 38 66.7 71.9 
loan rare 3 12 2l.1 93.0 
period of repayment 4 1 1.8 94.7 
tax 5 3 5.3 100.0 
------- .------
Total 57 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1422 
For the two stages of liberalisation in relation to the planned shipbuilding, there is 
the same pattern of priority. The fonner showed that 56.10/0 of respondents 
pointed out 'interest rate'. The latter pointed out that 66.7% chose 'interest rate'. 
Interest rates for both stages of liberalisation, was the most important factor in 
Korea. This means that fmancial managers, policy-makers and sales managers in 
Korean shipping industry still regarded the interest rate as a decisive factor when 
they decide to make a shipping investment by means of a planned shipbuilding. 
This system operated by the Korean government was devised to make Korean 
shipowners compulsorily use funds from the Korean Industrial Bank with a 
relatively high interest rate compared with foreign money. Therefore, the interest 
rate has been regarded as a very important factor by Korean shipping 
222 
managers, in utilising this system. 
By using the Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks Test, it was shown that there 
was no significant difference (p==0.1422) between the before- and the after-
liberalisation cases. 
(2) Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase (BBCIHP) 
Under this system the Korean shipowner builds a ship with Korean or a foreign 
bank's money under the maximum amount permitted by the government, through a 
paper company in case of foreign money established at an overseas country by the 
Korean shipping company in order to raise capital, and once financed, this money 
should be used to construct a ship at either a Korean yard or a foreign yard. 
Table (2)5.20 Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 9 15.3 15.3 
2 34 57.6 72.9 
3 6 10.2 83.1 
4 7 11.9 94.9 
5 3 5.1 100.0 
Total 59 100.0 
----- - ------ -- --- -- -- ----- -- -------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of [mance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 6 10.3 10.3 
2 36 62.1 72.4 
3 8 13.8 86.2 
4 7 12.1 98.3 
5 1 1.7 100.0 
Total 58 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.9176 
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From the frequencies test BBCIHP, 57.6% of total respondents indicated 'interest 
rate' as an important factor before liberalisation, and 62.1% of them answered 
'interest rate' after liberalisation as well. 
Each group managers took the interest rate into account as the most important 
factor in this investment activity. It was disclosed that the interest rate after 
liberalisation was regarded more significant than before liberalisation, and that other 
factors were treated as either of more importance or less, respectively. This means 
that post liberalisation Korean shipping managers have come to be concerned 
with other factors such as loan rate and repayment period more relatively than 
the interest rate. However, the interest rate was still the most significant factor for 
both stages, and the interest rate at a Korean bank is still higher than that of a 
foreign bank. 
By Nonparametric testing, it was presented that there is no a significant difference 
(p=0.9176) between the before-liberalisation and the after-liberalisation cases. 
(3) Secondhand Ship Purchase 
Table (2)5.21 Secondhand Ship Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 15 26.3 26.3 
2 15 26.3 52.6 
3 12 21.1 73.7 
4 7 12.3 86.0 
5 8 14.0 100.0 
Total 57 100.0 
--------------------------------- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Frequency Percent 
10 17.9 
20 35.7 
11 19.6 
9 16.1 
22.J 
Cum 
Percent 
17.9 
53.6 
73.2 
89.3 
(continued) 
tax 5 6 10.7 100.0 
Total 56 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) =0.4202 
In this analysis of secondhand purchase options, 26.30/0 of respondents selected 
'interest rate' and source of fmance respectively before liberalisation and 35.7%, 
19.6% of them responded the interest rate, loan rate after liberalisation. The 
rate of interest after liberalisation was shown to be of more importance than before 
liberalisation, as repayment period were becoming relatively more important. 
From Nonparametric tests, there was no significant difference (p=0.4202) between 
the before- and the after-liberalisation case. 
In summary, financial managers in Korean shipping have regarded the 
rate of interest as the most important factor, in both absolute and relative terms, 
when they make a decision in shipping investment, furthermore, the importance is 
getting higher in all three parts in whether the planned shipbuilding or BBC/HP or 
secondhand purchase options. They come to be interested in other factors, in 
relative terms, after liberalisation, including the options such as all three options of 
ship acquisition system. This means that a competitive financial package 
to investors is, to some extent, judged from more value-added financial service 
these days. However, the interest rate for all three parts was shown to be 
more important after liberalisation, compared with before liberalisation. There is 
now a tendency for the Korean shipowner reluctant to use this condition to raise 
money in building a ship, especially after liberalisation, which compulsory options 
to use this terms were removed. 
5.3.12 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
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Table (2)5.22 relates to the ship acquisition programme making comparisons pre 
and post liberalisation, using frequencies and Nonparametric testing. 
Table (2)5.22 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
planned shipbuilding 
bbc/hp 
Value 
1 
Frequency Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
30.4 
89.3 
100.0 
17 30.4 
2 33 58.9 
second-hand ship 3 6 10.7 
------- -------
Total 56 100.0 
- ------ ---------- - --- --- - - - - - -- - ---
After Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
planned shipbuilding 1 1 l.8 1.8 
bbc/hp 2 46 83.6 85.5 
second-hand ship 3 7 12.7 98.2 
4 1 1.8 100.0 
-------
.-.-._-
Total 55 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0035 
From the frequencies, 58.9% of respondents chose BBCIHP in the case of before-
liberalisation, and (83.60/0) was shown in the after-liberalisation case. An interesting 
feature was that BBC/HP and secondhand purchase options were more significant in 
after liberalisation, but planned shipbuilding diminished in preference after 
liberalisation, moving its share towards aforesaid two factors, mainly to BBCIHP, 
Korean shipowners are less interested in this option as it is non-competitive 
financial package under deregulation of the fmancial markets. 
The Nonparametric analysis suggests that there was significant difference 
(p=O. 0035) between the results before and after liberalisation. 
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(2)5.4 Return on Shipping Investment 
To test the mam hypothesis, further questions relate to the return on 
shipping investment and the evaluation method of shipping investment. 
5.4.1 Return on Shipping Investment 
In Table (2)5.23 this IS an evaluation of a reasonable period of 
return on investment in shipping, with comparisons between before and after 
liberalisation, by the two testing methods previously adopted. 
Table (2)5.23 Return on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
between 20 and 25 years 
Value Frequency 
1 10 
2 31 
3 14 
4 3 
Total 58 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
17.2 17.2 
53.4 70.7 
24.1 94.8 
5.2 100.0 
100.0 
--- -------- ----------------------- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
between 20 and 25 years 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
Frequency Percent 
16 27.1 
31 52.5 
10 16.9 
2 3.4 
-----.- ------. 
59 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0654 
Cum 
Percent 
27.1 
79.7 
96.6 
100.0 
Results revealed that 53.4% of total respondents chose 'between 10-15 years' and 
21.4% of them chose 'between 15-20 years' for the before-liberalisation case. For 
the after-lib eralis ation, 52.5% of respondents said 'between 10-15 years' and 
27.1% of responding managers said 'less than 10 years'. The case of 'less than 
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10 years' was relatively more important, instead, 'between 10 and 20 years' is 
getting less important between the two stages of liberalisation. They regarded the 
period of return on shipping investment as being relati vely shorter after 
liberalisation. Half of them believe 'between 10-15 years' as the most important 
factor in both stages. 
As far as a significant difference is concerned, there was no change (p=0. 0654) 
between the before-liberalisation and the after-liberalisation periods. 
5.4.2 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
In Table (2)5.24 the evaluation method was tested, with comparisons between the 
situations before and after liberalisation. 
Table (2)5.24 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
payback method 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 20 55.6 55.6 
2 11 30.6 86.1 
3 5 13.9 100.0 
Total 36 100.0 
-------- ----------- - ---- - - ------ ---
After LiberaIisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
net present value 1 17 44.7 44.7 
internal rate of return 2 15 39.5 84.2 
payback method 3 5 13.2 97.4 
4 1 2.6 100.0 
------- -------
Total 38 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3505 
Accordingly, 55.6% of respondents preferred the NPV method and 30.6% of 
them identified the IRR method for the before-liberalisation period. Similar results 
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for the after-liberalisation phase. The NPV method of both stages was of the highest 
significance. 
As far as a significant difference is concerned, there was no change (p=0.3505) 
between the before- and the after-liberalisation periods. 
(2)5.5 Choice of Shipyard 
In order to test the hypothesis, the following analysis was performed regarding the 
country's shipyards, the selection factors to shipyard and the ship registry countries. 
5.5.1 Choice of Country 
In Table (2)5.25 was included the result of a significant difference regarding the 
shipbuilding country selected by shipping company to build in a ship, making 
comparisons between the before- and the after-liberalisation periods. 
Table (2)5.25 Country's Shipyard 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Japan 
Europe 
Value 
1 
3 
4 
Total 
Cum 
Frequency Percent Percent 
48 87.3 87.3 
6 10.9 98.2 
1 1.8 100.0 
55 100.0 
--- --- -------- -- - -------- - -- ---- ---
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
America 
Japan 
others 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
5 
Total 
Cum 
Frequency Percent Percent 
39 73.6 73.6 
1 l.9 75.5 
12 22.6 98.1 
1 l.9 100.0 
53 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2097 
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By frequencies, 87.3% of respondents pointed out a Korean shipyard and 10.9%, a 
Japanese one, for the before-liberalisation case. In the case of after- liberalisation 
, 
73.6% chose Korea and 22.6%, Japan. The preference for a Korean shipyard was 
relatively higher than for a Japanese one before liberalisation, but, some portion of 
Korean one moves to Japanese one after liberalisation. 
By the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, it was analysed that there was 
no a significant difference (p=0.2097) between the before- and the after-
liberalisation case. 
5.5.2 Shipyard Selection 
For this question, each group managers were asked to indicate the scale of 
significance in relation to factors considered by a shipping company when building 
a ship. 
Table (2)5.26 Shipyard Selection (Mean Likert Score) 
construction capability 
labour force 
technology 
ship-linked industry 
price competitiveness 
non-price competitiveness 
exchange rate in market 
int'l competitiveness 
Overall mean 
Before 
3.6852 
3.2222 
4.1091 
3.0741 
4.2727 
3.2407 
3.2222 
3.4630 
3.5362 
After 
3.7963 
3.2778 
4.2727 
3.2593 
4.5636 
3.5741 
3.8519 
3.9074 
3.8129 
The price competitiveness (m=4.34) and technology (m==4.23) were of 
higher importance and "ship-linked" industry (m=2.80) was the lowest one. The 
same ordering (m=4.73, m==4.30) was shown in the after-liberalisation case. 
Therefore, these two factors, price-competitiveness for cost aspects and technology 
for the hi-tech vessel, were considered as more important factors by each group 
managers when making a decision to invest in shipping both before and after 
liberalisation. The price competitiveness was the first priority for both stages. 
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Each factor was considered as becoming more important after liberalisation. 
5.5.3 Ship Registry Country 
We examine the difference in relation to the country of ship regisny between the 
before- and after-liberalisation periods. 
Table (2)5.27 Ship Registry Country 
Before Li beralisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Greece 
Korea 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
Cum 
Freq uency Percent Percent 
40 72.7 72.7 
8 14.5 87.3 
2 3.6 90.9 
5 9.1 100.0 
55 100.0 
------- - - - -- ----------- - -----------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Greece 
Korea 
others 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Total 
Cum 
Frequency Percent Percent 
36 64.3 64.3 
13 23.2 87.5 
1 1.8 89.3 
4 7.1 96.4 
2 3.6 100.0 
56 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.4955 
72.7% of respondents named Panama and 14.5% of them pointed out Korea before 
liberalisation. For the after-liberalisation case, 64.3%) chose Panama and 23.20/0, 
Liberia. Accordingly, the position of Panama was getting ever less important, and it 
was shown that respondents preferred Liberia to Panama and Korea relatively in 
after-liberalisation case. 
There was no significant difference (p=0.4955) between the situations before and 
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after liberalisation. 
(2)5.6 Depreciation in Ships 
The subsequent question was checked to identify the period of depreciation in ship 
before and after liberalisation. 
5.6.1 Depreciation in Ship 
Table (2)5.28 Depreciation in Ship 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
Frequency 
12 
39 
9 
60 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
20.0 20.0 
65.0 85.0 
15.0 100.0 
100.0 
-------- ---- -- - -- -- --- - - ----- ------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
Cum 
Freq uency Percent Percent 
23 37.7 37.7 
29 47.5 85.2 
9 14.8 100.0 
61 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0883 
From the Table (2)5.28, 65.0% of respondents confinned 'between 15-20 years' and 
20.0%, 'less than 15 years' for the before-liberalisation. After liberalisation, 47.5% 
chose 'between 15-20 years' and 37.7% 'less than 15 years'. Therefore, the 
respondents thought the depreciation period in ships was getting shorter after 
liberalisation. 
By the N onparametric testing, it was shown that there was no significant difference 
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(p==O.0883) between the cases before and after liberalisation. 
(2)5.7 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
To test the hypothesis established, the purpose of an alliance and the partnership 
preferences were analysed. 
5.7.1 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
The significance of the difference between the purpose of strategic alliance by 
shipping company before and after liberalisation was evaluated. 
Table (2)5.29 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
expansion of service 
upgrade of service frequency 
reduction of transit time 
providing the inland service 
cost saving 
1 30 53.6 53.6 
2 3 5.4 58.9 
3 1 1.8 60.7 
4 1 1.8 62.5 
5 21 37.5 100.0 
Total 56 100.0 
-------------- ---------- - --------- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label Value Frequency 
expansion of service 
upgrade of service frequency 
reduction of transit time 
cost saving 
1 15 
2 6 
3 4 
5 32 
Total 57 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
26.3 26.3 
10.5 36.8 
7.0 43.9 
56.1 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.0056 
Following the analysis of results, 53.6%) of respondents pointed out 'expansion of 
service area', and 37.5%, 'cost savings' before liberalisation. Meanwhile. for the 
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after-liberalisation case, 56.1% selected 'cost savings' and 26.3%, 'expansion of 
service area'. The expansion of the service area was becoming relatively 
less important, than in case of cost saving. This means that they are 
concentrating on more competition of trade trades pursuing the fruitful profit-
making policy only. It was also shown that there was a significant difference 
(p=0.0056) between the situations before and after liberalisation. 
5.7.2 Preference to Partnership 
The Table (2)5.30 is set out to reveal differences in relation to partner's nationality 
desired by Korean shipping when they decide to make a strategic alliance. 
Table (2)5.30 Preference to Partnership 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
American shipping co. 1 10 2l.7 2l.7 
European shipping co. 2 19 4l.3 63.0 
Taiwanese shipping co. 3 3 6.5 69.6 
HongKong shipping co. 4 1 2.2 7l.7 
Japanese shipping co. 5 13 28.3 100.0 
------- -------
Total 46 100.0 
------- - - - - ---- ------ ----- - - -------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
European shipping co. 
Taiwanese shipping co. 
HongKong shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 11 23.4 23.4 
2 21 44.7 68.1 
3 3 6.4 74.5 
4 3 6.4 80.9 
5 9 19.1 100.0 
Total 47 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2668 
.. II· 41 3°/ of respondents answered By frequenCIes analYSIS, as a partner to an a lance, . 10 
'E hi . , d 28 3°1 'Japanese one' before liberalisation. The uropean s ppmg company an . 10, 
23.t 
different pattern of ordering was shown after liberalisation, European shipping 
company was getting more important and the Japanese one replaced by American 
shipping company, getting less important. Using a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks Test, it is shown that there is no significant difference (p=O.2668) 
between the before- and the after-liberalisation periods. 
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Appendix 2.2 to Chapter 6. Comparison between the Four Groups 
An analysis was performed of the impact of liberalisation, with appropriate 
comparisons between the four groups. 
(2)6.1 Government Shipping Policy 
(2)6.1.1 Government Subsidy 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.1 Government Subsidy (Mean Likert Score) 
operational subsidy 
construction subsidy 
fmancial aid 
waiver system 
cargo preference 
tax benefit 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
2.6538 
2.9286 
4.2069 
3.2500 
2.8519 
4.2069 
3.5164 
After 
2.1154 
2.5357 
3.9310 
2.3929 
2.1111 
4.5517 
2.8496 
Table (2)6.1 Government Subsidy (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
operational subsidy 3.6667 2.6667 
construction subsidy 3.9091 3.2727 
financial aid 4.0000 3.4167 
waiver system 3.2727 2.9091 
cargo preference 3.4545 3.0000 
tax benefit 3.6667 3.2500 
Overall mean 3.6616 3.0859 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.1 Government Subsidy (Mean Likert Score) 
operational subsidy 
construction subsidy 
fmancial aid 
waiver system 
cargo preference 
tax benefit 
Overall mean 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Before After 
2.9167 2.0000 
3.9091 3.1818 
3.7500 3.2500 
3.5000 1.9167 
3.5000 2.0000 
3.5000 3.6667 
3.5126 2.6692 
Table (2)6.1 Government Subsidy (Mean Likert Score) 
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Before After 
operational subsidy 3.9286 3.1429 
construction subsidy 3.3571 2.6429 
fmancial aid 3.7857 2.9286 
waiver system 3.7143 3.0714 
cargo preference 3.7857 3.2143 
tax benefit 3.9286 4.3571 
Overall mean 3.7500 3.2262 
(2)6.1.2 The Level of Impediments to Liberalisation 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.2 The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation (Mean Likert Score) 
appointed route 
route license 
investment restriction to foreigners 
ban to buy second-hand vessel 
limits on business expansion 
waiver system in liner shipping 
waiver system in bulk shipping 
ship acquisition system 
vessel-related tax 
ship registry system 
seafarer policy 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before After 
3.7143 2.5357 
3.9286 2.9643 
3.7500 2.7857 
3.9655 3.0345 
3.6429 2.5714 
3.0370 2.2963 
3.5185 2.7037 
4.1034 3.0690 
3.8966 3.2414 
4.0345 3.7586 
3.7931 3.2069 
3.7622 2.9243 
Table (2)6.2 The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation (Mean Likert Score) 
appointed route 
route license 
investment restriction to foreigners 
ban to buy second-hand vessel 
limits on business expansion 
waiver system in liner shipping 
waiver system in bulk shipping 
ship acquisition system 
vessel-related tax 
ship registry system 
seafarer po1icl' 
Overall mean 
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Before 
3.3000 
3.4000 
3.7000 
3.8000 
3.4000 
3.3000 
3.5000 
3.2000 
3.4000 
3.3000 
3.3000 
3.4182 
After 
3.1000 
3.1000 
2.8000 
2.8000 
2.8000 
2.8000 
2.8000 
2.6000 
6.6000 
2.8000 
2.4000 
3.1455 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.2 The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation (Mean Likert Score) 
appointed route 
route license 
investment restriction to foreigners 
ban to buy second-hand vessel 
limits on business expansion 
waiver system in liner shipping 
waiver system in bulk shipping 
ship acquisition system 
vessel-related tax 
ship registry system 
seafarer policy 
Overall mean 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Before After 
3.2500 2.0833 
3.5385 2.3077 
3.2308 2.3077 
2.9167 2.4167 
3.4615 2.4615 
3.0000 2.0000 
3.3846 2.2308 
3.0769 2.5385 
2.7692 2.8462 
3.1538 2.3846 
2.9231 2.3846 
3.1550 2.3601 
Table (2)6.2 The Level of Impediment to Liberalisation (Mean Likert Score) 
appointed route 
route license 
investment restriction to foreigners 
ban to buy second-hand vessel 
limits on business expansion 
waiver system in liner shipping 
waiver system in bulk shipping 
ship acquisition system 
vessel-related tax 
ship registry system 
seafarer policy 
Overall mean 
Before After 
3.3333 3.5000 
3.4615 3.3846 
3.5000 3.2143 
3.3571 3.1429 
3.2857 3.3571 
3.4286 2.9286 
3.4286 3.3571 
3.5000 3.3571 
3.5000 3.2143 
3.2143 3.5000 
3.3846 3.6923 
3.3994 3.3317 
(2)6.1.3 General Regulations by Country 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.3 General Regulations by Country (Mean Likert Score) 
FMC 
DGIV 
Int'l regUlations. 
(IMO, UNCTAD,etc) 
Korean regulations 
Overall mean 
Before After 
2.7200 2.8000 
2.5200 2.6400 
3.1429 3.3214 
4.1724 3.6897 
3.1388 3.1128 
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(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.3 General Regulations by Country (Mean Likert Score) 
FMC 
DO IV 
Int'l regulations. 
(IMO, UNCTAD,etc) 
Korean regulations 
Overall mean 
(3) Government Sector 
Before After 
3.7000 3.9000 
3.5000 3.7000 
3.6000 4.0000 
3.6667 3.5556 
3.6167 3.7889 
Table (2)6.3 General Regulations by Country (Mean Likert Score) 
FMC 
DO IV 
Int'l regulations. 
(IMO, UNCT AD,etc) 
Korean regulations 
Overall mean 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Before 
3.5385 
2.9231 
2.8462 
3.6667 
3.2436 
After 
7.0769 
2.9231 
3.0769 
3.0833 
4.0401 
Table (2)6.3 General Regulations by Country (Mean Likert Score) 
FMC 
DGIV 
Int'l regulations. 
(IMO, UNCTAD,etc) 
Korean regulations 
Overall mean 
(2)6.2 Shipping Market Situation 
(2)6.2.1 Shipping Cycle 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.4 Shipping Cycle 
Before Liberalisation 
Before 
2.8462 
3.2308 
3.3846 
3.5385 
3.2500 
After 
3.4615 
3.4615 
3.5385 
3.3846 
3.4615 
Cum 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
20-30 years 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 6.7 6.7 
2 20 66.7 73.3 
3 7 23.3 96.7 
4 1 3.3 100.0 
-------
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Total 30 100.0 
--- - - -- ------------- ------ ---------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 14 46.7 46.7 
2 14 46.7 93.3 
3 2 6.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0004 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.4 Shipping Cycle 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
20-30 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 7.7 7.7 
2 7 53.8 61.5 
3 3 23.1 84.6 
4 2 15.4 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
-----------------------------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
20-30 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 23.1 23.1 
2 7 53.8 76.9 
3 2 15.4 92.3 
4 1 7.7 100.0 
------- -------
Total 13 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0910 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.4 Shipping Cycle 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 23.1 23.1 
2 6 46.2 69.2 
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10-20 years 3 4 30.8 100.0 
-------
------. 
Total 13 100.0 
-- ----- ---------- ----- - --- ------- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 27.3 27.3 
2 7 63.6 90.9 
3 1 9.1 100.0 
-------
Total 11 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.3105 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.4 Shipping Cycle 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 7.1 7.1 
2 8 57.1 64.3 
3 5 35.7 100.0 
------- -------
Total 14 100.0 
- ------------------------- -- - -- ----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
1-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 21.4 21.4 
2 7 50.0 71.4 
3 4 28.6 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3105 
(2)6.2.2 Shipping Market Situation 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.5 Shipping Market Situations (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
2·B 
rates 3.2414 3.4483 
trade volumes 3.1333 3.3667 
tonnage 3.0333 3.7667 
ship price 3.1333 3.2000 
number of demolition 2.4828 2.7586 
operational performance 2.9333 3.0667 
& productivity. 
shipping cycle 3.3000 2.8000 
Overall mean 3.0368 3.201 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.5 Shipping Market Situations (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
rates 3.0000 3.4615 
trade volumes 2.9167 3.4167 
tonnage 3.0000 3.4167 
ship price 3.0000 3.0000 
number of demolition 3.0833 3.0000 
operational performance 2.9167 3.4167 
& productivity. 
shipping cycle 2.9167 3.0833 
Overall mean 2.9762 3.2571 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.5 Shipping Market Situations (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
rates 3.6154 3.6923 
trade volumes 3.3333 3.6667 
tonnage 3.3077 3.5385 
ship price 3.1667 3.0000 
number of demolition 2.6667 2.7500 
operational performance 3.1667 3.3333 
& productivity. 
shipping cycle 3.3077 3.0000 
Overall mean 3.2235 3.2830 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.5 Shipping Market Situations (Mean Likert Score) 
rates 
trade volumes 
tonnage 
ship price 
number of demolition 
operational performance 
Before After 
3.2143 3.2143 
3.1429 3.4286 
3.0714 3.7857 
3.3571 3.7143 
2.7143 3.2857 
3.0000 3.7143 
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& productivity. 
shipping cycle 
Overall mean 
(2)6.2.3 Supply and Demand of Ships 
(1) Shipping Company 
3.0000 3.2143 
3.0714 3.4796 
Table (2)6.6 Supply and Demand of Ship (Mean Likert Score) 
rates 
market expectations 
capital availability 
shipbuilding capability 
unit cost of shipyard 
construction subsidy 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before After 
4.3103 4.5517 
3.9000 4.1667 
3.5000 3.7000 
3.3667 3.3000 
2.9000 3.1333 
3.3000 2.7333 
3.5462 3.5975 
Table (2)6.6 Supply and Demand of Ship (Mean Likert Score) 
rates 
market expectations 
capital availability 
shipbuilding capability 
unit cost of shipyard 
construction subsidy 
Overall mean 
(3) Government Sector 
Before 
4.3077 
3.7692 
3.6154 
3.2308 
3.5385 
3.7143 
3.6960 
After 
4.5385 
4.2308 
3.7692 
3.3846 
3.6154 
3.4286 
3.8279 
Table (2)6.6 Supply and Demand of Ship (Mean Likert Score) 
rates 
market expectations 
capital availability 
shipbuilding capability 
unit cost of shipyard 
construction subsidy 
Overall mean 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Before 
4.2308 
4.3077 
3.6923 
2.4615 
3.0000 
3.6154 
3.5513 
After 
4.1538 
4.0000 
3.6923 
2.3846 
2.9231 
2.9231 
3.3462 
Table (2)6.6 Supply and Demand of Ship (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
rates 3.7857 4.0000 
market expectations 3.2857 3.6429 
2-1-3 
capital availability 
shipbuilding capability 
unit cost of shipyard 
construction subsidy 
Overall mean 
(2)6.2.4 Trade Routes 
(1) Shipping Company 
3.2143 
3.0714 
3.1429 
3.3571 
3.3095 
Table (2)6.7 Trade Route (Mean Likert Score) 
transpacific route 
European route 
trans-Atlantic route 
intra-Asia route 
Korean-Japanese route 
south-north route 
niche route 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
3.7600 
3.2800 
2.9167 
3.1852 
2.3846 
1.8333 
2.2000 
2.7943 
Table (2)6.7 Trade Route (Mean Likert Score) 
Before 
transpacific route 3.4286 
European route 3.4286 
trans-Atlantic route 3.1429 
intra-Asia route 3.4286 
Korean-J apanese route 3.2857 
south-north route 2.7143 
niche route 2.8571 
Overall mean 3.1837 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.7 Trade Route (Mean Likert Score) 
Before 
transpacific route 3.6667 
European route 3.7500 
trans-Atlantic route 2.9167 
intra-Asia route 3.6667 
Korean-Japanese route 3.3333 
south-north route 1.6667 
niche route 2.5000 
Overall mean 3.0714 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
2-l-l 
3.7143 
3.6429 
3.8571 
3.1429 
3.6667 
After 
3.9200 
3.4400 
3.2500 
3.6667 
2.8846 
2.4583 
2.8800 
3.2142 
After 
3.8571 
3.7143 
3.2857 
3.5714 
3.4286 
3.0000 
3.0000 
3.4082 
After 
4.0833 
4.1667 
3.0833 
3.8333 
3.6667 
2.0833 
3.0000 
3.4167 
Table (2)6.7 Trade Route (Mean Likert Score) 
transpacific route 
European route 
trans-Atlantic route 
intra-Asia route 
Korean-J apanese route 
south-north route 
niche route 
Overall mean 
(2)6.2.5 Type of Tonnage 
(1) Shipping Company 
Before 
3.6429 
3.4286 
2.9286 
3.1429 
3.0000 
2.7143 
3.0000 
3.1225 
Table (2)6.8 Type of Tonnage (Mean Likert Score) 
Before 
container ship 3.5926 
bulk ship 3.6207 
tanker 3.3462 
specialised ship 2.2963 
other ships 1.7000 
Overall mean 2.9112 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.8 Type of Tonnage (Mean Likert Score) 
container ship 
bulk ship 
tanker 
specialised ship 
other ships 
Overall mean 
(3) Government Sector 
Before 
3.6667 
3.2222 
3.2222 
2.6667 
2.6667 
3.0889 
Table (2)6.8 Type of Tonnage (Mean Likert Score) 
Before 
container ship 3.7692 
bulk ship 4.0000 
tanker 3.3077 
specialised ship 2.8462 
other ships 2.2500 
Overall mean 3.2346 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.8 Type of Tonnage (Mean Likert Score) 
2-l5 
After 
3.8571 
3.8571 
3.5714 
3.7857 
3.5714 
3.0000 
3.2143 
3.551 
After 
3.9259 
3.9310 
3.5769 
2.8148 
2.0000 
3.2497 
After 
4.1111 
3.4444 
3.5556 
2.7778 
3.0000 
3.3778 
After 
4.3077 
4.2308 
3.3077 
2.8462 
2.5000 
3.4385 
container ship 
bulk ship 
tanker 
specialised ship 
other ships 
Overall mean 
(2)6.3 Shipping Finance 
(2)6.3.1 Source of Finance 
(1) Shipping Company 
Before 
3.2857 
3.5714 
3.7143 
2.7857 
3.0000 
3.2714 
Table (2)6.9 Source of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
domestic capital 
foreign capital 
internal capital 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
3.0714 
3.8667 
2.0357 
2.9913 
Table (2)6.9 Source of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
domestic capital 
foreign capital 
internal capital 
Overall mean 
(3) Government Sector 
Before 
3.5000 
3.2000 
2.3000 
3 
Table (2)6.9 Source of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
domestic capital 
foreign capital 
internal capital 
Overall mean 
(4) Shipbuilding Sector 
Before 
3.2000 
2.8000 
2.8000 
2.9333 
Table (2)6.9 Source of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
domestic capital 
foreign capital 
internal capital 
Overall mean 
Before 
2.9231 
3.0000 
3.0000 
2.9667 
2-l6 
After 
4.0714 
3.7143 
3.9286 
3.2857 
3.2857 
3.6571 
After 
2.7143 
4.7000 
1.9286 
3.1143 
After 
3.5000 
4.0000 
2.3000 
3.2667 
After 
2.8000 
3.6000 
3.0000 
3.1333 
After 
3.2308 
3.8462 
2.9231 
3.3334 
(2)6.3.2 External Method of Finance 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.10 External Method of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
shipyard credit 
bank finance 
lease [mance 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before After 
2.4074 1.9259 
3.7586 4.0690 
2.9643 3.6429 
3.0434 3.2126 
Table (2)6.10 External Method of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
shipyard credit 3.4000 2.8000 
bank [mance 4.0000 3.8000 
lease finance 3.1111 3.3333 
Overall mean 3.5037 3.3111 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.10 External Method of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
shipyard credit 
bank fmance 
lease finance 
Overall mean 
(4) ShipbUilding Company 
Before 
3.0000 
3.2000 
3.6000 
3.2667 
After 
2.4000 
3.2000 
3.4000 
3 
Table (2)6.10 External Method of Finance (Mean Likert Score) 
shipyard credit 
bank fmance 
lease finance 
Overall mean 
(2)6.3.3 Financial Conditions 
Before After 
3.0769 3.0000 
3.5385 3.5385 
2.6923 3.4615 
3.1026 3.3333 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.11 Financial Conditions (Mean Likert Score) 
fmancial source 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
Before After 
3.4828 3.6897 
4.6207 4.7241 
4.1724 4.4483 
4.0345 4.3793 
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tax 
exchange rate 
inflation rate 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
3.4828 
3.3448 
3.1379 
3.7537 
3.6552 
3.8276 
3.2414 
3.9951 
Table (2)6.11 Financial Conditions (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
financial source 3.6000 3.8000 
interest rate 4.0000 4.3000 
loan rate 3.8000 3.7000 
repayment period 3.7000 3.7000 
tax 3.1000 3.4000 
exchange rate 3.2000 4.2000 
inflation rate 3.2000 3.6000 
Overall mean 3.5143 3.8143 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.11 Financial Conditions (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
financial source 4.0000 3.5000 
interest rate 4.0000 4.2000 
loan rate 4.0000 3.4000 
repayment period 4.0000 3.7500 
tax 3.2500 4.0000 
exchange rate 3.7500 4.2500 
inflation rate 3.5000 4.0000 
Overall mean 3.7857 3.8714 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.11 Financial Conditions (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
financial source 3.3571 3.9286 
interest rate 3.6429 4.1429 
loan rate 3.2143 3.7857 
repayment period 3.1429 3.8571 
tax 3.4286 4.1429 
exchange rate 3.1429 4.2857 
inflation rate 2.8571 3.4286 
Overall mean 3.2551 3.9388 
(2)6.3.4 Capital Structure 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.12 Capital Structure (Mean Likert Score) 
248 
capital structure 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
3.3214 
Table (2)6.12 Capital Structure (Mean Likert Score) 
capital structure 
(3) Government Sector 
Before 
3.5000 
Table (2)6.12 Capital Structure (Mean Likert Score) 
capital structure 
(4) Shipbuilding Sector 
Before 
2.0000 
Table (2)6.12 Capital Structure (Mean Likert Score) 
capital structure 
(2)6.3.5 Capital Cost 
(1) Shipping Sector 
Before 
3.0769 
Table (2)6.13 Capital Cost (Mean Likert Score) 
capital cost 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
3.2143 
Table (2)6.13 Capital Cost (Mean Likert Score) 
capital cost 
(3) Government Sector 
Before 
2.6667 
Table (2)6.13 Capital Cost (Mean Likert Score) 
capital cost 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Before 
2.5000 
Table (2)6.13 Capital Cost (Mean Likert Score) 
capital cost 
(2)6.3.6 Rate of Loan 
(1) Shipping Company 
Before 
3.0000 
2~9 
After 
3.4286 
After 
3.3333 
After 
3.6667 
After 
3.1538 
After 
3.0000 
After 
3.1667 
After 
3.0000 
After 
3.1538 
Table (2)6.14 Rate of Loan 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 100/0 
between 20-30% 
between 30-50% 
between 50-800/0 
more than 80% 
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10% 
between 20-30% 
between 30-50% 
between 50-800/0 
more than 80% 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 3.4 3.4 
3 2 6.9 10.3 
4 2 6.9 17.2 
5 6 20.7 37.9 
6 18 62.1 100.0 
Total 29 100.0 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 3.3 3.3 
3 2 6.7 10.0 
4 2 6.7 16.7 
5 3 10.0 26.7 
6 22 73.3 100.0 
Total 30 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.4631 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.14 Rate of Loan 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
between 20-30% 3 1 11.1 11.1 
between 30-50% 4 2 22.2 33.3 
between 50-800/0 5 3 33.3 66.7 
more than 80% 6 3 33.3 100.0 
------- -------
Total 9 100.0 
----- - ------- ----------------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
between 20-30% 
between 30-50% 
between 50-80% 
more than 80% 
Value Frequency 
3 2 
4 1 
5 4 
6 2 
Total 9 
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Cum 
Percent Percent 
22.2 22.2 
11.1 33.3 
44.4 77.8 
22.2 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.3613 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.14 Rate of Loan 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10% 
between 10-20% 
between 20-300/0 
more than 80% 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 20.0 20.0 
2 1 20.0 40.0 
3 1 20.0 60.0 
6 2 40.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
-- - ---- - --- - --- ------ ----- --- ------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10% 
between 20-30% 
between 30-50% 
between 50-80% 
Value Frequency Percent 
1 1 20.0 
3 1 20.0 
4 1 20.0 
5 2 40.0 
Total 5 100.0 
Cum 
Percent 
20.0 
40.0 
60.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 1.0000 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.14 Rate of Loan 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10% 
between 10-20% 
between 20-30% 
between 30-50% 
between 50-80% 
more than 80% 
Value Frequency 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 3 
6 1 
Total 14 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
7.1 7.1 
14.3 21.4 
21.4 42.9 
28.6 71.4 
21.4 92.9 
7.1 100.0 
100.0 
--- ---- --- ----- - ---- -- - - --- ---- ----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
between 10-20% 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 3 21.4 21.4 
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between 20-30% 3 2 14.3 35.7 
between 30-50% 4 1 7.1 42.9 
between 50-80% 5 6 42.9 85.7 
more than 800/0 6 2 14.3 100.0 
------- -------
Total 14 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0277 
(2)6.3.7 External Factors to Investment Decision-making 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.15 External Factor to Investment Decision-making (~Iean Likert Score) 
period ofROI 
decision-maker's attitude towards risk 
shipping cycle 
timing factors 
capital structure 
confidence in decision-making 
bank's attitude 
financial service level 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before After 
3.9333 4.3333 
3.8333 4.0000 
3.7333 3.9333 
4.0000 4.3667 
3.6000 4.0000 
3.2414 3.5172 
3.2333 3.2667 
3.2333 3.5000 
3.6010 3.8647 
Table (2)6.15 External Factor to Investment Decision-making (~'1ean Likert Score) 
period of ROI 
decision-maker's attitude towards risk 
shipping cycle 
timing factors 
capital structure 
confidence in decision-making 
bank's attitude 
financial service level 
Overall mean 
(3) Government Sector 
Before After 
3.7778 3.8889 
3.4444 4.1111 
3.3333 3.8889 
3.1111 3.8889 
2.8889 3.5556 
3.1111 3.3333 
3.2222 3.3333 
2.7778 3.4444 
3.2083 3.6806 
Table (2)6.15 External Factor to Investment Decision-making ('lean Likert Score) 
period of ROI 
decision-maker's attitude towards risk 
shipping cycle 
timing factors 
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Before After 
3.2500 3.7500 
3.2500 4.0000 
3.0000 3.5000 
3.0000 3.7500 
capital structure 3.2500 4.0000 
confidence in decision-making 3.0000 3.5000 
bank's attitude 3.5000 3.7500 
fmancial service level 3.2500 4.0000 
Overall mean 3.1875 3.7813 
(4) Shipbuilding Sector 
Table (2)6.15 External Factor to Investment Decision-making (~Iean Likert Score) 
Before After 
period ofROI 3.3571 4.0714 
decision-maker's attitude towards risk 
shipping cycle 
3.3571 4.1429 
3.5714 3.9286 
timing factors 3.8571 4.0000 
capital structure 3.2857 3.3571 
confidence in decision-making 
bank's attitude 
3.4286 
2.9286 
3.1429 
3.7143 
fmancial service level 3.0714 3.6429 
Overall mean 3.3571 3.7500 
(2)6.3.8 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.16 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 10.3 10.3 
2 14 48.3 58.6 
3 12 41.4 100.0 
Total 29 100.0 
- ---- ------------ ----- - ------ --- - - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 10.3 10.3 
2 8 27.6 37.9 
3 18 62.1 100.0 
------- -------
Total 29 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2446 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.16 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
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Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Value Frequency 
2 3 
3 8 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
27.3 27.3 
72.7 100.0 
------- -------
Total 11 100.0 
--------------------------------- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 4 36.4 36.4 
3 7 63.6 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.7353 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.16 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 1 25.0 25.0 
3 3 75.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
------ -------- - - - - --- - ---- - ---- ----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 25.0 25.0 
2 2 50.0 75.0 
3 1 25.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1088 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.16 Investor's Attitude towards Risk 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 14.3 14.3 
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risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
2 
3 
Total 
6 
6 
14 
42.9 57.1 
42.9 100.0 
100.0 
----- -------------------- -------- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
risk prone 
risk averse 
risk mixed (prone+averse) 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 7.1 7.1 
2 3 21.4 28.6 
3 10 71.4 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1386 
(2)6.3.9 Timing of Shipping Investment 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.17 Timing of Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
top of cycle 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
other 
Value Frequency 
1 9 
2 12 
3 8 
4 1 
Total 30 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
30.0 30.0 
40.0 70.0 
26.7 96.7 
3.3 100.0 
100.0 
------ - - - ----------------------- ---
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
top of cycle 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
other 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 6.7 6.7 
2 11 36.7 43.3 
3 15 50.0 93.3 
4 2 6.7 100.0 
----.-- -------
Total 30 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0060 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.17 Timing of Shipping Investment 
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Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
top of cycle 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
Value Frequency 
1 1 
2 4 
3 6 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
9.1 9.1 
36.4 45.5 
54.5 100.0 
------- -------
Total 11 100.0 
-- - - ---------- - -- --------- - - -------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 3 27.3 27.3 
3 8 72.7 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.2733 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.17 Timing of Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 1 25.0 25.0 
3 3 75.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
-----------------------------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 3 75.0 75.0 
3 1 25.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1797 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.17 Timing of Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
top of cycle 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 14.3 14.3 
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bottom of cycle 
turning point 
2 
3 
Total 
6 
6 
14 
42.9 57.1 
42.9 100.0 
100.0 
------------ - ---- ------------ ------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bottom of cycle 
turning point 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 6 42.9 42.9 
3 8 57.1 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2367 
(2)6.3.10 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.18 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation (Mean Likert Score) 
market share 
profitability (rates) 
load factor 
fixed cost 
floating cost 
choice on routes 
operational service level 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
3.3214 
4.3448 
3.6538 
3.6429 
3.4286 
3.5556 
3.5556 
3.6432 
After 
3.6786 
4.5172 
3.8077 
3.8929 
3.6071 
3.8889 
4.0370 
3.9185 
Table (2)6.18 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation (Mean Likert Score) 
market share 
profitability (rates) 
load factor 
fixed cost 
floating cost 
choice on routes 
operational service level 
Overall mean 
Before 
3.5556 
4.1111 
3.4286 
3.2222 
3.2222 
3.5556 
3.2222 
3.4739 
After 
3.7778 
4.3333 
3.2857 
3.2222 
3.6667 
3.6667 
3.6667 
3.6599 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.18 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation (~Iean Likert Score) 
Before After 
257 
market share 3.7500 3.7500 
profitability (rates) 3.7500 4.2500 
load factor 3.5000 3.5000 
fixed cost 3.2500 3.2500 
floating cost 3.2500 3.2500 
choice on routes 3.2500 3.7500 
operational service level 3.2500 3.7500 
Overall mean 3.4286 3.6429 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.18 Investment Factors Affected by Ship Operation (~lean Likert Score) 
Before After 
market share 3.1429 3.7143 
profitability (rates) 3.8462 4.6923 
load factor 3.2857 3.6429 
fixed cost 3.2143 3.4286 
floating cost 3.3571 3.7143 
choice on routes 3.7857 3.7143 
operational service level 3.4286 4.1429 
Overall mean 3.4372 3.8642 
(2)6.3.11 Financial Conditions in Acquiring a Ship 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.19 Planned Shipbuilding 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 7.1 7.1 
2 19 67.9 75.0 
3 5 17.9 92.9 
4 1 3.6 96.4 
5 1 3.6 100.0 
------- -------
Total 28 100.0 
-------- ---- - - - -- -. --- ------- -- ----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
loan rare 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 7.1 7.1 
2 20 71.4 78.6 
3 6 21.4 100.0 
------- .------
Total 28 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2850 
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Table (2)6.20 Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of [mance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 10.0 10.0 
2 19 63.3 73.3 
3 2 6.7 80.0 
4 3 10.0 90.0 
5 3 10.0 100.0 
------- -------
Total 30 100.0 
------- - - - -- --- - - -- - -- - - -- --- - - -- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Value Frequency 
1 4 
2 17 
3 4 
4 4 
5 1 
Total 30 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
13.3 13.3 
56.7 70.0 
13.3 83.3 
13.3 96.7 
3.3 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.5896 
Table (2)6.21 Secondhand Ship Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of [mance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Value Frequency 
1 5 
2 11 
3 4 
4 5 
5 4 
Total 29 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
17.2 17.2 
37.9 55.2 
13.8 69.0 
17.2 86.2 
13.8 100.0 
100.0 
-------- ----- - -------- - - --------- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of [mance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
Value Frequency 
1 5 
2 10 
3 6 
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Cum 
Percent Percent 
17.2 17.2 
34.5 5l.7 
20.7 72.4 
repayment period 
tax 
4 
5 
Total 
6 
2 
29 
20.7 93.1 
6.9 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 1.0000 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.19 Planned Shipbuilding 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
tax 
Value Frequency 
1 2 
2 5 
3 3 
5 1 
Total 11 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
18.2 18.2 
45.5 63.6 
27.3 90.9 
9.1 100.0 
100.0 
---- -------- - - - - ---- -- -------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
interest rate 
loan rare 
period of repayment 
tax 
Value Frequency 
2 5 
3 3 
4 1 
5 2 
Total 11 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
45.5 45.5 
27.3 72.7 
9.1 81.8 
18.2 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2012 
Table (2)6.20 Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 9.1 9.1 
2 5 45.5 54.5 
3 4 36.4 90.9 
4 1 9.1 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 
-----------------------------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
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source of [mance 1 1 10.0 10.0 
interest rate 2 5 50.0 60.0 
loan rate 3 2 20.0 80.0 
repayment period 4 2 20.0 100.0 
-------
-------
Total 10 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = l.0000 
Table (2)6.21 Secondhand Ship Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 9.1 9.1 
2 2 18.2 27.3 
3 6 54.5 81.8 
5 2 18.2 100.0 
------- -------
Total 11 100.0 
---- ------- - ----- - -------- - - -- - - - --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 10.0 10.0 
2 2 20.0 30.0 
3 4 40.0 70.0 
4 1 10.0 80.0 
5 2 20.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1797 
(3)Government Sector 
Table (2)6.19 Planned Shipbuilding 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of [mance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 50.0 50.0 
2 1 25.0 75.0 
3 1 25.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
------ --- --- -- ----- --- - -- ---- - - -
After Liberalisation 
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Cum 
Value Label Value Freq uency Percent Percent 
interest rate 2 4 100.0 100.0 
------- -------
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.5930 
Table (2)6.20 Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of [mance 
interest rate 
repayment period 
Value Frequency 
1 1 
2 1 
4 2 
Total 4 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
25.0 25.0 
25.0 50.0 
50.0 100.0 
100.0 
-------- - ---- --------- ----- ------ - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
interest rate 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 4 100.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2850 
Table (2)6.21 Secondhand Ship Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
Value Frequency 
1 2 
2 1 
3 1 
Total 4 
Percent 
50.0 
25.0 
25.0 
100.0 
-------- - ------------ - - -- ---- - - - - - -
After Liberalisation 
Cum 
Percent 
50.0 
75.0 
100.0 
Value Label 
interest rate 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 4 100.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.5930 
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(4)Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.19 Planned Shipbuilding 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of ffiance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 5 35.7 35.7 
2 7 50.0 85.7 
3 2 14.3 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
--- -- ------------------------ ------
After Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Freq uency Percent Percent 
source of finance 1 1 7.1 7.1 
interest rate 2 9 64.3 71.4 
loan rare 3 3 21.4 92.9 
tax 5 1 7.1 100.0 
------- ----.-. 
Total 14 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0630 
Table (2)6.20 Bareboat Charter on Hire Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
repayment period 
Value Frequency 
1 4 
2 9 
4 1 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
28.6 28.6 
64.3 92.9 
7.1 100.0 
------- -------
Total 14 100.0 
--------- --- --------- ------------- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
roan rate 
repayment period 
Value Frequency 
1 1 
2 10 
3 2 
4 1 
Total 14 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
7.1 7.1 
71.4 78.6 
14.3 92.9 
7.1 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0431 
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Table (2)6.21 Secondhand Ship Purchase 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of fmance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 7 53.8 53.8 
2 1 7.7 6l.5 
3 1 7.7 69.2 
4 2 15.4 84.6 
5 2 15.4 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
- ------- - --- -- ----- -- - -- ----- - -----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
source of finance 
interest rate 
loan rate 
repayment period 
tax 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 30.8 30.8 
2 4 30.8 6l.5 
3 1 7.7 69.2 
4 2 15.4 84.6 
5 2 15.4 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.6121 
(2)6.3.12 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.22 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
planned shipbuilding 
bbc/hp 
second-hand ship 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 13.3 13.3 
2 21 70.0 83.3 
3 5 16.7 100.0 
Total 30 100.0 
---------------- ----- --- - -- ------ - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
planned shipbuilding 
bbc/hp 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 3.4 3.4 
2 22 75.9 79.3 
26.t 
second-hand ship 3 6 20.7 100.0 
-------
Total 29 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3078 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.22 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
planned shipbuilding 
bbclhp 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 44.4 44.4 
2 5 55.6 100.0 
Total 9 100.0 
- -- ------------ -- - - - - -- ---- ---- - ---
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bbc/hp 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 9 100.0 100.0 
Total 9 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0679 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.22 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
planned shipbuilding 
bbc/hp 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 25.0 25.0 
2 3 75.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
- --------- ---- --- - ----- - - - ---------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bbc/hp 
second-hand ship 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 3 75.0 75.0 
3 1 25.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1797 
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(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.22 Method of Ship Acquisition in Korea 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
planned shipbuilding 
bbclhp 
second-hand ship 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 8 61.5 61.5 
2 4 30.8 92.3 
3 1 7.7 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
--- --- - ------ -- ---- --- - - ----- ---- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
bbclhp 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 12 92.3 92.3 
4 1 7.7 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0330 
(2)6.4 Return on Shipping Investment 
(2)6.4.1 Return on Shipping Investment 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.23 Return on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 14.3 14.3 
2 18 64.3 78.6 
3 6 21.4 100.0 
------- -------
Total 28 100.0 
-------- --- - --- --------- ----- ---- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
between 20 and 25 years 
Value Frequency 
1 8 
2 15 
3 5 
4 1 
Total 29 
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Cum 
Percent Percent 
27.6 27.6 
51.7 79.3 
17.2 96.6 
3.4 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.4446 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.23 Return on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
between 20 and 25 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 27.3 27.3 
2 3 27.3 54.5 
3 3 27.3 81.8 
4 2 18.2 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 
. ------ - ---- --- - - ---- - -- - - - --------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 18.2 18.2 
2 5 45.5 63.6 
3 4 36.4 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.5002 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.23 Return on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
between 20 and 25 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 3 60.0 60.0 
3 1 20.0 80.0 
4 1 20.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
----- - -------- - - - --- -- --- - --- - -- -- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
between 10 and 15years 
between 20 and 25 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
2 4 80.0 80.0 
4 1 20.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
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Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3173 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.23 Return on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 21.4 21.4 
2 7 50.0 71.4 
3 4 28.6 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
-- - -- - -------- - - --- - - --- --- ------- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 10 years 
between 10 and 15years 
between 15 and 20 years 
Value Frequency 
1 6 
2 7 
3 1 
Total 14 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
42.9 42.9 
50.0 92.9 
7.1 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1415 
(2)6.4.2 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.24 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
payback method 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 11 55.0 55.0 
2 6 30.0 85.0 
3 3 15.0 100.0 
------- -------
Total 20 100.0 
-- - ----------- -- -- -----------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
payback method 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 12 57.1 57.1 
2 7 33.3 90.5 
3 2 9.5 100.0 
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Total 21 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3613 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.24 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
Value 
1 
2 
Total 
Cum 
Frequency Percent Percent 
3 75.0 75.0 
1 25.0 100.0 
4 100.0 
---- - -- - - -- - - ----------- - ----------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 60.0 60.0 
2 2 40.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 1.0000 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.24 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 50.0 50.0 
2 1 50.0 100.0 
Total 2 100.0 
---- -------- --------- --------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 50.0 50.0 
2 1 50.0 100.0 
Total 2 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 1.0000 
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(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.24 Evaluation Method on Shipping Investment 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
payback method 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 5 50.0 50.0 
2 3 30.0 80.0 
3 2 20.0 100.0 
------- ---.---
Total 10 100.0 
-- --- ------- --- - - - ------------- -- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
net present value 
internal rate of return 
payback method 
sensitivity analysis 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 10.0 10.0 
2 5 50.0 60.0 
3 3 30.0 90.0 
4 1 10.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1056 
(2)6.5 Choice of Shipyard 
(2)6.5.1 Choice of Country 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.25 Country's Shipyard 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Japan 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 24 88.9 88.9 
3 3 11. 1 100.0 
------- -------
Total 27 100.0 
------- --- -------------- - - ----- -- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Japan 
others 
Cum 
Value Freq uency Percent Percent 
1 14 56.0 56.0 
3 10 40.0 96.0 
5 1 4.0 100.0 
Total 25 100.0 
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Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0218 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.25 Country's Shipyard 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Japan 
Value Frequency 
1 9 
3 2 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
81.8 81.8 
18.2 100.0 
------- -------
Total 11 100.0 
----------- - - ------ ---- - ---- - ------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 11 100.0 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.1797 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.25 Country's Shipyard 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 100.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
--- ------- - -- -------- - -- -- --- --- - --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 100.0 100.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 1.0000 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.25 Country's Shipyard 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
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Korea 1 11 84.6 84.6 
Japan 3 1 7.7 92.3 
Europe 4 1 7.7 100.0 
----.--
-------
Total 13 100.0 
-------- - --- --- - ----- - -------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Korea 
America 
Japan 
Value Frequency 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
1 10 76.9 76.9 
2 1 7.7 84.6 
3 2 15.4 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.8927 
(2)6.5.2 Shipyard Selection 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.26 Shipyard Selection (Mean Likert Score) 
construction capability 
labour force 
technology 
ship-linked indusoy 
price competitiveness 
non-price competitiveness 
exchange rate in market 
int'l competitiveness 
Overall mean 
(2) Banking Sector 
Before 
3.8000 
2.9200 
4.2308 
2.8000 
4.3462 
3.2400 
3.0000 
3.3200 
3.4571 
Table (2)6.26 Shipyard Selection (Mean Likert Score) 
construction capability 
labour force 
technology 
ship-linked indusuy 
price competitiveness 
non-price competitiveness 
exchange rate in market 
int'l competitiveness 
Overall mean 
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Before 
3.8333 
3.4167 
4.0000 
3.4167 
4.0000 
3.3333 
3.6667 
3.6667 
3.6667 
After 
3.9200 
3.0400 
4.3077 
2.9600 
4.7308 
3.4000 
3.4800 
3.6000 
3.6798 
After 
4.0000 
3.3333 
4.1667 
3.5000 
4.4167 
3.9167 
4.1667 
4.0833 
3.9479 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.26 Shipyard Selection (Mean Likert Score) 
construction capability 
labour force 
technology 
ship-linked indusuy 
price competitiveness 
non-price competitiveness 
exchange rate in market 
int'l competitiveness 
Overall mean 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Before 
3.6000 
3.5000 
3.7500 
3.5000 
4.2500 
3.2500 
3.5000 
3.2500 
3.575 
After 
3.4000 
3.7500 
4.0000 
3.7500 
4.5000 
3.7500 
4.2500 
4.0000 
3.925 
Table (2)6.26 Shipyard Selection (Mean Likert Score) 
Before After 
construction capability 3.3077 3.3846 
labour force 3.5385 3.5385 
technology 4.0769 4.3846 
ship-linked indusuy 3.1538 3.4615 
price competitiveness 4.3846 4.3077 
non-price competitiveness 3.1538 3.5385 
exchange rate in market 3.1538 4.1538 
int'l competitiveness 3.6154 4.3077 
Overall mean 3.5481 3.8846 
(2)6.5.3 Ship Registry Country 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.27 Ship Registry Country 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Korea 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 21 75.0 75.0 
2 3 10.7 85.7 
4 4 14.3 100.0 
Total 28 100.0 
-- - -- -- - -- -- --- - - - - - ------ ----- --- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Korea 
others 
Value Frequency 
1 22 
2 3 
4 1 
5 2 
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Cum 
Percent Percent 
78.6 78.6 
10.7 89.3 
3.6 92.9 
7.1 100.0 
-------
Total 28 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 1.0000 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.27 Ship Registry Country 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Greece 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 44.4 44.4 
2 4 44.4 88.9 
3 1 1l.1 100.0 
Total 9 100.0 
------------------- --- - ------ -- - - --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Greece 
Value Frequency 
1 3 
2 6 
3 1 
Total 10 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
30.0 30.0 
60.0 90.0 
10.0 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3173 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.27 Ship Registry Country 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Korea 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 80.0 80.0 
4 1 20.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
-------------- ---- - - - --- --- -- - ---- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Korea 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 60.0 60.0 
4 2 40.0 100.0 
-------
Total 5 100.0 
27-l 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.5930 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.27 Ship Registry Country 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Greece 
Value 
1 
2 
3 
Total 
Cum 
Frequency Percent Percent 
11 84.6 84.6 
1 7.7 92.3 
1 7.7 100.0 
------- -----.-
13 100.0 
---------- - - ------------ - - - -- -- - ---
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Panama 
Liberia 
Korea 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 8 61.5 6l.5 
2 4 30.8 92.3 
4 1 7.7 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.3452 
{2)6.6 Depreciation in Ships 
{2)6.6.1 Depreciation in Ship 
(I) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.28 Depreciation in Ship 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 10.3 10.3 
2 24 82.8 93.1 
3 2 6.9 100.0 
Total 29 100.0 
-------- ---- --- ---- - - - - - -- - - --- ----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 10 33.3 33.3 
2 18 60.0 93.3 
3 2 6.7 100.0 
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-------
Total 30 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) :::: 0.1097 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.28 Depreciation in Ship 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 8.3 8.3 
2 7 58.3 66.7 
3 4 33.3 100.0 
Total 12 100.0 
------- -- - -------------- ------ -----
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 16.7 16.7 
2 5 4l.7 58.3 
3 5 4l. 7 100.0 
Total 12 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 1.0000 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.28 Depreciation in Ship 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 40.0 40.0 
2 1 20.0 60.0 
3 2 40.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
-------- ----------- ---- ------ - ---- -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 2 40.0 40.0 
2 2 40.0 80.0 
3 1 20.0 100.0 
------- -------
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Total 5 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3173 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.28 Depreciation in Ship 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 6 42.9 42.9 
2 7 50.0 92.9 
3 1 7.1 100.0 
------- -------
Total 14 100.0 
------ - --------------- -- -- - --- - -- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
less than 15 years 
between 15 and 20 years 
more than 20 years 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 9 64.3 64.3 
2 4 28.6 92.9 
3 1 7.1 100.0 
Total 14 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3454 
(2)6.7 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
(2)6.7.1 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.29 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Before Liberalisation 
Cum 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent 
expansion of service 1 13 48.1 48.1 
upgrade of service frequency 2 3 11.1 59.3 
cost saving 5 11 40.7 100.0 
Total 27 100.0 
----------- - - -- - - ---- ------- - ---- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
expansion of service 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 10 35.7 35.7 
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upgrade of service frequency 2 
costsavtng 5 
5 
13 
17.9 53.6 
46.4 100.0 
-------
-------
Total 28 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.5076 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.29 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
expansion of service 
cost savIng 
Value Frequency 
1 4 
5 6 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
40.0 40.0 
60.0 100.0 
------- -------
Total 10 100.0 
------- - -- ---- ------ - -------- - - -- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
expansion of service 
cost saving 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 30.0 30.0 
5 7 70.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.3173 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.29 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
expansion of service 
cost saving 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 4 80.0 80.0 
5 1 20.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
----------- - - - --- ---- ---- - --- ------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
expansion of service 
reduction of transit time 
cost saving 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 20.0 20.0 
3 1 20.0 40.0 
5 3 60.0 100.0 
Total 5 100.0 
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Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) == 0.1088 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.29 Strategic Alliance in Shipping 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
expansion of service 
reduction of transit time 
providing the inland service 
cost saVlng 
1 9 64.3 64.3 
3 1 7.1 7l.4 
4 1 7.1 78.6 
5 3 2l.4 100.0 
------- -------
Total 14 100.0 
---- ------ --- ---- -- ------- - - --- -- - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label Value Frequency 
expansion of service 1 1 
upgrade of service frequency 2 1 
reduction of transit time 3 3 
cost saving 5 9 
Total 14 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
7.1 7.1 
7.1 14.3 
21.4 35.7 
64.3 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.0145 
(2)6.7.2 Preference to Partnership 
(1) Shipping Company 
Table (2)6.30 Preference to Partnership 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
European shipping co. 
Taiwanese shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Value Frequency 
1 1 
2 9 
3 3 
5 8 
Total 21 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
4.8 4.8 
42.9 47.6 
14.3 61.9 
38.1 100.0 
100.0 
-----------------------------------
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
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American shipping co. 1 3 13.6 13.6 European shipping co. 2 10 45.5 59.1 
Taiwanese shipping co. 3 2 9.1 68.2 
HongKong shipping co. 4 2 9.1 77.3 
Japanese shipping co. 5 5 22.7 100.0 
-------
-------
Total 22 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.2411 
(2) Banking Sector 
Table (2)6.30 Preference to Partnership 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
European shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 12.5 12.5 
2 5 62.5 75.0 
5 2 25.0 100.0 
------- -------
Total 8 100.0 
----- - ----- -------- ------ ------- - - -
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
European shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 1 12.5 12.5 
2 5 62.5 75.0 
5 2 25.0 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.6547 
(3) Government Sector 
Table (2)6.30 Preference to Partnership 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Cum 
Value Frequency Percent Percent 
1 3 60.0 60.0 
5 2 40.0 100.0 
8 
Total 13 100.0 
-------- ------- - --- -- -- ---------- --
After Liberalisation 
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Value Label 
American shipping co. 
HongKong shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Value Frequency 
1 3 
4 1 
5 1 
8 
Total 13 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
60.0 60.0 
20.0 80.0 
20.0 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.6547 
(4) Shipbuilding Company 
Table (2)6.30 Preference to Partnership 
Before Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
European shipping co. 
HongKong shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Value Frequency 
1 5 
2 5 
4 1 
5 1 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
41.7 41.7 
41.7 83.3 
8.3 91.7 
8.3 100.0 
------- -------
Total 12 100.0 
--- - - --- ------ ---------- ----- ---- --
After Liberalisation 
Value Label 
American shipping co. 
European shipping co. 
Taiwanese shipping co. 
Japanese shipping co. 
Value Frequency 
1 4 
2 6 
3 1 
5 1 
Total 12 
Cum 
Percent Percent 
33.3 33.3 
50.0 83.3 
8.3 91.7 
8.3 100.0 
100.0 
Significance Probability of Ranks (SPSS) = 0.7532 
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Appendix 3 : Source: Reference [1] 
ANNEX ON NEGOTIATIONS ON MARITIME TRANSPORT 
SERVICES 
1. Article II and the Annex on Article II Exemptions, including the requirement to 
list in the Annex any measure inconsistent with most-favoured-nation treatment that 
a Member will maintain, shall enter into force for international shipping, auxiliary 
services and access to and use of port facilities only on: 
(a) the implementation date to be determined under paragraph 4 of 
the Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Maritime Transport 
Services; or, 
(b) should the negotiations not succeed, the date of the [mal report 
of the Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services 
provided for in that Decision. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to any specific commitment on maritime transport 
services which is inscribed in a Member's Schedule. 
3. From the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1, and before the 
implementation date, a Member may improve, modify or withdraw all or part of its 
specific commitments in this sector without offering compensation, notwithstanding 
the provisions of Article XXI. 
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Appendix 4 : Source: Reference [2] 
DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS ON MARITIME TRANSPORT 
SERVICES 
Ministers, 
Noti.ng that commitm~nts scheduled by partIcIpants on manhme transport 
serYlces at the conclusIon of the Uruguay Round shall enter into force on an 
MFN basis at the same time as the Agreement Establishing the W orId Trade 
Organization (hereinafter referred to as the "WTO Agreement"), 
Decide as follows: 
l. Negotiations shall be entered into on a voluntary basis in the sector of maritime 
transport services within the framework of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services. The negotiations shall be comprehensive in scope, 
aiming at commitments in international shipping, auxiliruy services and 
access to and use of port facilities, leading to the elimination of restrictions within a 
fixed time scale. 
2. A Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services (hereinafter 
referred to as the "NGMTS") is established to carry out this mandate. The 
NGMTS shall report periodically on the progress of these negotiations. 
3. The negotiations in the NGMTS shall be open to all governments and the 
European Communities which announce their intention to participate. To date, the 
following have announced their intention to take part in the negotiations: 
Argentina, Canada, European Communities and their member States, Finland, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
United States. 
Further notifications of intention to participate shall be addressed to the depositary 
of the WTO Agreement. 
4. The NGMTS shall hold its first negotiatIng session no later than 16 
May 1994. It shall conclude these negotiations and make a [mal report no 
later than June 1996. The fmal report of the NGMTS shall include a date for 
the implementation of results of these negotiations. 
5. Until the conclusion of the negotiations Article II and para~aphs ,I 
and 2 of the Annex on Article II Exemptions are suspended ill ~eIr 
application to this sector, and it is not necessary to list MFN exe~ptlOns, 
At the conclusion of the negotiations, Members shall be free to I~pro\'e, 
modify or withdraw any commitments made in this sector d~g the 
U .. . 'th tanding the prOVISIons of ruguay Round WIthout offenng compensation, notwi s 
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Article XXI of the Agreement. At the same time Members shall fmalize their 
positions relating to M~ exemptions .in this sector, notwithstanding the pro\1sions 
of the Annex on Article II Exemptions. Should negotiations not succeed, the 
Council for Trade in Services shall decide whether to continue the negotiations in 
accordance with this mandate. 
6. Any commitments resulting from the negotIatIons, including the date of 
their entry into force, shall be inscribed in the Schedules annexed to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services and be subject to all the provisions 
of the Agreement. 
7. Commencing immediately and continuing until the implementation date to 
be determined under paragraph 4, it is understood that participants shall 
not apply any measure affecting trade in maritime transport services except 
in response to measures applied by other countries and with a view to 
maintaining or improving the freedom of provision of maritime transport 
seIVlces, nor in such a manner as would improve their negotiating position 
and leverage. 
8. The implementation of paragraph 7 shall be subject to surveillance in 
the NGMTS. Any participant may bring to the attention of the NGMTS any 
action or omission which it believes to be relevant to the fulfilment of 
paragraph 7. Such notifications shall be deemed to have been submitted to 
the NGMTS upon their receipt by the Secretariat. 
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Appendix 5 : Source: Reference [3] 
PART IV 
PROGRESSIVE LIBERALIZATION 
Article XIX 
Negotiation of Specific Commitments 
1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Agreement, Members shall enter into 
successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date 
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view 
to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization. Such negotiations shall 
be directed to the reduction or elimination of the adverse effects on trade in services 
of measures as a means of providing effective market access. This process shall take 
place with a view to promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually 
advantageous basis and to securing an overall balance of rights and obligations. 
2. The process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for national 
policy objectives and the level of development of individual Members, both overall 
and in individual sectors. There shall be appropriate flexibility for individual 
developing country Members for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of 
transactions, progressively extending market access in line with their development 
situation and, when making access to their markets available to foreign service 
suppliers, attaching to such access conditions aimed at achieving the objectives 
referred to in Article IV. 
3. For each round, negotiating guidelines and procedures shall be established. For 
the purposes of establishing such guidelines, the Council for Trade in Services shall 
carry out an assessment of trade in services in overall tenns and on a sectoral 
basis with reference to the objectives of this Agreement, including those set out in 
paragraph 1 of Article IV. Negotiating guidelines shall establish modalities for the 
treatment of liberalization undertaken autonomously by Members since previous 
negotiations, as well as for the special treatment for least-developed country 
Members under the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article IV. 
4. The process of progressive liberalization shall be advanced in each such round 
through bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral negotiations directed towards 
increasing the general level of specific commitments undertaken by Members under 
this Agreement. 
Article XX 
Schedules of Specific Commitments 
1. Each Member shall set out in a schedule the specific commitments it 
undertakes under Part III of this Agreement. With respect to sectors where such 
commitments are undertaken, each Schedule shall specify: 
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(a) terms, limitations and conditions on market access· , 
(b) conditions and qualifications on national treatment· , 
(c) undertakings relating to additional commitments· , 
(d) where appropriate the time-frame for implementation of such 
commitments; and 
( e) the date of enny into force of such commitments. 
2. Measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be inscribed in 
the column relating to Article XVI. In this case the inscription will be considered to 
provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII as well. 
3. Schedules of specific commitments shall be annexed to this Agreement and 
shall form an integral part thereof. 
Article XXI 
Modification of Schedules 
1. (a) A Member (referred to in this Article as the "modifying Member") may 
modify or withdraw any commitment in its Schedule, at any time after three years 
have elapsed from the date on which that commitment entered into force, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
(b) A modifying Member shall notify its intent to modify or withdraw a 
commitment pursuant to this Article to the Council for Trade in Services no later 
than three months before the intended date of implementation of the modification or 
withdrawal. 
2. (a) At the request of any Member the benefits of which under this Agreement 
may be affected (referred to in this Article as an "affected Member") by a proposed 
modification or withdrawal notified under subparagraph 1 (b ), the modifying 
Member shall enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on any 
necessary compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations and agreement, the 
Members concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of mutually 
advantageous commitments not less favourable to trade than that provided for in 
Schedules of specific commitments prior to such negotiations. 
(b) Compensatory adjustments shall be made on a most-favoured-nation basis. 
3. ( a) If agreement is not reached between the modifying Member and any 
affected Member before the end of the period provided for negotiations, such 
affected Member may refer the matter to arbitration. Any affected Member that 
wishes to enforce a right that it may have to compensation must participate in the 
arbitration. 
(b) If no affected Member has requested arbitration, the modifying Member 
shall be free to implement the proposed modification or withdrawal. 
4. (a) The modifying Member may not modify or withdraw its commitment until 
it has made compensatory adjustments in conformity with the findings of the 
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arbitration. 
(b) If the modifying Member implements its proposed modification or 
withdrawal and does not comply with the fmdings of the arbitration, any affected 
Member that participated in the arbitration may modify or withdraw substantially 
equivalent benefits in conformity with those fmdings. Notwithstanding Article II, 
such a modification or withdrawal may be implemented solely with respect to the 
modifying Member. 
5. The Council for Trade in Services shall establish procedures for rectification or 
modification of Schedules. Any Member which has modified or withdrawn 
scheduled commitments under this Article shall modify its Schedule according to 
such procedures. 
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Appendix 6 : Source: Reference [4] 
The Agreements: 
Services - rules for growth and investment 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the flrst ever set of 
multilateral, legally-enforceable rules covering international trade in services. It was 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Like the agreements on goods, GATS operates on 
three levels: the main text containing general principles and obligations; annexes 
dealing with rules for specific sectors; and individual countries' specific 
commitments to provide access to their markets. Unlike in goods, GATS has a 
fourth special element: lists showing where countries are temporarily not applying 
the "most-favoured-nation" principle of non-discrimination. These commitments -
like tariff schedules under GATT - are an integral part of the agreement. So are the 
temporary withdrawals of most-favoured-nation treatment. 
A WTO Council for Trade in Services oversees the operation of the agreement. 
Negotiations on commitments in four topics have taken place after the Uruguay 
Round. A full new services round will start no later than 2000. 
The framework: the GATS articles 
-Basic principles 
-All services are covered by GATS 
-Most-favoured-nation treatment applies to all 
services, except the one-off temporary exemptions 
-National treatment applies in the areas where 
commitments are made 
-Transparency in regulations, inquiry points 
-Regulations have to be objective and reasonable 
International payments: normally unrestricted 
Individual countries' commitments: negotiated and 
bound 
Progressive liberalization: through further negotiations 
GATS's 29 articles cover all services sectors. They contain the general obligations 
that all members have to apply. (See also Principles of the trading system.): 
Maritime transport 
Maritime transport negotiations were originally scheduled to end in June .1996, but 
participants failed to agree on a package of commitments. The talks ':111 resume 
with the new services round due to start no later than 2000. Some corrumtments are 
already included in some countries' schedules covering the three main areas in this 
sector: access to and use of port facilities; auxiliary services; and ocean transport. 
288 
After the Uruguay Round 
GATS talks that resumed after the round. A full new services round will start in 
2000 at the latest. 
- Basic telecommunications completed February 1997 
- Financial services to end late 1997 
- Maritime transport suspended 
- Movement of natural persons completed July 1995 
- Other issues for future negotiation: subsidies, government procurement, 
safeguards, qualifications, technical standards, licensing 
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Appendix 7 : : Source: Reference [5] 
OEeD : Transport 
Maritime Transport 
Activities in the field of maritime transport are directed towards eliminating 
measures that distort competition or hamper the freedom to provide maritime and 
maritime-related services. The Maritime Transport Committee is also promoting 
compatibility of shipping policies - notably in the area of competition policies 
applied to international maritime trades - and initiatives concerning maritime safety 
and the protection of the marine environment. 
Shipbuilding 
In the area of shipbuilding, the OECD seeks to encourage transparency, exchange of 
infonnation, monitoring, peer review and moral persuasion. The Council Working 
Party on Shipbuilding provides a forum for the exchange of infonnation among 
governments on world shipbuilding policies and conditions, and is the only 
international body charged with influencing and guiding government policies in 
shipbuilding. 
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Appendix 8 : : Source: Reference [6] 
Maritime Transport Committee 
Objectives 
The Maritime Transport Committee seeks to eliminate obstacles to the free 
circulation of maritime transport services by promoting compatible competition 
policies for maritime transport and liberalisation of maritime and maritime-related 
services. At a political level, it also aids the International Maritime Organisation 
in its effort to eliminate sub-standard shipping. More generally it promotes 
initiatives that encourage maritime safety and the protection of the marine 
environment. 
All Member countries take part in the work of the committee, Russia participates 
as an observer, and the participation of non-Member countries in the Committee's 
work is actively encouraged. 
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Appendix 9 : : Source: Reference [7] 
Maritime Transport! Activities 
The OEeD offers the only international forum for considering maritime transport 
issues from both the policy and economic angles. It encourages dialogue, 
consultation and hannonisation of OEeD Member countries' maritime policies. It 
has defmed principles that govern the way in which the industry operates and 
ensures their enforcement. The principles are based on free access of fleets to 
international traffic, free and fair competition on shipping markets, lack of 
discrimination, and priority for multilateral dispute settlement. These principles 
are contained in the OECD Council Recommendation of 13 Februruy 1987. 
Although it cannot be mandatorily enforced, this document represents a policy 
commitment for the countries that have adhered to it. As the 29 OECD Member 
countries account for over two-thirds of world-wide imports and exports, these 
principles may be considered as universally applicable. The Committee seeks to 
secure their observance by non-member maritime nations. 
In accordance with its approved Programme of Work for the period 1997-98, the 
Maritime Transport Committee (MTC) has undertaken work in the following areas: 
- Compatibility of shipping policies 
- Promotion of rules concerning maritime safety and the protection of the marine 
environment 
- Consideration of support measures provided by Member countries for shipping 
_ Dialogue with non-Member countries, including a Workshop on Shipping Policies 
with China 
- Review of MTC Common Shipping Principles 
- Trade in Services 
Summary of main issues discussed at last MTC meeting on 23-24 April 1998 
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Appendix 10 : : Source: Reference [8] 
Compatibility of Shipping Policies 
The OECD seeks to ensure compatibility of shipping policies, given that diverging 
policies and legislation are considered detrimental to maritime transport operators. 
This is particularly true for competition policy where rules may vary considerably 
from one part of the world to another, and this may impede the liberalisation and the 
adjustment of commercial policies in the maritime sector. The Maritime Transport 
Committee is trying to encourage pragmatic solutions in this area, and has just 
released its report. 
MTC Conclusions on Work on Promotion of Compatibility of Competition Policy 
Applied to International Liner Shipping Including Multimodal Transport with a 
Maritime Leg. 
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Appendix 11 : : Source: Reference [9] 
Activities: 
Meeting of the Maritime Transport Committee, Paris, 23-24 April 1998 
The principal issues considered by the Maritime Transport Committee (MTC) were: 
a Draft Understanding on Principles concerning Shipping Policy for discussion 
between representatives of OECD countries and Dynamic Non-member Economies 
(DNMEs); shipping relations among Member countries; possible actions to combat 
substandard shipping by involving players other than shipowners in the shipping 
market, and the Committee 1999-2000 Programme of Work. The Committee also 
elected its officers for 1998. 
Relations with Non-member Economies 
After considerable discussion, the Committee agreed to a draft Understanding on 
Principles to be Adhered to in International Maritime Transport for discussion with 
DNMEs at a meeting to be held in conjunction with the next MTC meeting in 
December 1998. Within the OECD, the DNME group comprises: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand. 
The draft principles concern shipping policy; encouragement of commercial 
initiatives and co-operation; promotion of maritime safety and protection of the 
marine environment; and consultations to improve competitive access to 
international seaborne trade. 
The Committee also endorsed a proposal for the next stage of the dialogue on 
maritime issues with China. It is envisaged that such a step will go beyond the 
traditional exchange of information and will be used by both the OECD Members 
and China as an opportunity to raise and address any problems which may exist in 
their maritime relations. 
Relations among Member countries 
The Committee, although recognising that a number of the 1987 Common 
Principles of Shipping Policy for Member countries no longer fully responded to 
present circumstances, decided that it was not appropriate to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the Principles, principally because of the concern 
expressed by some delegations that reopening the contents of the Princ.iples may 
result in a significantly less liberal overall package than the one presently m force. 
However, the Committee did endorse the proposal to add additional Principles to 
cover recent maritime developments such as multimodal transport and safety and 
environmental issues. The Committee agreed to complete discussions on these 
additional proposals by about mid-1999. 
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Safety and the environment 
The Committee agreed to the public release of a discussion paper; Possible Action 
to Combat Substandard Shipping by Involving Players Other that the Shipowner in 
the Shipping Market; This paper, which will be made available over the Internet, 
will be backed up by a series of discussions with industry players (e.g. financial 
institutions, marine underwriters, protection and indemnity clubs, classification 
societies, cargo generators, ship brokers) for action and will culminate in a 
roundtable later in 1998 between governments and industry players. It is expected 
that such a roundtable will develop proposals for actions contributing to the 
elimination of substandard shipping. 
Programme of Work 1999-2000 
The Committee endorsed a Programme of Work for the period 1999-2000. In 
approving this Programme, the Committee noted the resource constraints which the 
Organisation was facing, and requested that a thorough appraisal of progress on the 
Programme be undertaken at the end of the first year. The highest work priorities 
were given to: dialogue with non-Members; support measures; competition policy 
issues; shipping policy developments and non-compliance with environmental 
regulations. 
Officers for 1998 
The Committee elected: Mr. Ryoichi Sonoda (Director, Maritime Transport 
Bureau, Japan) as its Chairman for 1998. Mr. Ok-In Baek (Assistant Minister, 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Korea) Mr. Leif Nygaard (Director-
General, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Norway) and Mr.Christoph Hinz 
(Director-General for Shipping, Federal Ministry of Transport, Germany) were 
elected Vice-Chairmen. 
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Appendix 12 : : Source: Reference [10] 
Shipbuilding 
Objectives 
In the area of shipbuilding, the OECD seeks to encourage transparency, exchange of 
infonnation, monitoring, peer review and moral persuasion. 
It provides a forum for the exchange of infonnation among governments on world 
shipbuilding policies and conditions. As the only international body charged with 
influencing and guiding government policies for shipbuilding, one of its objectives 
is to contain and progressively eliminate government assistance, which has been a 
characteristic feature of shipbuilding in many countries and has distorted 
competitive conditions in the industry. 
Countries participating in this work are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (since 1990), the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States (since 1989) and 
the Commission of the European Communities. 
Observers are: Canada, Poland (since 1992), Portugal, the Russian Federation (since 
1996) and Turkey. 
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Appendix 13 : : Source: Reference [11] 
Shipbuilding 
Activities 
To contain the subsidiation provided by OECD countries to their shipbuilding 
industries~ the OECD has in the past negotiated three agreements which 
subsequently became "Resolutions" of the Council of the DECD. They concern 
export credits for ships, special subsidies to shipbuilding, and government policy 
regarding the restructuring of the shipbuilidng industry. Since 1989, the OECD 
Council Working Party has been the forum for negotiating the international 
"Agreement Respecting Normal Competitive Conditions in the Commercial 
Shipbuilding and Repair Industry". 
At present, priority is given to expanding the policy dialogue in this area to 
emerging shipbuilding nations in the new independent states of the former Soviet 
Union, central and eastern Europe~ and China. A workshop with these emerging 
markets covering shipbuilding policies was held in Paris on 8-9 December 1997. 
In its technical and statistical work, the DECO is assisted by shipbuilders' 
associations in Member countries. Work covers a wide range of factors that shape 
the evolution of the shipbuilding industry in DECD countries and in the world; 
particular emphasis has recently been put on forecasts of longer-tenn demand and 
supply of ships. 
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Appendix 14 : Source: Reference [12] 
Other Statistical Methods 
(i) The Kolmogorov-Smimov test 
An alternative goodness-of-fit test is the Kolmogorov-Smimov one-sample test, 
named after A.Kolmogorov and N.V.Smimov, two Russian mathematicians who 
provided the theoretical foundations for this test. This test compares the observed 
cumulative frequency distribution for the sample to that expected for the population 
specified by the null hypothesis. The test statistic obtained is the maximum 
deviation between the observed and the expected distributions. 
(ii) Wald-Wolfowitz run test 
In statistical inference it is usually assumed that the collected data constitute a 
random sample. Such an assumption, however, may be test by the employment of a 
nonparametric procedure called the Wald-W olfowitz one-sample run test for 
randomness. The null hypothesis of randomness may be tested by observing the 
order of sequence in which the items are obtained. If each item is assigned one of 
two symbols, such as S and F (for success and failure), depending either on whether 
the item possessed a particular property or on the amount or magnitude in which the 
property is possessed, the randomness of the sequence may be investigated. 
If sequence is randomly generated, the item will be independent and identically 
distributed. The means that the value of an item will be independent both of its 
position in the sequence and of the value of the items that precede it and follow it. 
On the other hand, if an item in the sequence is affected by the items that precede it 
or succeed it so that probability of its occurrence varies from one position to another, 
the process is not considered random. In such cases either similar items would tend 
to cluster together (such as when a trend in the data is present) or the similar items 
would altematingly mix so that some systematic periodic effect would exist. 
(iii) Regression 
Regression analysis tell us how one variable is related to another by providing an 
equation that allows us to use the known value of one or more variables to estimate 
the unknown value of the remaining variable. F or instance, an economist may use 
regression analysis to show how one variable, such as percentage unemployment, 
can be used to predict the percentage inflation rate. The resulting mathematical 
relationship provides a graphical display called the Phillips curve. Mor~ the one 
variable can be used to estimate an unknown variable. When several vanables are 
used to make a prediction, the teclmique is called multiple regression. 
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(iv) Speannan's rank-correlation and Pearson (product-moment) correlation 
Among the various statistical methods based on ranks, the Spearman's rank-
correlation procedure was the earliest to be developed. For more than three-quarters 
of a century this procedure has continued to be widely used for studying the 
association between two variables - primarily because of its simplicity and its 
power. That is the Spearman rank-correlation procedure is simple to use and 
easy to apply. Moreover, it has proven to be almost as powerful as its classical 
counterpart - the Pearson (product-moment)correlation method - under conditions 
favourable to the latter and even more powerful than the parametric method when 
its assumptions are violated. 
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